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 The long-term historical legacy and place in national memory of Brazil’s Pedro I 
has not been sufficiently analyzed in the historiography centered on the nation’s first 
emperor and the ways in which successive political regimes approached remembering the 
past. Yet, Pedro I provides a fascinating case study in memory because of his 
complicated relationship to Brazil. The Portuguese prince who declared Brazilian 
independence but was forced into exile, Pedro I became the subject of Brazil’s first 
public monument. Located in Rio de Janeiro, the equestrian statue of Pedro I serves as a 
touchstone for how the ruling political elites of different eras viewed the nation’s 
founding historical figure, its past, and the legitimacy of their own societies and regimes. 
The methodology of this study serves to explain how the Brazilian people, 
represented in the writings of their intellectual elite, remembered their first emperor on 
the occasion of his statue’s inauguration in 1862 and after an incident involving the 
covering of his statue in 1893. Because the former took place during the imperial era of 
Brazilian history and the latter during that of the Republic, the examination of those 
moments will shed light onto the ways in which the concepts of history, memory, 
politics, and sovereignty intersected in the public square in Rio de Janeiro.  
This dissertation argues that the historical standing of Pedro I was constructed, 
deconstructed, and reconstructed in the public sphere throughout the first century of 
Brazil’s national history, and that contested legacy was being continually impacted by the 
dueling forces of acclaim and repudiation as well as political change and tradition. The 
thesis is argued through an analysis of public perceptions of the Emperor and his statue 
amidst moments of larger reflection on the nature of Brazil’s national origins and 
iii 
 
identity. The discourse surrounding the moment of the statue’s inauguration in 1862 
establishes the imperial definitions—and critical refutations—of Pedro I as the founder of 
both the nation and its constitution while similarly establishing competing narratives 
regarding his abdication, exile, and portugalidade (Portuguese-ness). The discourse 
surrounding the statue’s controversial covering in the incipient years of the Republic 
shows not only contested views of the nation’s past and traditions but also the profound 
tensions between the disparate groups who constituted the new republican elite. 
Ultimately the statue of Pedro I kept its place in the public square in Rio de 
Janeiro despite calls for its removal. The statue’s perseverance amidst contestation 
mirrors the ways in which Pedro I’s place in national memory would be both challenged 
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Chapter One:                                               
Introduction 
Today in Rio de Janeiro, a statue of an emperor stands in the middle of a public 
square named after a republican martyr. Passers-by do not pay much mind to the 
cognitive and historical dissonance of the square. When I would stop and ask them what 
they thought of the statue, many assumed that it was a monument depicting that praça’s 
namesake, Tiradentes. After stopping and truly looking at the statue, though, those same 
Cariocas, or inhabitants of Rio, shook their heads immediately and readily conceded that 
they were mistaken. The iconography simply did not fit. Almost to a person, they pulled 
their right hands across their necks and upwards to make the sign of a noose. Tiradentes 
had been hung and then dismembered. The figure on the statue before them sat 
triumphantly atop a noble steed with his right hand extended to offer them a charter (see 
Figure 1). This man was a leader, not the martyr. Some Cariocas instantly recalled his 
 
Figure 1: Equestrian Statue of Pedro I in Rio de Janeiro. Photograph by the author. 
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name. Some offered the name of his son. One offered the name of the subject of another 
equestrian statue located in a different part of the city. Thus, despite the impressiveness 
of the statue, this leader had been rendered to some extent anonymous by the 
denomination of his statue’s location.  
Pedro I of Brazil is a perfect subject for a study of long-term national memory and 
historical legacy precisely because of the complicated nature of his own personal identity 
and place in history. He was a Portuguese prince who joined the Brazilian independence 
movement and participated in the iconic declaration of his adopted homeland’s political 
separation from Portugal, the land of his birth. His family’s move to Brazil when he was 
a child is the only example in history of a European sovereign transferring a royal court 
to a colony, not to mention an American colony. Although he self-identified as Brazilian, 
his Portuguese roots drove a wedge between himself and his Brazilian subjects, and his 
perceived foreignness eventually became a factor in his being forced from power after 
less than a decade on the throne. He was liberal yet autocratic, approachable but cruel. He 
was the nation’s first leader crowned and then deposed for being a tyrant who 
constitutionally abdicated power to his Brazilian-born son without a fight. His story ends 
with a transformation from an exile from Brazil into a Portuguese military hero who 
secured the throne of his daughter and preserved constitutional liberty in Portugal.  
Pedro I was all of these things, and his political actions in two separate nations 
and worlds have created a fascinating legacy of both acclaim and disdain. That legacy is 
complicated even further in Brazil by the fact that the nation’s changing political 
circumstances have impacted how its people view their past and their first emperor. His is 
an historical standing that has been constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed by 
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different political and intellectual elites and different political regimes. Yet his role in 
proclaiming Brazil’s independence makes him a fundamental figure in the nation’s 
origins and thereby its collective identity. The study of Pedro I’s legacy is important, 
therefore, because it is the study of how Brazilians perceive the origins of their patria. 
The fundamental goal of this study is to explain how the Brazilian people, represented in 
the writings of their intellectual elite, remembered their first emperor on the occasion of 
his statue’s inauguration in 1862 and after an incident involving the covering of his statue 
in 1893. Because the former took place during the imperial era of Brazilian history and 
the latter during that of the Republic, the examination of those moments will shed light 
onto the ways in which the concepts of history, memory, politics, and sovereignty 
intersect in the middle of Praça Tiradentes.   
 
 
My Study in Relation to the Historiography 
 
 No one has yet written a comprehensive study of Pedro I’s legacy in Brazil across 
time and political regimes. His story is a popular subject for biography and serves as a 
vital component to any study of Brazilian independence. His role in the founding myth of 
the nation earns him a place in discussions of identity formation. As the nation’s first 
public monument, his statue in Rio de Janeiro inspires inclusion into any study of 
memory, posterity, and the public representation of the power of the state. Despite this 
popularity and new emphasis on the intellectual aspects of the construction of a nation’s 
identity and political legitimacy, there is no focused and detailed study of how Pedro I is 




 The complexity and richness of Pedro I’s life as discussed above is precisely why 
his life and times are popular topics for a wide range of historians representing different 
eras in the historiography of the field. The most recent scholarship on Pedro I has been in 
the form of biography, but those publications have generated a very specific debate over 
the question of how Pedro I should be defined by today’s historians. Thus, their 
connection to this study is tangential but nevertheless informative. In her 2006 work 
entitled D. Pedro I: Um Heroí sem nenhum caráter (A Hero with no character), Isabel 
Lustoso presents the traditional biographical points of Pedro’s life but recasts her subject 
as an anti-hero and a man without morals. She uses the same stories and the same sources 
as other historians but uses them to advance her revisionist labeling of Pedro. Her book 
made a momentary splash because of its provocative title, but it offered little beyond that. 
It did trigger a response by Francisco Alambert who wrote an alternate biography with a 
much different label: D. Pedro I: O Imperador Cordial.  His book is a short response of 
only sixty pages, but it specifically seeks to address the theme of memory and historical 
interpretation precisely because of his taking issue with Lustoso’s work. He uses his 
chapter on memory in order to refute what he considers the overly-simplistic approach of 
Lustoso towards a complicated and contradictory figure. Throughout his biography, he 
engages on that issue of character privileged by Lustoso, so O Imperador Cordial ends 
up being more about the personal descriptive traits Pedro I could be labeled by rather 
than any actual primary source discussion or synthesis on how Brazilians have actually 
defined Pedro I. His main concern is how today’s historians should characterize the first 
emperor, so his work remains outside of the purview of this study.1  
                                                 
1 Isabel Lustoso, D. Pedro I: Um Heroí sem nenhum caráter (São Paulo: Companhia Das Letras, 2006); 
Francisco Alambert, D. Pedro I: O Imperador Cordial (São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado do São 
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The biographical studies that serve as the cornerstones of any analysis of Pedro 
I’s life are those of Octavio Tarquinio de Sousa and Neill Macaulay. Tarquinio’s three-
volume study is the definitive and comprehensive Brazilian treatment of Pedro I while 
Macaulay’s is the go-to biography in English. Both are impeccably sourced, 
conceptualized and written and contribute greatly to the historiography as well as provide 
secondary source context to this study.2 There are various other published general 
biographies of Pedro I as well as curiosity biographies such as Sérgio Corrêa da Costa’s 
As Quatro Coroas de D. Pedro I which presents Pedro I’s life with international relations, 
geopolitics, and his royal sovereignty at the center of the analysis. The work was 
originally intended to mark a commemorative date in Portugal but was included in the 
cultural production of the Sesquicentennial celebration of Brazil’s independence in 1972. 
Various books on Pedro I and his mistress, the Marquesa de Santos, round out the 
biographical treatments available on the emperor.3 
Historians have also looked extensively into the contours of Brazilian 
independence, a topic in which Pedro I figures prominently. Discussions of his role in 
independence range from those penned by stalwarts in Brazilian historiography such as 
the foundational study by Varnhagen and the five-volume work of José Honório 
Rodrigues to children’s books on Pedro I and his declaration of Brazilian independence.4 
                                                                                                                                                 
Paulo: Secretaria de Estado da Educação, 2006). 
2 Octavio Tarquinio de Sousa, A Vida de D. Pedro I (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio, 1952); Neill 
Macaulay, Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1986). 
3 Most notably the sourced work of Pedro Calmon, O Rei Cavaleiro (São Paulo: Edição Saraiva, 1950). 
Other biographies include Laura Areias, D. Pedro: Imperador do Brasil e Rei de Portugal (Recife: Bagaço, 
2003) which includes no citations and only a limited bibliography and Herculano Gomes Mathias, D. Pedro 
I (Editora Tecnoprint, 1982), a typical little biography of 90 pages with no citations. Sérgio Corrêa da 
Costa, As Quatro Coroas de D. Pedro I (Rio de Janeiro: A Casa do Livro, 1972). 
4 José Honório Rodrigues, Independência: revolução e contra-revolução (Rio de Janeiro: F. Alves, 1975); 
Mariângela Bueno and Sonia Dreyfuss, Pedro, O Independente (São Paulo: Callis, 1999); Marcelo Duarte, 
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Since my study is not a retelling or analysis of Brazil’s achievement of independence in 
the early 1800s, these works connect to my topic (although not to this particular study) 
through what they reveal about each historian’s approach to the telling of the founding 
narrative of the nation.   
 On the topic of the formation of Brazilian nationality and identity, there is one 
main publication that is greatly informative to this study. The work of Noé Freire Sandes, 
A invenção da nação: entre a monarquia e a república, provides great insight into the 
theory and context involved in memory construction, and it is the closest thing to a sister 
study for this doctoral thesis since it delves into the theoretical constructs of nationalism 
through the lens of understandings of September 7 and Ipiranga as Brazil’s founding 
myth. Sandes provides a sophisticated analysis of the systematic approach that the 
imperial elite took in their deliberate efforts to construct a common history and origins 
for the nation and its people. He does this by taking a detailed look at the specific 
construction of the September 7 founding myth in order to comment on the evolution of 
national memory as it related to Brazil’s Independence Day. His study begins by tracing 
the construction of the civic understanding of Independence Day from the very first 
accounts of the moment of the Grito in 1822 to the iconic Pedro America painting of the 
Grito myth that in 1888 became the definitive image and interpretation of Pedro I and 
independence. Having explained the construction of that founding narrative, Sandes then 
focuses the rest of his book on a thorough and nuanced discussion of how intellectuals 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ouviram do Ipiranga: a história do Hino Nacional Brasileiro (São Paulo: Editora Panda, 1999); Francisco 
Adolfo de Varnhagen, História da Independência do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1917); 
Oliveira Lima, O Movimento da Independência, 1821-1822 (Rio de Janeiro, Topbooks, 1997 (1922 first 
edition); Brasil Gerson, A Revolução Brasileira de Pedro I (uma história essencialmente política da 
Independência) (São Paulo: Industria Gráfica Saraiva, S. A., 1971); and Iara Lis C. Souza, A Independência 
do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Jorge Zahar, Ed., 2000). 
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involved in the centennial celebration of independence  in 1922 engaged with that 
narrative and civic understanding. While I will similarly use the commemorations of 
Independence Day in Rio de Janeiro as a means through which I can guage public 
perceptions of the nation’s past, the sources I look at, especially in the chapters focused 
on the 1890s, are relatively normal, seemingly insignificant years rather than the 
officially orchestrated production of commemorating the centennial. These sources allow 
me to explore the everyday conceptions of September 7 and glean insight into the 
discussions and contestations taking place over day-to-day things in the public sphere of 
the new Republic. My study also diverges significantly from this wonderful work of 
Sandes by moving away from the approach that makes his study heavily sourced and 
focused on the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro and other contributors to the 
official centennial project. My sources and research topic allow for an analysis more 
about the ways writers engaged with the larger topic of identity and memory in the daily 
public sphere rather than behind the scenes of the professional institutions of the day. 
Moving forward, Sandes’s work will continue to inform my research and analysis as I 
look to expand my study of Pedro’s legacy into the twentieth century. His study of the 
1922 centennial celebration will be an invaluable resource in understanding Pedro’s 
legacy in that commemoration as well as the sesquicentennial one of 1972.5 
 This thesis has also benefited from and will seek to add to the contribution of 
several seminal studies on the symbolic representation of state power. In various topical 
treatments, historians have provided historical discussions of Pedro I and his legacy. One 
key work is that of Iara Lis Carvalho Souza in her exploration of the concept of the 
                                                 
5 Noé Freire Sandes, A invenção da nação: entre a monarquia e a república (Goiâna: Ed. Da UFG: 
Agência Goiana de Cultura Pedro Ludovico Teixeira, 2000). 
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Brazilian “body politic,” the public square, and national memory in Pátria Coroada. Her 
topic is the public elaboration of royal sovereignty and power in all its forms and facets.  
Her work is impeccably researched, and in her efforts she thoroughly details the 
construction of the public’s understanding of royal power by looking through the lens of 
the public square and the plans and efforts that went into paying tribute to Pedro I. While 
her study is centered on the period of the First Reign, Pedro I’s rule from 1822 to 1831, 
her focus on the public memorialization of Pedro I subsequently includes a very detailed 
analysis of the conceptualization, inauguration, and reaction to the state of Pedro I 
inaugurated in 1862. As part of her larger discussion of Pedro’s construction of symbolic 
authority, the statue’s inauguration serves as the culmination of the visible representation 
of Pedro I and royal sovereignty.6  
Souza’s work in analyzing the 1862 inauguration of the statue is one of several 
different treatments on that subject. Because of this, there already exists a very detailed 
understanding of how the statue was conceived and created. There is a very clear picture 
of the logistical and symbolic nuts and bolts that went into its symbolic representation of 
Pedro I. This aspect of analysis in terms of the statue needs no further elaboration. My 
study does not seek to contribute to this historiography. I also do not delve into the 
complex political and social landscape of the Rio de Janeiro of 1862. That also is a topic 
well-researched and articulated by previous scholars. For example, Maria Eurydice de 
Barros Ribeiro in her chapter entitled “Memória em Bronze: Estátua Equestre de D. 
Pedro I” provides a detailed description of the statue’s creation much like Souza’s, but 
she approaches it with the different objective of looking at the topic of monuments and 
                                                 
6 Iara Lis Carvalho Souza. Pátria Coroada: O Brasil como Corpo Político Autônomo, 1780-1831 (São 
Paulo: Fundação Editora da UNESP, 1999). 
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patrimony in Rio de Janeiro. The work of Gisele Cunha dos Santos and Fernanda 
Fonseca Monteiro as well as James N. Green both provide informative articles exploring 
the imperial landscape and political reception of the statue’s inauguration. By being able 
to reference their work, I was able to give context to what was, after all, the intent of my 
study’s chapter on 1862 Brazil: the ways in which writers specifically defined the 
historical legacy of Pedro I. In addition to Ribeiro’s contribution to the topic of 
monuments and patrimony, there are also other publications that provide specific 
information on the public squares and statues of Rio de Janeiro. These works are mostly 
sponsored by municipal institutions in order to provide the public with the history and 
facts behind the landscape of the city. I owe all of these writers and organizations a debt 
of gratitude for the research and synthesis they have provided for the context of my 
chapter.7 
Iara Lis Carvalho Souza’s exploration of the construction of power and 
sovereignty is the imperial equivalent of what José Murilo de Carvalho does for the study 
of the early Republic, and both of these works have had considerable influence on this 
study. 8 Maria Eurydice de Barros Ribeiro also relies on José Murilo for her discussions 
of the shared space between Pedro I and Tiradentes. In his seminal study of the symbolic 
and intellectual construction of the republican state, José Murilo devotes a chapter to the 
                                                 
7 Maria Eurydice de Barros Ribeiro, “Memória em Bronze: Estátua Equestre de D. Pedro I” in Cidade 
vaidosa: imagens urbanas do Rio de Janeiro, ed. Paulo Knoss, (Rio de Janeiro: Sette Letras, 1999); Gisele 
Cunha dos Santos and Fernanda Fonseca Monteiro, “Celebrando a fundação do Brasil: A inauguração da 
Estátua Equestre de D. Pedro I,” in Revista Electrônica de História do Brasil, 4, no. 1 (January_June 
2000); James N. Green, “The Emperor and His Pedestal: Pedro I and Disputed Views of the Brazilian 
Nation, 1860-1900” in Brazil in the Making: Facets of National Identity, eds. Carmen Nava and Ludwig 
Lauerhass, Jr., (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006); Roberta Oliveira, Praça 
Tiradentes (Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, Prefeitura, 2000); Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, O 
Rio de Janeiro e Suas Praças (Rio de Janeiro: RIOTUR—Empresa de Turismo do Município do Rio de 
Janeiro S. A., 1988); Sergio A.  Fridman, Posteridade em pedra e bronze:história dos monumentos e 
estátuas da cidade do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Publicação Independente, 1996).  
8 José Murilo de Carvalho, A Formação das Almas: O Imaginário da República no Brasil, 17th ed. (São 
Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2007). 
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complex contours of the Republic’s process of hero-making in the figure of Tiradentes as 
well as the contestation for national hero status playing out specifically in Praça 
Tiradentes where the dueling national narratives of the martyr and the first emperor 
would intersect. The bandstand incident, which I detail in a chapter of its own in my 
study, is covered in just a paragraph by José Murilo, but it is used as a moment to reflect 
on the more specific debate over the selection of Tiradentes as Brazil’s national hero. 
José Murilo’s conceptualization of the intellectual construction of republican legitimacy 
and sovereignty is the seminal work done on the topic and the era, and it serves as the 
building blocks of my three chapters on the 1890s. What this doctoral thesis does is flesh 
out those sources that José Murilo consulted for that chapter reference and re-
contextualize them in order to focus on the impact of that intellectual process on views of 
Pedro I. His focus is more on the importance of the new republican elites’ object of 
affection—Tiradentes—than their target of derision—Pedro I. It focuses more on what 
they attempted to do in the creation of the republican narrative whereas my work is more 
interested in the republican elite’s engagement with the preexisting imperial narrative. 
Where there is change and attempted agency with the deliberate actions in the larger 
national project of the Republic, Pedro’s statue is one ultimately of inertia. Yet its 
visibility made it a part of this important discussion, and I hope to add to the already 
sophisticated understanding of the time and the place articulated by José Murilo. 
 
 
Description of Methodology and Sources 
1862 Discussion of the Imperial Era 
My overall approach in this chapter and topical discussion is to scrutinize very 
closely the rhetoric surrounding one specific moment in the memorialization of Pedro I: 
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the inauguration of his equestrian statue in 1862. Secondary works do provide a broader 
context to that moment, but all of the primary source documents analyzed are strictly 
related to that act of inauguration. In the secondary works discussed previously as 
analyzing public rhetoric of the inauguration, most historians typically draw from the 
three most visible writers at the time, most notably Luiz Vicente De-Simoni, Manoel de 
Araujo Porto-Alegre, and Alfrede de Tuanay for their comments articulating the elements 
of the Imperial State’s project to construct an historical narrative based on a collective 
notion of the Empire’s origins and founder. The writings of those men are key examples 
of the discourse of the day, but as a small sample they cannot substitute for the analysis 
of all of the inaugural odes published for the inauguration of the statue. Only in looking 
at all thirty-eight celebratory inaugural publications can a true sense of the dominant 
themes and definitions of Pedro I’s historical identity and legacy emerge. For this 
chapter, I analyzed each of the thirty-eight odes and cite thirty-two. Twenty-seven 
different writers are represented in those odes cited, with four separate submissions being 
the work of De-Simoni (who submitted seven in total). The list of those writers represents 
a Who’s Who of the Empire’s intellectual and cultural elite. It includes founders and 
members of the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro as well as the Academia 
Brasileira de Letras who by the end of many of their careers had been awarded every 
imperial distinction of honor that existed. Several of those analyzed at some point also 
held the position of private tutor to the royal family. They were every bit the Empire’s 
elite and part of that literary effort to richly and artistically define the nation’s origins. A 
careful analysis of those extensive inaugural primary source documents, many of which 
have not been referenced in previous studies, was undertaken to identify the specific 
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ways in which those writers remembered and defined the achievements and legacy of 
Pedro I. There existed an emerging consensus on the facets of Pedro’s historical identity, 
and those definitions of him in 1862 are used to establish a starting point from which to 
contextualize and explore how Brazil’s change in political landscapes would affect elite 
perceptions of the nation’s first emperor. 
In contrast to that large sample of discourse celebrating the statue’s inauguration, 
I rely primarily on the one publication that was most prominent as a public criticism and 
repudiation of the statue and the imperial narrative. That source is the pamphlet written 
by Teófilo Otoni, an active and vocal political opponent of the monarchy. The pamphlet 
is an incredibly rich text and serves as the definitive counter-narrative to that advanced by 
the imperial elite. For every single one of the ways in which Pedro I was positively 
identified by the other source group, Otoni meticulously disputed that characterization. 
He instead articulated a republican-themed narrative that would reemerge in increasingly 
visibility with the end of the Empire. While Otoni’s work is the go-to source for any and 
all who write about the reception of the statue’s inauguration, my synthesis of its point-
by-point refutation of the celebratory definitions provides new insight into the 
relationship between the two historical narratives. 
1890s Discussion of the Early Republic 
 The change made in Brazil’s political system accompanies a requisite change in 
methodology and type of primary source documentation as well. In Chapter Three, which 
is the first of three chapters exploring the republican elites’ approach to the nation’s 
memory and history, secondary sources will still be used to accurately describe the 
background of the changed political landscape after the proclamation of the Republic in 
1889. But after that effort, I then turn to a small sampling of Rio de Janeiro newspapers 
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and how their writers discussed the statue’s existence in the public square in the context 
of the Republic’s early commemorations of Tiradentes Day and Independence Day. 
After that, I turn specific attention to the main focus of the chapter: an analysis of the 
public discourse surrounding the bandstand incident in which a republican civic club 
triggered a public outcry when it covered the statue of Pedro I with a bandstand. I analyze 
the news accounts, editorials, and publicized letters from the public throughout a wide 
range of Rio de Janeiro newspapers in order to reconstruct the details of the incident and 
the response in the public sphere to it. Those eleven newspapers are the Diário de 
Notícias, the Gazeta da Tarde, the Gazeta de Notícias, the Jornal do Commercio, the 
Jornal do Brasil, Novidades, O Apostolo, O Brazil, O Paiz, O Tempo, and the Revista 
Illustrada. These sources provide a wide range of perspectives on the incident and the 
larger issues of history, memory, and tradition after regime change and between the years 
of 1890 and 1895. The discourses contained in them provide a sophisticated and nuanced 
insight into how and why the covering of the statue was criticized as well as how 
defenders of the covering and the group behind it justified their actions and responded to 
that criticism. Lastly, this public debate that took place as a result of the incident and that 
played out in the newspapers provides first-hand commentary on the ways in which the 
early republican elite perceived that Republican State as well as how the members of 
different elite factions perceived each other. 
 Chapter Four similarly employs aspects of the discussions found in the 
newspapers listed above, but it also adds a broader range of Rio newspaper sources and 
reaches as far back as 1889 and forward into 1894 to provide insight into the changing 
nature of how Rio de Janeiro observed royal commemorative dates and viewed the 
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monarchy and its monarchs. In order to trace that changing rhetoric and views of the past, 
this chapter uses the lens of the commemorative date write-ups in the newspapers for the 
historical dates of September 7, the day Pedro I declared independence; April 7, the day 
of Pedro I’s abdication of the throne; April 21, the day Tiradentes was martyred; and May 
13, the day that slavery was abolished. The additional newspapers analyzed in this 
chapter are A Notícia, the Correio da Tarde, O Fluminense, and The Rio News. A special 
commemorative publication that marked the final celebration of September 7 during the 
Empire called the Estatua Equestre de D. Pedro I publicizes the texts of speeches given 
during the day’s celebration, and it provides invaluable insight into the civic topics and 
themes preoccupying the city’s elite just months before the Empire’s fall. All of these 
periodicals shed light on how Pedro I and those important national dates associated with 
the imperial past were constantly being redefined. No comprehensive primary source 
captures this process more than a book written privately but adopted by the Republican 
State for the civic education of its children. In Festas Nacionaes, Rodrigo Octavio fully 
articulates and advances a series of new historical narratives for the nation’s civic 
holidays, and they represent the historical interpretations of the radical faction of the 
republican elite and pointedly attack the person and legacy of Pedro I.9 
 Chapter Five returns our focus to the specific subject of Pedro I by tracing the 
four proposals to remove the statue of Pedro I from Praça Tiradentes as well as the public 
reaction to them. The approach to this part of the study shifts from using a large number 
of commentators and sources as were used in the two previous chapters to very detailed 
analyses of the highly-developed and articulate arguments for and against the proposals 
found in what was a narrow number of commentators. I analyze the 1890 proposal of 
                                                 
9 Rodrigo Octavio, Festas Nacionaes (Rio: F. Briguiet & C., 1893). 
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Miguel Lemos whose text was published in the newspaper O Brazil and then commented 
on in that same paper as well as its coverage in the newspaper O Cruzeiro.  
The discourse provided by the writers for those two papers reveal a wide range of reasons 
the authors opposed the moving of the statue, and they stand out for their insight into 
comparative history and the specific lessons of the French Republic and other modern 
nations. Since the second proposal to remove the statue was merely a reprint of Lemos’s 
previous 1890 proposal, there was no discernible intellectual response despite the fact 
that it occurred just after the bandstand incident in 1893. The Gazeta de Notícias printed 
a letter that included the text of the old proposal, but that is a far as this discussion went. 
While there was no new proposal to move the statue in between these proposals in the 
year of 1892, the erection that year of a statue memorializing Deodoro da Fonseca did 
prompt another writer, this time for the Diário de Notícias, to wax philosophical and 
historical on the significance of regime change on memorials to the past thus adding one 
more commentary on the subject of the statue’s possible removal. The petition made to 
the National Congress in 1894 by Lúcio de Mendonça was the third of its kind and 
published in various newspaper accounts of the legislative action of the day, but it was 
the petitioner’s prior journalistic relationship with the newspaper O Paiz that made it the 
focal point for supporters writing letters in support for the proposal along with a modest 
editorial response on the part of the paper. O Paiz was also the best source through which 
to track the progress of the petition through the bureaucratic process before it died a quiet 
legislative death that was commented on in the Correio da Tarde. While these articles 
evidence a very limited response to Mendonça’s petition despite the ways that the Naval 
Revolt (which is contextualized with background information in its own section) was 
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changing elite perspectives, there was one highly critical response to the proposal in the 
form of a published pamphlet written by André P. L. Werneck and titled D. Pedro I e a 
Independencia (A proposito da demolição da estatua da Praça Tiradentes).10 Meant to 
inform the intellectual and legislative deliberation of the petition, Werneck’s pamphlet is 
valuable as an example of a very public and unapologetic re-articulation of the imperial 
narrative of Pedro I and independence that was uncommon in the climate of the day. I 
then leave behind Werneck’s work but turn my attention back to the Naval Revolt and its 
impact on how writers for the Gazeta de Notícias, Don Quixote, and the Diário de 
Notícias conceptualized new meanings for and perspectives on September 7 and 
Brazilian history in general. Much like the bandstand incident, the revolt stimulated new 
discussions of how to view the nation’s past. The chapter concludes with various 
references to the possible removal of the statue, including a debate between the  Gazeta 
de Notícias and O Paiz over some of the physical transformations of the city and a 
passing reference in the newspaper Cidade do Rio of an upcoming proposal to be made 
by Senator Antonio José Caiado to remove and replace the statue. That work is most 
likely satirical in nature, so it provides a unique glimpse into the ways in which the 




 My first content chapter, Chapter Two, will establish a baseline of understanding 
of the identity and historical legacy of Pedro I as defined during the Empire. It explores 
the discourse—both celebratory and critical—surrounding the inauguration of his 
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equestrian statue in 1862. Those opposing viewpoints are explored as examples of 
dueling narratives of the nation’s origins and the first emperor’s historical identity. In 
terms of the celebratory narrative, I identify and discuss the five components of that 
identity that appear consistently throughout the sources and that hinge on popular notions 
of the roles that the First Emperor played: 1) the icon of independence and the founder of 
the Empire of Brazil; 2) the giver of law; 3) the soldier; 4) the hero of two worlds; and 5) 
the magnanimous father who bequeathed the throne to his son. Within the discussion of 
each of these components, I end by also including the point-by-point refutation against 
those celebratory elements of Pedro I’s identity made in the discourse critical of the 
statue. Thus, I trace the contours of the counter narrative also present in 1862. In it, Pedro 
I was the following: 1) the antagonist and usurper of the independence movement; 2) the 
autocrat who illegally violated democratic principles; 3) the valid military defender of 
Portuguese constitutionalism; 4) the hero only of Portugal, not Brazil; and 5) the tyrant 
valiantly driven out by patriots. This analysis of how Brazilian intellectuals remembered 
Pedro I in 1862 lays the foundation for the discussions in the subsequent chapters on the 
impact that the fall of the Empire and the proclamation of the Republic had on public 
perceptions of his legacy, his statue, and the general importance of the public 
representation of the nation’s history. The overall discussion will demonstrate the ways in 
which history and memory become part of the contestation between elites over claims to 
legitimacy and power in the deliberate construction of the nation-state.  
 Chapter Three expands the previous chapter’s discussion of how imperial 
commentators defined Pedro I and his statue to include the larger debate amongst the new 
republican elite over their views not just of the first emperor and his statue but also 
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Brazilian history, tradition, and each other. Underlying the entire chapter is the profound 
impact that the proclamation of the Republic had on the nation’s political and intellectual 
landscape. I explain the characteristics of that regime change, paying particular attention 
to how the new republican elites conceptualized political legitimacy and the transfer of 
sovereignty from the Empire to the Republic. With that context provided, I then provide a 
comprehensive account of the incident involving the covering of the statue by a 
bandstand that was part of the civic commemoration of Tiradentes Day. The public 
debate that was triggered by this seemingly minor event provides a fascinating glimpse 
into how the process of national identity formation responds to political change in the 
context of highly contentious relationships between elite factions. To address these 
topics, this chapter explores the different reasons that the covering of the statue was 
criticized. Those reasons involved the role of “the people” in judging the treatment of the 
statue to be an insult to Brazil’s past, the role of art as a marker of a people’s culture and 
degree of civilization, and the importance of history in the affirmation of a nation’s 
greatness and self-awareness. Noticeably absent is any full-throated endorsement of 
Pedro I as a reason in and of itself to criticize the bandstand. The aftermath of the 
incident also provides insight into the human toll of regime change. I explore how the 
fear and anxiety that accompanied the new elites’ attempts to establish the Republic’s 
political legitimacy determined how they perceived their newly formed state and each 
other. I will show the depth of their fears of both restoration and internal republican 
betrayal. Ultimately, the rhetoric surrounding the bandstand incident will reveal a 
growing elite sense of disunity and antagonism to the point that criticism of the statue’s 
covering becomes a litmus test for “true” republicanism. 
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 While Chapter Three did involve specific discussions centered on how the 
republican elite viewed Pedro I’s statue in the context of its covering, it did not 
specifically address their views on his legacy. Chapter Four will turn our focus back to 
that very topic and look at the ways in which Pedro I and his legacy were being 
redefined. The articulation of those views of the Empire’s first ruler was part of a larger 
reimagining of the imperial past to serve the Republic’s new historical narrative. The first 
part of this chapter discusses the various perspectives advanced in the newspapers of the 
city over how the imperial past—including its monarchy and monarchs—should be 
viewed. The practical matter of constructing a republican-themed civic calendar 
precipitated changes to commemorative traditions and the understanding of royal 
historical moments, and these changes sparked commentary in the local papers. That 
discourse reveals an awareness of and uneasiness with the supplanting of the national 
holiday of September 7, Independence Day, with the celebration of the founding of the 
Republic on November 15 instead. Part of this changing commemorative landscape also 
involved the cooptation of Abolition Day, May 13, as a marker in the republican 
evolution of the nation. The write-ups marking the commemorations of these two civic 
dates, as well as that of April 7 which was the day that Pedro I abdicated, also allow me 
to return once again to the specific question of Pedro I’s legacy. Just as certain themes 
and elements of identity emerged in the discourse in 1862, in the first few years of the 
Republic writers similarly were coming to a new consensus. A common practice became 
comparing Pedro I to his father and his son as a means to evaluate and judge him as 
deficient as an historical figure and a man. They specifically attacked Pedro I’s legacy as 
it related to his role in independence and the nature of his abdication. They challenged 
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and qualified every accomplishment previously credited to him to continuously chip 
away at his historical and political standing. 
 This desire to ultimately remove Pedro I from history and memory translated into 
various proposals being made to have his statue physically removed from the Republic’s 
public square. Chapter Five examines very closely the arguments made for the statue’s 
removal and the public responses that those proposals provoked. The chapter begins with 
a description of the proposal made by Miguel Lemos in 1890 and republished in 1893 in 
the context of the bandstand incident. He called for the statue’s removal and replacement 
with a republican-themed monument. The criticisms of this proposal illustrate a level of 
sophistication similar to those of the covering of the statue discussed in Chapter Three. 
The writers use historical comparisons and a deep understanding of the implications of 
eradicating symbolic representations of the nation. This sort of response is true as well 
for the proposal in 1894 to remove Pedro I’s statue and replace it with one of Tiradentes. 
Finally in1898, there was reference, perhaps satirical, to a federal senator’s plan to ask 
that the statue be demolished and replaced by a bust to an obscure Rio figure. This last 
proposal did not elicit any sort of response, and none of these four proposals ever 
succeeded in spurring action on the part of the municipal or federal governments. Yet this 
chapter will pointedly show how their presence in the public and political imagination 
became an ongoing rhetorical tool for elite discussions of the Empire’s past and the 
Republic’s present. Chapter Five ultimately pulls together all of the previous discussions 
about history, memory, tradition, and sovereignty in its resolution of the imperial statue 






Defining the Historical Legacy of Pedro I in 1862 
In March of 1862, 
Dom Pedro II presided 
over the inauguration of 
Brazil’s first official public 
monument which honored 
the memory and 
accomplishments of his 
late father and imperial 
predecessor, D. Pedro I. It 
was not merely a son’s 
tribute to his father. Nor 
was it simply a nation 
memorializing its past. 
Instead, it signified the 
very deliberate attempt on the part of the empire’s elite to affirm the Imperial State on the 
domestic and international stages. The decision to erect the statue was just one part of the 
empire’s “national project” to revitalize the past and construct an imperial national 
identity based on collective memory.11 That larger project saw the full weight and power 
of the Brazilian imperial elite brought to bear on the academic and artistic production of 
                                                 
11 Noé Freire Sandes, A invenção da nação: entre a monarquia e a república (Goiâna: Ed. Da UFG: 
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Figure 2: Monumento a D. Pedro I. Rio de Janeiro, RJ: [s.n.], [1862]. 1 
foto, pb, 32 x 34. Disponível em: 
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the time with the express intent of establishing a historical narrative that defined and 
glorified the nation’s monarchical and imperial past.  
Such a symbolic construction of nationality through the cultivation of historical 
memory was not new. As Iara Lis Carvalho Souza points out, Brazilian intellectuals had 
been discussing the importance of the idea of the patria, of defining Brazilian identity, 
and of constructing an historical past beginning in the 1830s.12 The need for this national 
sense of self took on greater import in the mid to latter 1850s because of two factors. 
First, a growing number of the group of elites driving the national project and their 
intended audience were not members of the generation that actually witnessed or 
participated in the independence effort that culminated in 1822 with Brazil’s political 
independence from Portugal. As a result, this effort to establish the historical record was 
no longer about simply remembering Pedro I through first-hand experience but by 
actively constructing a national past through written history and representations. Such 
representations had to be accessible and understandable to the general—and mostly 
illiterate—population, otherwise they would only reach the target audience of the lettered 
elite behind the project itself. The need to expand that audience created in turn the need 
for public art. In this case, the statue of Pedro I would serve as that monumental 
statement in the public square.13  
Added to this issue of the passage of time was also the context of the political 
landscape of the day when the statue became the visible expression of the national 
project. The imperial elites’ efforts were taking place amidst an emerging public 
perception and subsequent Liberal criticism that Brazil under Pedro II was failing to live 
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up to its political, economic, and cultural potential. In some ways, as a ruler Pedro II 
became the victim of his own success. Roderick J. Barman cites Brazil’s prior “decade of 
peace and prosperity” as having “removed fears of social unrest and of ideological 
conflicts.”  This climate in turn led to a “resurgence in political Liberalism” and a new 
generation of opposition leaders who would become increasingly active and successful in 
Rio politics by using the rhetoric of federalism, individual rights, and reform. Those 
criticisms began to challenge the imperial institutions themselves, a step considered 
radical by many, given the tendency in Brazil for tinkering rather than institutional 
change.14 One such successful opposition figure would be Teófilo Otoni, who radically 
challenged the “concentration of power in the hands of the emperor” and whose writings 
will be analyzed in this chapter as a counterpoint to the version of D. Pedro I’s legacy 
enshrined in the statue.15  The imperial project and the national identity and pride it was 
meant to engender signaled those elites’ recognition of those critical sentiments and their 
need to buoy Brazilian pride and political cooperation rather than frustration.  
With the erection of the statue, the historical engineers began at the beginning: the 
founding moment of the nation both in terms of its political independence and its 
constitutional and legal framework. Both accomplishments belonged to Pedro I. He was 
the hero of independence and the founder of the Empire and nation. He was also the 
promulgator of Brazil’s first—and in 1862 current—constitution. Both accomplishments 
were central to the construction of the Brazilian nation-state and laid the foundations for 
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later nationalistic sentiments and understandings. The fact that the imperial elite could 
make the direct connection between father and son, founder and consolidator of the 
Empire, certainly made the choice that much more useful for their attempt to reinforce 
the regime’s current legitimacy and power. As part of that “national project,” the Instituto 
Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (IHGB), which had been founded in 1838 and tasked 
from the beginning with delineating a unique profile for the imagined “Brazilian Nation,” 
looked to employ the “great deeds and great men” approach to history in order to begin 
establishing the bases of the country’s identity. Their “search for common origins” and a 
“common past” led them to eventually place the onus for that achievement onto one 
effective tool: “the myth of the founder hero.”16 Consequently, the Institute in 1854 first 
called for a trinity of monuments to be constructed to honor Brazil’s maritime discovery 
by the Portuguese, its independence, and its founder. Thus, the person of Pedro I, because 
of the fact that his iconic role in declaring Brazilian independence would also be 
represented in the monument to independence, was set to be central to two of the three 
proposed first national monuments. Just two years prior, a Rio de Janeiro city council 
member’s proposal that the city oversee a collection of funds to build an equestrian statue 
of Pedro I fell on deaf ears and went absolutely nowhere. In contrast, when another 
councilman, Haddock Lobo, made the IHGB-backed proposal for the erection of the 
equestrian statue on September 7, 1854, the commemorative date of Brazilian 
independence, the city council approved the measure unanimously and began the work of 
organizing the efforts to oversee the statue’s design and construction. The local 
newspapers chronicled the opening and contributions to the popular subscription to raise 
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the money for the project.17 The council ultimately selected French sculptor Luis Rochet 
to realize the design chosen that conflated those two aforementioned national 
accomplishments of Pedro I. In doing so, the government purposely focused not on the 
first emperor’s royalty or reign but on the two specific foundational moments for the 
nation. 
The design used the generally accepted iconography of Pedro I’s role in Brazil’s 
declaration of independence, the “Grito do Ipiranga,” as the basis for the equestrian 
nature and posing of the statue.18 It then layered D. Pedro’s constitutional legacy onto the 
statue by placing in his right hand a document symbolizing the nation’s charter along 
with its independence (see Figure 3). The government added even more to this conflation 
by its choice of the statue’s commemorative inaugural date. The specific year of 1862 
was selected in order to coincide with the fortieth anniversary of the Grito and Brazilian 
independence while the day of March 25 (the original inaugural date before the weather 
forced a postponement) commemorated the anniversary of the promulgation of the first 
Brazilian constitution authored by Pedro I himself in 1824. The symbolic representation 
of Pedro’s figure also fused the two together by creating a variation on the traditional 
narrative and powerful imagery of Pedro I’s Grito do Ipiranga which served as the iconic 
declaration of Brazil’s independence. The choice of location for the statue was also 
related to the first emperor and the idea of constitutionalism, although not in the most 
direct way possible. The public square, or praça, chosen to be the historical space for the  
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Figure 3: Rafael Castro y Ordonez, Estátua de D. Pedro I. Rio de Janeiro, RJ: [s.n.], 1862. 1 foto, papel 
albuminado, p&b, 25 x 18,2. Disponível em: <http://objdigital.bn.br/acervo_digital/div_iconografia/TH_ 
christina/icon21044/ icon1018520.jpg>. Acesso em: 20 jul. 2015. Disponível em: <http://objdigital.bn.br/ 
acervo_digital/div_iconografia/TH_christina/icon21044/icon1018520.sid>. Acesso em: 20 jul. 2015. 
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equestrian statue was not the scene of the great moment when on March 25, 1824 Brazil’s 
constitution came into effect. Hendrik Kraay documents that no public ceremony was 
staged that day or in the years after. Instead, the reasoning behind the choice of that 
specific space came from the praça’s significance prior to Brazil’s nationhood.  The 
name Praça da Constituição stemmed from the moment in 1821 when the Portuguese 
royal family—under public pressure and facilitated by Pedro himself—swore acceptance 
and observance of the upcoming constitution being formulated in Portugal. Such a multi-
layered connection between Pedro, the constitution, and that historical space added 
significance to the statue’s symbolic representations and placement. In addition to the 
Grito symbolism represented in the statue which established the official narrative of 
Pedro as the founder of the Brazilian nation and the Empire, the establishment of 
Brazil—by Pedro I—as a constitutional monarchy was also symbolically represented in  
the statue. 
Given this context of careful symbolism and imperial design, the purpose of this 
chapter is twofold. My first objective is to set a baseline of understanding of the identity 
and historical legacy of Pedro I as defined by the public discourse surrounding the 
inauguration of his equestrian statue in 1862. To gauge his standing in the nation’s 
memory forty years after independence, I analyzed the thirty-eight odes written to 
celebrate the statue and what it symbolized as well as the writings of the statue’s most 
vocal critic, Teófilo Otoni. Taken together, these sources provide a narrative and counter 
narrative on the ways in which contemporary writers defined the former emperor’s 
historical identity.  The chapter is divided according to what I identify as the five 
components of that identity that appear consistently throughout the sources and that hinge 
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on popular notions of the roles that the First Emperor played: 1) the icon of independence 
and the founder of the Empire of Brazil; 2) the giver of law; 3) the soldier; 4) the hero of 
two worlds; and 5) the magnanimous father who bequeathed the throne to his son. These 
labels are clearly those present in the writing of the statue’s admirers. The counter 
narrative nevertheless engaged with these components but did so as a refutation of each. 
For those detractors, Pedro I was the following: 1) the antagonist and usurper of the 
independence movement; 2) the autocrat who illegally violated democratic principles; 3) 
the valid military defender of Portuguese constitutionalism; 4) the hero only of Portugal, 
not Brazil; and 5) the tyrant valiantly driven out by patriots. This analysis of how 
Brazilian intellectuals remembered Pedro I in 1862 lays the foundation for the 
discussions in the subsequent chapters on the impact that the fall of the Empire and the 
proclamation of the Republic had on public perceptions of his legacy, his statue, and the 
general importance of the public representation of a nation’s history. 
Secondly, this discussion of the publically represented historical narrative and its 
respondent refutation provide insight into the ways in which history and memory become 
part of the contestation between elites over claims to legitimacy and power in the 
deliberate construction of the nation-state. By interlocking memorials to Pedro I to 
affirmations of Brazil’s greatness, supporters helped to begin advancing the macro 
identity of the nation through the definition of one historical figure’s micro identity. 
These building blocks of nationalism, of the “imagined community” that the imperial 
elites sought to foster, are clearly evident in the fact that the writings in 1862 showed a 
preoccupation not just with how Brazilians saw Pedro I but how they saw their own 
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generation, society, civilization, and nation.19 They were defining themselves through 
their celebration or condemnation of the statue’s inauguration. That the celebratory odes 
far outnumbered and outshone, in terms of visibility, Otoni’s critical pamphlet also 
reveals the importance of the political elites’ access to power to drive public perceptions.  
This chapter will also set the comparative scene for future discussions of the long-
term viability of an important figure’s legacy as part of an historical narrative despite the 
nation’s change in political circumstances and regimes. It will help to show the difficulty 
in resolving competing perspectives, ideologies, and perhaps even more importantly, 
experiences of the past in defining the nation’s political organization. Yet the fact that 
this debate over how to remember Pedro I would continue from the time of the Republic 
and still be warranting discussion today also shows the ability of a people’s sense of self 
and nation to absorb those competing and contradictory ideas as the nation’s politics and 
society change. In addition, this chapter will lay the groundwork for understanding the 
significance of being “first” in the establishment of a narrative in terms of that narrative’s 
long-term viability. It will provide a construct from which to evaluate and contrast the 
construction or reinforcement of a narrative with the realities of attempting to deconstruct 
or replace an existing one. Finally, the discussions contained in this chapter and those to 
come will illustrate the recognition on the part of political elites for the need for public 
opinion and perception to buoy contemporary claims to power via the past. Whether it 
was imperial elites hearkening back to Pedro I and the nation’s origins or later republican 
                                                 
19 Benedict Anderson, “Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991).  Regarding Brazil specifically, historians Gisele Cunha dos Santos, Fernanda 
Fonseca Monteiro, and José Murilo de Carvalho note that the “Brazilian nation” of this time was indeed 
more imagined by the governing elite than real. In 1862 Brazil was still a slave society with a miscegenated 
population. That reality did not fit the mold or criteria of the European notion of civilization and therefore 
national identity. See Santos, 56.  
30 
 
elites looking even further back to the colony’s most famous insurrectionist and 
republican, those in the pursuit of power sought legitimacy in the present from the 
nation’s past. 
 
The Icon of Independence and the Founder of the Empire 
 
  The writers celebrating the inauguration of the statue of Pedro I in 1862 
overwhelmingly identified him with the independence movement and the founding of the 
empire—and thereby the nation—and made it the principal way in which they defined the 
legacy of their first emperor. Of the thirty-eight celebratory odes written, twelve ascribe 
to Pedro I the title of “Fundador” (founder) of the empire of Brazil in the very titles of 
the poems while the vast majority features the concept prominently in their first lines and 
throughout the discourse. The moment that defined Pedro I’s role in history was also the 
moment that defined Brazil’s march towards independence: September 7, 1822. On that 
day, Pedro I symbolically declared Brazil’s independence on the banks of the Ipiranga 
River when he famously said “Independence or Death! We are separated from Portugal!” 
This dramatic moment became known as the “Grito do Ipiranga,” and the Grito became 
the foundation of the identities of both Pedro I and the nation. 
The “Grito do Ipiranga” as an Historical Moment 
To understand the degree to which Pedro became the icon of Brazilian 
independence, it is necessary to look at the circumstances that fused the interests of a 
Portuguese prince to an American colonial independence movement. The creation of a 
revolutionary parliament or Côrtes in Lisbon in 1820, served as the catalyst for that 
process. By 1820, the Portuguese King, and Pedro I’s father, João VI remained in Brazil, 
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despite the fact that it had been six years since Napoleon’s general defeat and eleven 
years since British forces had driven the French out of Portugal. The role of the British 
military—specifically General William Carr Beresford—as administrative caretaker of 
Portugal during the King’s long absence loosened the Portuguese people’s ties to their 
distant absolute monarch and created an environment ripe for change. The revolutionary 
Côrtes recalled the King and began the work of writing a constitution that reflected the 
liberal ideals of popular sovereignty and representation to replace Portugal’s previously 
absolute monarchy. The metropolitan schism within the empire that resulted from the 
relocation of the monarchy to Brazil, though, created a complex reality of alliance and 
confrontation amongst the three principal actors of the period: the Royal House of 
Bragança, the Portuguese Côrtes, and the Brazilian people.  
Alongside the inevitable tension that arose because of the new legislature’s 
assertion of political power at the expense of the monarchy in Brazil was another source 
of discord: the relationship between Portugal and Brazil. The trans-Atlantic move of the 
Braganças turned the imperial-colonial pyramid upside down, and the power asserted and 
exerted by the Côrtes profoundly affected the dynamics of imperial administration and 
set the two metropolises on a collision course with each other. A product of the volatile 
mixture of constitutionalism and the uncertainties of a metropolis left behind and 
seemingly forsaken by its sovereign, the Portuguese Côrtes would ultimately challenge 
Brazilian ascendance and royal authority in an attempt to reclaim Portuguese prominence 
and identity. However, in attacking both targets through the recall of the Braganças and 
legislative attempts to return primacy to Lisbon while re-subordinating Brazil to those 
Portuguese interests, the Côrtes committed a costly tactical error. It managed to fuse 
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Dom Pedro’s defense of his and his dynasty’s royal monarchical authority as Prince 
Regent of Brazil with the efforts of the Brazilian people around him who were similarly 
fighting to defend their rights and status as a kingdom. This unique dynamic set the 
Brazilian people at odds not with their imperial sovereign but instead solely with the 
revolutionary Côrtes in Lisbon intent on bending the former colony to its will. In the war 
over authority and preeminence, Dom Pedro would prove to be the most potent symbol of 
power in that conflict. His role as champion and protector of the monarchy, his dynasty, 
and Brazil placed him at the forefront of independence and at the center of the newly 
emerging Brazilian society.  
By September of 1822, the Côrtes had already suppressed Brazil’s legal tribunals 
placing its administration of justice squarely under Portuguese dominion. It had also 
closed Brazilian military and academic institutions, introduced legislation to restrict 
Brazilian foreign trade back to its pre-1808 levels and limitations, and annulled the 
powers bestowed on Pedro as Prince Regent by his father.20 The Brazilian—albeit Rio-
centric—recognition of the continued authority of D. Pedro despite the actions of the 
Côrtes made it possible for the Regent to take measures to actively defend Brazil and 
himself against Portuguese hostility. In August of 1822 he issued dual decrees: one 
establishing the rhetoric of the independence movement—citing injustices done to 
Brazil—and one with practical actions to fortify Brazil against any Portuguese 
aggression. For example, the Regent ordered the fortification of ports, the prevention of 
supplies to Portuguese garrisons located in Brazil, and the prevention of juntas from 
accepting any officials dispatched from Portugal. Numerous provincial juntas responded 
to assert conformity to these instructions, demonstrating Pedro’s early legitimacy as 
                                                 
20 Roderick Cavaliero, The Independence of Brazil (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 131-132. 
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Brazil’s leader.21 The morning of September 7, 1822 found Pedro the Regent and his 
imperial guard on their way back from a successful trip to São Paulo to cultivate more 
strategic support for his leadership and the independence movement. 
The traditional narrative of the events of that day, which developed over time 
from the circulating accounts by various witnesses to the event in 1822, is best 
represented in English by Pedro I’s biographer, Neill Macaulay. Upon receiving 
dispatches making clear that the Portuguese Côrtes was moving forward on criminalizing 
and stopping the independent political actions being taken by Pedro I and his ministers as 
well as letters from his chief advisor José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva and wife Princess 
Leopoldina counseling him towards action, Pedro I responded to Portugal’s intent to 
resubordinate Brazil under the colonial system thusly: 
After a moment of reflection, Dom Pedro declared: “The time has come. 
Independence or death! We’re separated from Portugal!” Then he mounted his 
pretty bay mare, rode to the top of the hill [on the banks of the Ipiranga River 
outside of São Paulo on his return journey to Rio de Janeiro] and addressed his 
honor guard: “Friends, the Cortes persecutes us and wants to enslave us. From 
this day forward our relations are broken.” He tore the blue and white insignia of 
Portugal from his uniform and his soldiers followed suit, shouting vivas for 
independence and for Dom Pedro. The prince drew his sword and swore: “By my 
blood, by my honor, and by God: I will make Brazil free.” After everyone had 
taken the same oath, Dom Pedro stood up in his stirrups, looked in all directions, 
and announced, “Brazilians, from this day forward our motto will be—
Independence or Death.” Then he took off at a gallop toward São Paulo.22 
 
This portrayal of the Grito by Macaulay represents what Noé Freire Sandes calls the 
“classical version of independence” because it includes all of the iconic components 
typically associated with that moment: the receipt of the letters, the gesture of throwing 
                                                 
21 “Decreto de S. A. R. o Principe Regente, ordenando a resistencia as hostilidades de Portugal,” in Correio 
Braziliense, vol. XXIX, ed. Hipólito José da Costa (São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 2002), 429-
431; As Juntas Governativas e a Independência, Vol. 2 (Rio de Janeiro, Arquivo Nacional, Conselho 
Federal de Cultura, 1973), 462, #153. 
22 Neill Macaulay, Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1934 (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1986), 124-125. 
34 
 
away the Portuguese insignia, the raising of the sword, and the cry of “Independence or 
Death!” (see Figure 4 for the iconic painting that represents this interpretation).   
 
Figure 4: Pedro Américo, Independência ou Morte! (O Grito do Ipiranga), 1888, Museu Paulista da USP, São 
Paulo, accessed through Wiki Commons, April 1, 2014. 
Following that immediate moment, the founding moment myth also includes Pedro I’s 
return to São Paulo where there were festivities and calls for Brazilian independence and 
Pedro’s kingship as well as the presentation of the national anthem Pedro had composed 
on his way back from the banks of the Ipiranga.23   
 The idea of a grito as a defining historical moment goes beyond this Brazilian 
experience, therefore it is important to place the “Grito do Ipiranga” within the larger 
memorial context of independence in Spanish America. The commemorations and civic 
celebrations that mark the seminal and foundational moments in Mexico and South 
America reveal the longstanding power of the idealized grito and even a competition to 
be the first to have asserted American sovereignty and courage. For example, today 
                                                 
23 Sandes, 31. 
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Ecuador lays claim to being the site of “el primer grito de la independencia” in Latin 
America for what took place on August 10, 1809 in Quito. There a group consisting of 
Creoles, landowners, and military rebels relieved the president of the Royal Audiencia of 
his administrative charge and formed a Junta Suprema to rule until King Ferdinand VII 
could reclaim the Spanish throne from French control. Thus, it was not so much of an 
“Independence or Death!” moment but a “we’ll administer ourselves until the King is 
back” one. The fact that the junta did function as an autonomous local government is the 
basis for Ecuador’s claim. However, that claim is based more on this moment’s 
placement in the larger sequence of events that led to eventual independence from Spain 
rather than the moment’s own revolutionary content. What would have been the radical 
seizing of self-government in the Americas was instead tempered by the insurgents’ 
continued loyalty to the Spanish Crown. This using of the creation of temporary 
governing juntas as “gritos” and moments of national origins is further complicated by 
the fact that localities throughout Spanish America were independently forming similar 
juntas. Because of this reality, Bolivia also lays claim to being the “first of firsts” because 
of the efforts to create juntas in Chuquisaca and La Paz. The “revolution,” as it came to 
be known, that took place in Chuquisaca prior to Quito’s events inspired the claim of 
Chuquisaca being the site of the “primer grito libertario” or “first cry for freedom.”  If 
looking just at junta formation as being equivalent to the utterance of a grito or 
proclamation, then these others—as well as localities in Venezuela--would precede 
Quito. But the fact that the Quito’s junta succeeded with initial military adherence and 
actual exercise of power allows for Ecuador to celebrate this distinction as part of the 
nation’s—and the region’s—founding historical moments. The independence 
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bicentennial commemorative period of the past few years demonstrates both competition 
and cooperation in the South American nations celebrating these various “first” moments. 
For example, national leaders in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela stood together in Quito 
in 2009 to celebrate that supposed first grito while simultaneously touting each of their 
own nations’ equally important place in the history of the independence era. In turn, these 
separate and collective celebrations show just how important the idea of the grito is in the 
national and regional historical narratives. Most importantly, they demonstrate how the 
grito still resonates with the regimes and people of Latin America as indicators of their 
political, economic, and cultural sovereignty.24 
 Despite these various South American claims to grito prominence, the only other 
famous cry that has achieved the same singular proclamatory historical significance as 
Brazil’s “Grito do Ipiranga” is that of Mexico: the “Grito de Dolores.” Its recognition 
for being such is evidenced by the fact that it alone can typically be found as an index 
reference entry in an historical monograph on Latin American independence or even 
Latin American history in general. It too has the component of a rebellious leader 
receiving word that his enemies have moved against him, inspiring him to exhort those 
around him to rise up against those who would impose their illegitimate and unpopular 
rule. When Father Miguel Hidalgo uttered his call to arms on September 16, 1810, in the 
village of Dolores after receiving news of the betrayal and capture of his fellow 
insurrectionists in Querétaro, he successfully wove together religious obligation with that 
of political and military action. Before the day was over, an army marched out of Dolores 
                                                 
24 Tomás Ciuffardi, “El primer grito fue en Quito,” BBC Mundo, May 26, 2009, 
http://www.bbc.com/mundo/america_latina/2009/05/090526_0924_ecuador.shtml?print=1 (accessed July 
17, 2015); Vladimir Hernández, “Tras el grito de independencia,” BBC Mundo, May 24, 2009, 
http://www.bbc.com/mundo/participe/2009/05/090518_1400_grito_independencia_med.shtml (accessed 
July 17, 2015). 
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with the inspirational padre at its head. Despite the fact that within four months Father 
Hidalgo had already been relieved of his command due to incessant infighting amongst 
those in the army and rebel leadership when he was ultimately captured, tried, and 
sentenced to death, the combination of the drama and spectacle of his Grito in Dolores 
and his martyrdom made September 16 a potent symbol of defiance. According to 
William H. Beezley and David E. Lorey, it remains to this day “the most important public 
festival in the civic calendar and has bequeathed to Mexicans a rich tradition that is part 
creation myth, part official pomp, and part popular merrymaking.”  
 While the Gritos of both Ipiranga and Dolores share a similar commemorative 
and dramatic flair, there are important distinctions between the two that emphasize the 
different historical experiences of the two emerging nations in the nineteenth century. 
Father Hidalgo was a Creole priest. Pedro I was the Prince Regent of Brazil and the heir 
to the Portuguese throne. Father Hidalgo’s speech was one described by Isabel Fernández 
Tejedo and Carmen Nava Nava as more of a “harangue” to compel adhesion to his cause 
and inspire fighters to participate and join his army. His grito was an immediate call to 
arms for a rebel army bound for actual conflict and combat. He and the men who left 
Dolores were headed for a fight. Pedro I’s grito, however, reflects the curiosity of an 
independence movement led by royalty. It reflects Pedro’s decision that Brazil be free. 
This top-down aspect to that movement is even deepened by the sense that the royal “we” 
permeates his proclamation with an unspoken “let it be done.” He attended festivities 
after his grito. He wrote a song. And he never had to fight a battle against the Portuguese 
troops stationed in Brazil in order to achieve Brazil’s independence.  
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 Despite these differences, both Ipiranga and Dolores would ultimately serve as the 
foundational moments of Brazil and Mexico. Their places in their respective nations’ 
identity would be challenged or redefined by new commemorative dates associated with 
subsequent political regimes and events. Yet both would persevere and become part of 
the common knowledge of their respective people’s histories and a myth where origins, 
community, and history could capture the imagination.25 
Nevertheless, in 1862 Brazil, the “Grito do Ipiranga” narrative was still in the 
process of coalescing into national myth. For our purposes, though, what is important is 
what popular notions of the Grito were at the time of the statue’s inauguration. With the 
exception of the prominent imagery of the raising of the sword, all of the other 
components were already in place in the Brazilian political imagination of the time.26 The 
poems submitted to celebrate the inauguration of the statue in 1862 provide insight into a 
consensus interpretation of the Grito moment. First, they emphasize the location: along 
the banks of the Ipiranga River outside of São Paulo. Second, they have a notion of a 
raised arm as a gesture that conveyed emotion and strength (albeit without a sword). Last, 
                                                 
25 William H. Beezley and David E. Lorey, “Introduction: The Functions of Patriotic Ceremony in 
Mexico,” in Viva Mexico! Viva la Independencia! Celebrations of September 16, eds. William H. Beezley 
and David E. Lorey (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001),  x-xii; Isabel Fernández Tejedo and 
Carmen Nava Nava, “Images of Independence in the Nineteenth Century: The Grito de Dolores, History, 
and Myth,” in Viva Mexico! Viva la Independencia! Celebrations of September 16, eds. William H. 
Beezley and David E. Lorey (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001), 5, 9-10.  
26 However, Macaulay’s footnote for the grito narrative demonstrates just how cobbled together the account 
was. For example, he cites four different first-hand accounts by Padre Belchior Pinheiro de Oliveira, 
Manuel Marcondes de Oliveira Mello, Francisco Gomes da Silva, and Francisco de Castro Canto e Mello. 
Those citations stem from sources presented in other publications which reprinted earlier pamphlets and 
accounts. Each account varied from each other in terms of exact wording and sequencing. In what is 
considered the definitive biography of Pedro I, Octavio Tarquinio de Sousa explores the variations of the 
accounts in his own attempt to reconstruct the scene. For this discussion, see A Vida de D. Pedro I, Volume 
II (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio, 1952), 433-436.  According to Noé Freire Sandes, it is not until 
Canto e Mello’s account becomes widely circulated starting in the 1860s that the image of the raised sword 
takes hold. Padre Belchior makes no mention of the sword in his account. See Sandes, 29. 
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they emphasize Pedro’s vocalization of “Independence or Death” as the definitive clarion 
call for independence (see Figure 5 for an earlier visual interpretation).27  
 
Figure 5: François-René Moreaux, A Proclamação da Independência, 1844, Museu Imperial, Petrópolis, accessed 
from Wiki Commons: April 4, 2014. 
The “Grito do Ipiranga” as Used to Define Pedro I in 1862 
  The narrative of Ipiranga was powerful in and of itself, especially as a vivid 
image conveyed in poetry. The fundamental aspects of the scene that occurred on 
September 7, 1822 in which Pedro unsheathed his sword and demanded “Independence 
or Death!” were tailor-made for national myth-making. The acclaimed Brazilian writer 
Machado de Assis commented on how the choice of that moment to mark Brazil’s origins 
served the nation well. He described the Grito as a moment “most concise, most 
                                                 
27 For studies specific on the various political construction of commemorative dates in Brazil, see Cecilia 
Helena de Salles Oliveira, O Museu Paulista da USP e a memória da independência (Cad.Cedes, 
Campinas, v. 22, n. 58, p. 65-80, dezembro/2002; Disponível em http://www.cedes.unicamp.br; Accessed 
via site http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ccedes/v22n58/v22n58a05.pdf on 4/1/14), 67-68 for an article on the 
evolution of September 7 as an officially recognized date. See also the recent and very detailed monograph 
by Hendrik Kraay referenced earlier. 
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beautiful, and most generic” and therefore most useful as legend. For the famous author, 
that singular and discreet act was the perfect dramatic moment. The theatrical element 
that it possessed was far better than any reality could possibly be. After all, it was 
action—both physical and verbal. The gesture was also generic, romantic, and universal 
in its ability to spark the political and public imagination.28 Given this later perspective, 
the poets in 1862 predictably latched onto the Grito as the defining image of 
independence and thereby the defining image of Pedro I. 
  Yet that was not all. The celebration of Pedro as founder and independence icon 
existed within a much larger and supremely important context: the Brazilians’ need to 
establish their own identity and origins in order to stake their claim to membership in the 
community of self-aware and civilized nations. A celebratory canto was not merely an 
ode to Pedro I but was also “a hymn to the patria!” For Joaquim Norberto de Sousa 
Silva, a Rio-born writer and future IHGB president who would be acclaimed both for the 
quality and quantity (over eighty various writings) of his works of poetry, theatre, novels, 
biographies, essays, and literary / historical studies, the statue homenagens performed a 
national service in allowing Brazilians to “make sacred the foundation of the empire at 
the altar of the beloved patria!” Sousa Silva asserted that paying tribute to Pedro I 
sacralized Brazil’s origins.29 Because the three—Pedro I, the Grito, and independence—
                                                 
28 Sandes, 30. The comments of Machado de Assis came during a reevaluation of the veracity of previous 
historical accounts of the Grito. Questions arose over Pedro’s physical condition, his appearance, his 
mount, and his exact actions as they were typically portrayed. In his opinion, Machado favored the myth 
over whatever the reality was. 
29 Manoel de Araujo Porto-Alegre, “Canto Inaugural” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862); Joaquim 
Norberto de Sousa Silva, “Á Inauguração da Estatua Equestre do Fundador do Imperio” Rio de Janeiro: 
Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862); Antonio José dos Santos Neves, “Á Sua Magestade Imperial O Senhor D. 
Pedro II Imperador Constitucional e Defensor Perpetuo do Brasil por Occasião de Inaugurar-se na Capital 
do Imperio a Estatua Equestre do Seu Augusto Pai O Fundador de Sua Dymnastia, Heróe da 
Independencia, Libertador da Nação Brasileira O Senhor D. Pedro I” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 
1862); J. [João] Barbosa Rodrigues, “Á Fundador da Monarchia Brazileira” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula 
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were so inextricably linked, the argument could be made that glorifying one necessarily 
cast glory upon the others. Rather than the “Bronze Lie” that the statue’s critics would 
label it, for the popular afro-Brazilian poet and novelist Antonio Gonçalves Teixeira e 
Sousa it was the “sacred bronze.” Echoing Sousa Silva’s call to sacralize Brazil’s origins 
and founder, Teixeira e Sousa proposed that the statue serve as a “sacred temple of 
undiminished glory” for the nation and the emperor.30  
  On top of this pressure of honoring the nation internally, poem after poem reveal 
their writer’s sense that Brazil’s monumental recognition of its origins and founder had 
the world as its audience. The statue “attested” to the world, “affirmed” to the world, and 
“acclaimed” to the world the “greatest heroism” possible in the legacy of Pedro I. It 
served just as much as a “testament” to the nation’s “vibrant glory” as well. Beyond such 
domestic glory, Brazil could even be a model to that world audience.31 For one writer in 
particular, Beatriz Francisca de Assis Brandão, the “gifts” and “benefits” received from 
Pedro I’s “generous hand” were the very foundation for Brazil’s claim to standing 
amongst the world’s leading nations. Brandão, who was born in Minas Gerais, became 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brito, 1862). For biographical information on Sousa Silva, see José Veríssimo, História da Literatura 
Brasileira, Volume 6 of Biblioteca Essencial da Literatura Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Atlântico Press, 
2015), V, https://books.google.com/books?id=sSAqBgAAQBAJ&pg=PT29&dq=joaquim+norberto 
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e Geográfico Brasileiro, accessed July 20, 2015, http://www.ihgb.org.br/ihgb27.php. 
30 Antonio Gonsalves Teixeira e Sousa, “Á Inauguração da Estatua Equestre do Senhor D. Pedro I. Cantico 
do Brazil” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862). Teixeira e Sousa became a part of the intellectual 
circles in Rio after his move to the capital city. He is known more specifically for weaving nationalistic 
elements into his works, and he used historical novels “to explore issues of racial and national identity,” 
most notably in his famous work A Independência do Brasil. Although he died before the actual 
inauguration date of the statue, his poem was nevertheless published for the ceremony. See Nicola Cooney, 
“Antonio Gonçalves Teixeira e Sousa,” in Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African-
American Experience, eds. Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (New York: Oxford 
University Press: 2005), 136, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=TMZMAgAAQBAJ&dq=Antonio+Gon%C3%A7alves+Teixeira+e+S
ousa+biography&source=gbs_navlinks_s (accessed July 20, 2015). 
31 Domingo José Gonçalves Magalhães, “Cântico á inauguração da estatua eqüestre do Fundador do 
Império do Brazil” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paulo Brito, 1862); Porto-Alegre; Dr. Joaquim Manoel de 
Macedo, “Cantico” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862); Sousa Silva; Neves.  
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one of the few prominent female artists and intellectuals during the reign of Pedro II 
through her well-known poetry which was published in various Rio newspapers. In her 
inaugural poem, she went on to assert that “the patria, liberty, glory, national honor, and 
dignity amongst the most conspicuous nations of the world, all emanated from you 
[Pedro].”32 This passage demonstrates well the overarching desire on the part of many to 
stake an international claim to glory and standing on the commemoration of Brazil’s 
origins via Pedro I.   
  Other writers also commented on the role of monuments in the public recording 
of history, noting that the statue would be a “canvas of bronze, where history recorded 
the renown of a people” and that “bowing before the statue” would be a means to 
acclaiming Brazil’s own existence.33 That use of the language of fealty was atypical in 
the poems, even though it was meant to celebrate Brazil as well. Instead, writers 
repeatedly defined themselves as free people, not subjects, who were demonstrating 
appreciation for the figure who secured their political liberty. They made the clear 
distinction between a people honoring “the memory of the brave” and an “enslaved 
people” laying incense at the “feet of a king.” In this view of the past and the present, 
Brazilians were not merely subjects, and Pedro I was no common king but a heroic 
warrior and founder of Brazil.34 Similarly, some poets called the statue a testament made 
by a “free people” for the world to see Brazil’s “vibrant glory,” calling the day of the 
                                                 
32 Beatriz Francisca de Assis Brandão, “Saudação á Estatua Equestre de S. M. I. O Senhor D. Pedro I. 
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inauguration the “Brazilian Day.” 35 They also gave credit to Pedro I for the origins of a 
“new horizon” for Brazil by ushering in its existence as a “free, independent, and vast 
empire.”  For the prominent Bahian newspaper publisher Manoel Agostinho da Cruz 
Mello in particular, Brazilians were not just free but also living in their own self-
identified golden age. He found the Grito to be the moment in which Pedro I awoke the 
“Giant of America” and made possible the “happy times” of his age.36 Along with 
freedom, one attribute overwhelmingly attributed to the Brazil of the those times was 
unity. An “entire Brazil” welcomed the statue, and one writer even refered to unity as 
“the crown that rested” on Pedro I’s “brow.”  
  This theme of a unified Brazil also accompanied notions of popular acclaim.  In 
1862, Pedro I was being received by a “unified and free people” who celebrated the 
statue in an “explosion of love” with “not a single voice from a Brazilian breast lacking.” 
In addition, Domingos José Gonçalves Magalhães labeled that expression of the people as 
“free and spontaneous adulation.”37 His wording demonstrates the use of spontaneity as 
validation of true emotion rather than a function of coersion. In addition, he also 
employed the more fundamental use of “o povo” (or “the people”) as the ultimate 
measure of validation. In this rhetoric, the judgement of the people served as the final 
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according to the orthography of that day), was a medical doctor, diplomat, poet, dramatist, and member of 
the Academy of Letters from Rio de Janeiro. His Academia Brasileira de Letras biography also notes that 
he was a friend of Emperor Pedro II. See “Domingo José Gonçalves de Magalhaens: Biografia,” Academia 




arbiter of historical legacy. Magalhães asserted that the nation was “listening to what the 
people say,” and in his poetry, he established the people’s ability to define their own 
history by judging for themselves—a judgement that would be lasting—who and what 
would ultimately merit hate or love and a place of honor. In the end, such a democratic 
principle would lace multiple homages to Brazil’s royal emperor. Just as Pedro I himself 
strategically used constitutional and democratic rhetoric in the justification of his actions, 
four decades later those who glorified his statue employed those same themes.38 It could 
certainly be argued that the generalized “o povo”  referred to in the poems was bound to 
resemble more the members of the IHGB than the population at large when it came to 
such sentiments towards the statue. Yet the fact that unity and popular acclaim were a 
part of these writers’ interpretations of legitimacy and the public symbolism of the state 
adds yet another layer onto how they wished to portray themselves in their celebration of 
Pedro I’s statue.   
  Many writers viewed that aforementioned “undiminished glory”—of political 
emancipation and national beginnings—as deeds for which Brazilians owed their 
emperor the debt of gratitude. For them, the currency with which Brazilians could repay 
that debt was in the form of memory and monument. Such a notion of a monument as 
debt payment went back as far as the very first decade of Brazil’s national existence. The 
elites of the 1820s had a different approach, however, as evidenced by their cultivation of 
a French cultural mission replete with artists and a passion for the monumentalidade (or 
“monument craze”) of the era. Even Pedro I himself saw the importance of such public 
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and symbolic representations of power, and he actively sought ways in which to fuse his 
persona with them. Because of the intersection of these trends, a “Monument of National 
Gratitude” and other statues dedicated to Pedro I were proposed. The plan’s scale 
ultimately made it untenable at that time, and the first emperor’s eventual abdication in 
1831 served to end the discussions of building such an homage.39 Therefore, before the 
ceremony in 1862, that memorial debt had yet to be paid, and the writers of the time 
showed an acute awareness of this fact. This feeling was only deepened by the fact that 
twenty years had passed since Pedro I’s death with still nothing existing to publically 
honor his memory in Brazil or Rio. Haddock Lobo himself, in his speech to the city 
council in 1854 referred to the statue he was proposing as an effort to “pay a sacred 
debt.”40  
  Perhaps this awareness drove some writers to see what many perceived as the 
overdue erection of the statue as taking on a religious quality, and they even employed 
hyperbolic deification rhetoric. Domingo José Gonçalves de Magalhães asserted that the 
statue represented an ovação, or offering, up to the nation’s collective memory in much 
the same way that Beatriz Francisca de Assis Brandão called on Pedro I “to bless this 
empire that you founded” and to “receive the pure and sincere offering of a People whom 
you saved and ennobled.” Magalhães referred to the “divine impetus” to erect the statue 
while another poet asserted that there was “a fervid cult” dedicated to “the memory of the 
good things” that the people owed to Pedro I.  They went further to say that the people do 
not just “exalt their hero” but “deify him” as well to the point that Pedro’s name should 
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be deified as an “emblem” for the nation.41 Even more writers referenced either 
veneration or outright deification for Pedro’s standing as it related to the statue. For 
Manoel de Araujo Porto-Alegre, whose far-reaching artistic and intellectual contributions 
to the Empire as a painter, caricaturist, poet, architect, writer, and diplomat earned him 
the esteem of Pedro II and the title of Barão de Santo Ângelo, the statue made permanent 
Pedro I’s importance by “stamping itself in the skies and deifying itself throughout the 
times.” One final writer, the scientist J. Barbosa Rodrigues known for his work in natural 
history and botany, combined this religious terminology with the very essence of 
monumentalidade as it related to the imperial national project. He called the “pilgrimage” 
to the statue, where the people were to “reverently” come, a necessary “tribute to pay.”42 
  The majority of the poets in 1862, however, were more concerned with the larger 
secular themes of memory and gratitude in their celebrations of the statue’s inauguration. 
They echoed Haddock Lobo’s proposal, stating that “the sepulcher cannot be the only 
tribute to a hero so great.” 43 Antonio José Victorino de Barros went further, equating the 
Brazilian nation’s lack of any forms of tribute to its illustrious historical figures to its 
“forgetting” of its own history.44 For him, that forgetting was a “crime and insult” with 
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no possibility of “forgiveness.” Barros found the “arrogant ingratitude” demonstrated by 
that absence of tribute as in stark contrast with the example of Europe. He cited the fact 
that the “Old World” peoples had erected columns and trophies to denote their own 
accomplishments, all of which were to the amazement of the New World. That 
aforementioned ingratitude, though, and the lack of tribute in which it manifested itself, 
would be made right by the erection of the statue to the deserving figure of Pedro I. For 
this, the author congratulated the Brazilian people, calling them a “grateful people,” and 
proclaimed that the monument was proof that they “are a people who value yourself.”45 
Another poet, writing under the name of Pedro I’s venerated (and deceased) advisor and 
minister, José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, also took up the idea of the nation forgetting 
its past. He condemned himself, alluding to the future as his judge, for the crime of 
having “forgotten his heritage” and offered his desire to stand “contrite and kneeling” 
before the statue in order to atone.46 Others also addressed the New World aspect of 
Brazil but did so very differently from Barros’ comparative comments above. For them, 
Brazil was “a nation new and dignified” and “an empire so rich and so fertile, ” and this 
youthfulness accounted for the nation’s lack of commemoration. Despite not judging the 
nation and its people harshly, they did echo the mandate that Brazil not forget its past. 
The act of remembering and commemorating was “for the good of the people,” the “glory 
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of the history of the patria,” and “a thought of eternal value.”47 Ultimately these writers 
each extolled the beauty and virtue of the sentiment of gratitude in its expression on 
inaugural day.48 
  Woven into these ruminations on the tribute owed by the Brazilian nation to its 
founder was a related notion of generational debt and obligation. In speaking to the 
patria, Joaquim Antônio Hamvultando de Oliveira condemned Brazil for being populated 
by an “unjust people” who had left “to the new generation the debt of gratefully 
memorializing Pedro I.” 49  This writer asserted his belief that  people do not respect their 
past or themselves if they do not visibly demonstrate their appreciation for those who 
came before and left a mark on the nature and course of the nation. It is not enough to say 
that some of the generation of writers in 1862 reveled in their role in paying their nation’s 
memorial debt. Rather, they went further to pointedly chide the previous generation for 
its inability to act. For Oliveira, it was Brazil’s “children” who could say “Here it is! Here 
it is! In our capital we erect a glorious monument that eternalizes the venerable day and 
words of Ipiranga.”50 Dr. Luiz Vicente De-Simoni echoed the sentiment of Oliveira. He 
described the statue as “this colossal bronze erected to the skies by a subsequent and just 
generation.” It would be his generation, therefore, who presented the monument “to the 
world” and out of the noble sentiment of “high gratitude.” For De-Simoni, the statue 
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explicity represented the payment of that generational debt, one that “our age pays in 
metal.”51 An Italian-born medical doctor who had become a naturalized Brazilian citizen 
in 1855 and risen to great prominence in the Empire as the director of the Santa Casa da 
Misericórdia of Rio de Janeiro and the government’s Public Health initiatives, De-Simoni 
wholeheartedly embraced his distinguished standing in that Brazilian generation and their 
role to play in the national project, himself contributing a total of seven different 
inaugural works.52 One other writer touched on the  theme of history and and posterity, 
but he did so specifically looking to the future generations rather than the present or the 
past. Joaquim Norberto de Sousa Silva cast the importance of the statue in this light, 
saying “Generation yet to come! Noble and sublime...contemplate the origin of your 
greatness!” For Sousa Silva, the glorification surrounding the nation’s first monument 
was centered on that idea of greatness and origins. He saw his nation in 1862 as a 
“flourishing and rich and beautiful and learned and blessed patria.” That greatness found 
its origins on the banks of Ipiranga and would thereby be represented for posterity in the 
statue of Pedro I.53 
  This linking of the statue to the concept of generational awareness would also 
take on a didactic element.54 Contributors such as the playwright Joaquim Jacome de 
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Oliveira Campos Filho and the aforementioned Domingo José Gonçalves Magalhães saw 
the inauguration as not just an opportunity to show deference to the past but also to glean 
lessons for the present. For his part, Campos Filho held up the statue as the means in 
which Pedro I could serve as a model to Brazil and the world. He said that through the 
statue Pedro was elevated as a “living emblem of noble deeds” to be forever venerated. 
This notion of the statue being a lasting influence is captured nicely with Campos Filho’s 
labeling of it as an “eloquent artifact” of Brazil’s past that could speak of those deeds and 
heroic origins to the present and future Brazil.55 Rather than an artifact, Magalhães saw 
the statue as a “distant echo” across time that would have the ability to reanimate or 
revive the exhausted or empty grandeur of the nation. His notion of time also conveyed a 
sense of cross-generational revival through the nation’s memorializing of its past. For 
him, a generation had allowed itself to fade away into historical and memorial oblivion. 
Yet with its new tribute, his era could be one of revival.56 
  In the end, therefore, these writers remained mindful of the overarching themes of 
memory, the patria, and obligation. In speaking to “the patria,” Manoel de Araujo Porto-
Alegre stated that “they will not say that you were ungrateful…because you erect for him 
an eternal monument.”57 This author expressed the same sentiment as other writers in that 
recognition was owed to Pedro I. While Porto-Alegre did not specifically criticize the 
generation that came before as being ungrateful or self-aware—as others did—for not 
having erected a monument or homage, he did have a shared sense of being judged by 
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posterity for not adequately showing appreciation for the defining moments of the history 
of the patria. Thus the statue, for many, signified the payment of such a memorial debt. 
  It was on this layered tapestry of exalting Brazil through celebrating Pedro I and 
vice versa that the writers in 1862 defined Pedro I primarily as the hero of independence 
and founder of the nation. They portrayed him as the starring actor “at the front of the 
nation” as the “magnanimous founder of the empire” and the “royal author” of Brazil’s 
independence. Making his enemies yield and bringing greatness to Brazil in the form of 
political separation from Portugal often accompanied references to Pedro’s one 
unassailable characteristic: his virility. Along with the common thanks given to Pedro I 
for Brazil’s independence and law, there is noticeably an appreciation for qualities such 
as his dynamic “strength” and “attitude.” No matter the political or moral controversies 
swirling around the first emperor or his shortcomings that led to them, his personal 
vitality always stands out in the way that the writers bring his deeds to life.58 
Consequently, no action or moment lent itself any better to that notion of vitality and 
charisma than the ultimate founding moment, a moment replete with action, drama, and 
decisiveness: the Grito do Ipiranga. 
Not only did the inaugural writers for all practical purposes reduce Pedro I and his 
legacy to that moment, but they also simultaneously narrowed the Brazilian effort and 
achievement of independence to the Grito as well. Since there was no protracted, national 
military struggle required for Brazil to achieve recognition as an independent state, there 
is no other truly shared experience for Brazilians to draw from in the myth-making of 
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their independence. Certainly there are strong regional and local experiences from that 
era that have shaped identities on those levels, some of which are based upon tensions 
and resentments towards the fledgling imperial government headed by Pedro I and seated 
in Rio de Janeiro. Yet for the people of that “unified” nation, their only climactic moment 
was the 7th of September. And because of this, Pedro’s standing is somewhat curious. His 
fame as the “hero” of independence comes not from him marshalling a revolutionary 
army and securing independence like Bolívar or Washington or articulating Brazilian 
grievances against the Portuguese attempts to re-subordinate Brazil into a colonial 
system, the latter which he actually did. Instead, Pedro’s claim to fame centers on the act 
of verbally proclaiming independence. 
This repeated identification of Pedro as Brazil’s “immortal Herald” (“immortal 
Arauto”) emphasizes the dynamic—and more specifically vocal—characteristics that the 
Grito do Ipiranga possessed by its very nature.59 The majority of inaugural odes employ 
not only allusions to the visual imagery of Ipiranga (Pedro on horseback alongside the 
shore of the river, right arm raised), but more often to the sound of his words, 
“Independence or Death!”  In fact, this quotation appears fifteen times, sometimes in all 
capital letters for emphasis and sometimes multiple times in the same poem as a refrain. 
The many ways that writers could refer to Brazilian independence via Ipiranga made it 
such a useful and frequent device. This utility also explains why Ipiranga became so 
iconic and even preferable to future writers such as Machado de Assis. The poets in 1862 




sanctified the Grito as “the supreme saying,” a “voice so holy,” and a cry that was both 
“heroic” and “powerful” at the banks of the river.60  
The authors used that “sublime voice” to not only symbolize Brazilian 
independence and liberty but also as a link once again between generations. While one 
author says that Pedro “raised his voice” for the Brazilian people in 1822, another asserts 
that through the statue, all of Brazil “still listens” to Pedro because the statue perpetuates 
his “Grito of magnetic influence.” The writers repeatedly give voice to the statue, for 
example saying that “once again the brado (or grito) rings out and the hero appears!” 
There is even a reference to the statue “feeling the sensation of the rays of the sun upon 
it” so that ‘“independence or death’ might echo in the bronze and the vast empire!” That 
the Grito could echo again in the hearts and minds of Brazilians—and throughout the 
world—made it powerful as well as interactive.  The homenagens that the authors call for 
on the part of Brazilians are presented as gritos in their own rights. The authors describe 
Brazilian voices raised to glorify Pedro and independence as modern-day voices that call 
back to their first emperor and repeat the fundamental messages of liberty and freedom.61  
One poem brings all of these ideas together by discussing just three things in an ode to 
Pedro I: the Grito, liberty, and the eternalization of memory. In it, the Grito is a 
“prophetic voice, thunderous and strong,” and the author embellishes that traditional 
quotation by adding the words “Courageous Brazilians! Independence, liberty or death!” 
From that point, he then portrays the Grito as spurring action, a casting of Pedro I as 
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catalyst via the Grito that several other authors do as well. For one, Pedro is credited with 
“letting out, before all, the invincible brado [grito] that awakened Ipiranga, and lit the 
fire of enthusiasm in the citizens and gave rise to the Empire.” It is notable that this 
author privileges this awakening of Brazilian greatness over what he portrays as Pedro’s 
giving of independence and law previously in the stanza. His doing so reflects the 
popular perception of the Grito as being the impetus for Brazil’s nationhood. Similarly, 
another writer casts Pedro’s words as having “awakened the giant that slept the heavy 
sleep of the captive.” In the end, this view of Pedro unleashing Brazilian ascendancy 
through political emancipation from Portugal, all of which they trace back to that 
founding moment, places the Grito as meriting an eternal place in the country’s national 
memory. Because the Grito had “broken the shackles of slavery…and allowed the light 
of liberty to bathe Brazil in its glow,” it was imperative that “a grateful people today raise 
an eternal monument” to Pedro’s glory so that his “heroic deeds will not be forgotten by 
future generations.”62 Similarly, another writer asserts that the statue retroactively averts 
Pedro’s death, making him immortal through remembrance and that the “bronze speaks 
to the present generation” as well as to the “centuries to come,” saying “Hear me! Hear 
me!”63 One final writer attached even more than the didactic reminder of liberty and 
independence. For Joaquim Norberto de Sousa Silva, the statue would have a 
regenerative impact. He called for the “sun of Ipiranga, star of glory, of liberty and life to 
shine and inundate the bronze bust with light, and again light the fire of the soul! Ah! 
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Remember, patria, past days of fortune and belief!” For one last author, the statue itself 
was that generation’s own Grito “to the hero of Ipiranga.”64  
As the previous paragraph illustrates, embedded in the discussions of the Grito 
was the association of that moment—along with Pedro I—with the concept of liberty. In 
terms of what exactly they attributed to Pedro, the authors reflected different places on a 
continuum of understanding of what liberty meant to them. For some, it meant simply 
political separation from Portugal and Brazilian sovereignty. For this reason, authors 
could describe Pedro as the one who “gave” or “bequeathed to us liberty” and who 
subsequently merited the title of “king of liberty” or “hero of liberty.”65 Other authors 
went further to attach a popular notion to the liberty and historical standing associated 
with Pedro I. Alfrede de Taunay, just a military engineering student at the time but 
destined for literary and political renown in the decades to come, addressed the issue of 
the legitimacy of historical claims to glory, and he asserted that that legitimacy originates 
in popular recognition, not self-promotion. He stated that “The Caligulas, the Neros, the 
Tiberiuses, they manufacture their laurels, whereas the king who is father, the king who 
is just, receives his commendation from the people.” Another author discussed this notion 
of Pedro as the “king of the people” as being directly related to Brazil’s origins and 
giving the nation historical prominence and standing based upon its “glory, liberty, and 
royalty.” Similarly, Pedro was not just a monarch; he was more than just a crown. 
Instead, “Pedro Primeiro and a liberated Brazilian people are twin ideas” because Pedro 
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was the “king of liberty!”66 At each turn in Pedro’s ascendance to power, he sought the 
legitimacy that came from the appearance of his acting upon the people’s will. Some of 
those who celebrated him in 1862 reinforced that image.  
Related to the call and answer aspect of the Grito discussed previously, the 
journalist A. J. (Antonio José) de Araujo added one more layer: the transnational 
experience of Pedro I. While this notion of Pedro as the hero of two worlds will be 
discussed in greater detail in a later section, the words of Araujo demonstrate that the 
imagery and identification of Pedro I with the Grito were so powerful that this writer 
used them to discuss the shared and even mirrored legacies of Pedro I in Brazil and 
Portugal. Writing from Rio, Araujo used the demarcation of “here” and “there” for Brazil 
and Portugal, but he used them to assert their shared historical experience. His writing 
regarding Brazil’s independence employs the typical use of the Grito detailed above. 
Pedro “breaks the chains” of colonial servitude and “calls to the Brazilians: liberty!” Yet 
immediately following that, Araujo provides a parallel Grito for Portugal, having Pedro I 
call “O Portuguese, liberty!” Within this application of the Grito imagery to the 
Portuguese historical legacy, there is also the appropriation of the famous unsheathing of 
the sword (which in fact is more appropriate given Pedro’s role as actual military 
commander in Portugal) specifically for the “there” portion. The author then returns to 
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Brazil, saying that “here at the banks of the Ipiranga he [Pedro I] shouts: ‘Independence 
or death!’” For Araujo, this call receives an answer, saying that “the Amazon and the 
Prata repeat: ‘Liberty!’” While for Brazilians the Grito was the call and liberty the 
answer, over “there” in Portugal the call is instead symbolized by Pedro’s unfurling of 
Portugal’s flag (upon his arrival to carry out the military campaign against his brother 
Miguel’s absolute rule) and the river is instead the Douro. Yet the answer is the same: 
“the Douro says to Europe: “Liberty!’”67 This application of the Grito imagery to the 
Portuguese historical experience is one of the few examples of Pedro’s Brazilian identity 
bleeding over into an interpretation of his Portuguese exploits. As will be discussed later, 
the opposite was generally true, with notions of Pedro as Portuguese soldier and king 
infusing Brazilian perceptions of him. 
Araujo’s side by side recounting of Pedro’s dual accomplishments offers more 
commentary on the reality of his being defined by a moment in Brazil versus a military 
campaign in Portugal. The poet deals with this contrast explicitly, saying that for Brazil 
Pedro’s legacy would always by measured by the Grito, what Araujo considered “a 
thousand works in only one day,” whereas for Portugal “your [Pedro’s] works are 
measured by victories.” The Grito was, according to him, Pedro’s greatest day in Brazil. 
Joaquim Manoel de Macedo, a prolific writer recognized as the nation’s first novelist, 
agreed with Araujo. He called Pedro I’s “heroic deed” as the one that “rises above all else 
in Brazilian history.” With only forty years of existence as a nation, it is not surprising 
that the inception of the nation would loom as the defining moment. Interestingly, 
though, Araujo chose the day of Pedro’s death in Portugal as the most significant day for 
                                                 




“there.” Despite his previous definition of Pedro by multiple victories, it is the loss of that 
leader in Portugal which he considered the most significant day. Nevertheless, the poet 
assuages that loss by noting how the statue in Rio would bring Pedro immortality.68 Other 
writers also echo the explicit reduction of Pedro to the Grito. Some do it by omission: 
they focus solely on Pedro’s heroic actions regarding independence with a one 
dimensional representation of Pedro via discussions of Ipiranga. Others are as explicit as 
Araujo. The poet, playwrite, and journalist José Maria Gomes de Sousa articulates this 
reductionist view: “when the future asks who he [Pedro I] was...it is enough that we will 
say only this: he was the hero of Ipiranga.”69 
Along with immortalizing Pedro’s voice, the Grito also made famous his action, 
and it was that action—the gesture of raising his right arm in protest of Portugal and oath-
swearing to Brazil—that was reinforced and celebrated in the composition of the statue. 
References to that gesture range from simple embellishing, such as it being a “strong” or 
“herculean arm,” to a much deeper meaning and connection to the nation’s founding. For 
the journalist and educator José Albano Cordeiro, the act meant that “with a wave of his 
arm, despotism falls, and heroism in Brazil awakens.” Cordeiro is but one of many who 
make Pedro the one to fell Portuguese despotism and who assert that the chronicles of the 
nation’s heroic figures begin with Pedro I and Ipiranga.70 The raising of the arm also 
came to represent the “raising of the Brazilian standard” as well as the “immortal 
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standard of liberty…on the banks of the Ipiranga.”71 The militaristic connotation of the 
idea of the raising of a nation’s standard again emphasizes the proclamation aspect of 
Pedro’s role and the function of the Grito as the foundational myth of Brazil’s origins. In 
effect, it emphasizes such a militaristic style over any real historical substance. Lastly, 
some writers added a popular element to the symbolism of Pedro’s right arm. For one, it 
was the extension of the “hand of a true friend” while for another it was “the arm of the 
people.”72  
The attribution of all that the Grito set into motion into that one moment made it 
more and more powerful as an image and a myth. It is precisely because it came to 
symbolize Brazil’s unlimited potential and promise that the inauguration of the statue 
which captured and celebrated it became a moment in and of itself for Brazilians to 
reflect on their political and social reality forty years later. The result, according to 
Hendrik Kraay, was that the inauguration “became the lightning rod for criticisms of the 
imperial regime and indirect challenges to Pedro II himself.”73 Caricatures of the statue in 
the Rio press became not so much criticisms of the ways in which Pedro I was being 
defined but a critique of the empire’s and the nation’s shortcomings in fulfilling the 
promise of that idealized imperial past. New political groups vying for power and a place 
in the imperial regime found fault with the idea of the emergence of a unified, triumphant 
nation—“liberated” by Pedro I—which in 1862 was still based upon the institution of 
slavery and had an emperor who increasingly asserted his moderating power to appoint 
and dissolve ministries in order to thwart partisan agendas and political change. The 
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government of Pedro II in the years after the inauguration would be in turmoil, trying to 
deal with the consequences of the war in Paraguay, an emergent abolition movement, and 
an increasing republicanism in the new generation of military and civil leaders. Noé 
Freire Sandes calls the polemic regarding the statue a “dispute of memory” regarding the 
past and the present.74 Therefore, the majority of the later public discourse surrounding 
the statue was more about defining the empire’s legacy than it was the ways in which the 
nation specifically remembered its first emperor, whose rule accounted for less than one 
quarter of the empire’s existence.  
The Counter Narrative: Pedro I as Opportunistic Antagonist to 
Independence 
This intellectual and critical diversion was true except for one loud voice in the 
public sphere who felt compelled to refute the official imperial interpretations of Pedro 
I’s legacy which were represented in the statue’s symbolism. That figure was Minas 
Gerais-born Teófilo Otoni, a prominent political figure in his home state and Rio, 
businessman, and critic of the monarchy which he found to be authoritarian and 
undemocratic. Yet his concern for “the message that the bronze [statue] would pass on to 
Brazil’s posterity,” preserved in his pamphlet dated the day before the statue’s initial 
inauguration, did not engage the larger issues of the monarchy in general or the politics of 
the day. 75 In his famous pamphlet, he has no axe to grind with Pedro’s father, Dom João 
VI or his son, Pedro II…the ruling monarch of the day. He does not rehash independence 
or the veracity of the Grito. What Otoni does take issue with is the ways in which the 
statue advances the historical attribution of independence and constitutionalism to Pedro 
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I. The bottom line for the critic is that Pedro’s transgressions as an opportunistic and 
autocratic ruler are so poisonous that they obliterate and negate any positive elements of 
his historical legacy. The first emperor’s legacy is solely that of tyranny, constitutional 
and moral transgression, and unadulterated self-interest. Otoni finds those qualities—
rather than heroism or allegiance to Brazil—to be at the root of all of the actions for 
which Pedro I was being lauded in the statue. In Otoni’s eyes, none of those things being 
attributed to Pedro were legitimate or truly his doing. Very importantly, though, and at 
the core of these definitions of Pedro I, was the fact that Otoni himself took part in the 
political uprising that forced Pedro I’s abdication in 1831. As counter legacies to each 
other, Otoni felt compelled to delegitimize and indict Pedro in order to subsequently 
justify and legitimize his own participation in the events of April 7th that led to the 
emperor’s abdication. For Otoni, the stakes in 1862 were high, extremely personal, and 
with absolutely no middle ground. Since Otoni’s historical role was one of 
contraposition, the glorification of his political foe equates to the contemporary 
criminalization of himself.76 For these reasons, he refuted—point by point—the 
fundamental historical statements symbolically represented in the statue and its imperial 
vision of history. The first that he addresses is the definition of Pedro I as the hero of 
independence. 
Otoni takes issue with all that the writers discussed above attributed to the Grito 
and to Pedro I. For him, the portrayal of independence as some sort of “donation” from a 
monarch was a false narrative of a super-imposed, top-down, royal elite driven 
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independence. Instead, his historical reality centered on the organic, local, and decidedly 
Brazilian bottom-up social and political movement that came to fruition based upon the 
“efforts of more than one generation.”77 Rather than the reductionist view of Pedro, the 
Grito, and independence, Otoni places the credit for independence in the figure of 
Tiradentes, the executed leader of the Inconfidência Mineira. Arrested in 1789 and later 
executed, quartered, and displayed throughout the southeast of Brazil, Joaquim José da 
Silva Xavier, whose nickname Tiradentes followed him into the history books, took part 
in a republican uprising during the reign of Pedro’s grandmother, Queen Maria. His 
participation in what Otoni considered the “project of liberation” ended with martyrdom 
and catapulted him into the role of “patriarch of the independence of Brazil” for 
republicans and liberals like Otoni.78 That Pedro I could preempt that standing and 
receive false accolades and credit over a man martyred for advancing the cause of 
independence affected Otoni profoundly. Even more galling was the fact that the statue 
was being erected on the supposed site of the martyr’s execution. An abomination in his 
eyes, the statue of Pedro I on sacred historical ground would be met with a starkly 
different public reaction, according to Otoni. There, instead of the inspiration and 
sympathy that the witnesses to the 1792 execution felt, the “spectators” of the statue’s 
inauguration would be there only out of “empty curiosity.”79 By comparing each 
historical figure’s public reception on that specific ground, Otoni was attempting to 
dismiss Pedro I and instead assert Tiradentes’ place in the public imagination. 
Only one writer celebrating the statue discussed the shared space between 
Tiradentes and Pedro I, and De-Simoni naturally did so in a way that glorified both 
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figures and therefore undoubtedly drew Otoni’s ire. De-Simoni establishes Tiradentes’ 
claim to the praça’s sacred space as well as his historical legacy saying that “in this same 
place where one day he expired on the infamous gallows, who condemned by Portuguese 
justice, died for the Brazilian patria!” The poet then juxtaposes the experiences of the two 
figures of independence by presenting them as a study in contrasts. Where the people 
looked on in pain as Tiradentes moaned in terror, in front of the statue people rise in joy. 
De-Simoni asserts that this difference, these contrasts, come from “this Patriot avenging 
the honored fame” and “reestablishes his [Tiradentes’] dignity.” Linking the two even 
further, the poet says that Pedro made to flourish that which Tiradentes wanted: an 
independent homeland. Ultimately, De-Simoni finds that the statue honors the memory of 
Tiradentes by asserting, somewhat curiously, that the homage to the “Luso-Prince” could 
make right the execution carried out by “lusa justice.”80 Such a vision of history was in 
stark opposition to Otoni’s reverence of Tiradentes and enmity for Pedro I. 
Otoni also vehemently refuted the notion of Pedro I as any sort of protagonist of 
Brazil’s independence. Instead, for him the prince regent consistently antagonized the 
efforts—efforts which matured despite him—through his continued vows of loyalty to his 
father and Portuguese rule in Brazil. Otoni gives no credit for Pedro’s change in 
allegiance, characterizing it as born out of self-serving political survival and necessity 
rather than any ideological adhesion to the tenets of liberty and independence or even any 
identification with Brazil. The writers celebrating Pedro could laud him as the bringer of 
liberty to Brazil because they defined liberty as political separation from Portugal 
whereas Otoni defined the idea of liberty as that which sustains representative 
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democracy. Pedro’s cooptation of the independence movement (after the Portuguese 
Côrtes effectively stripped him of any legal authority in Brazil) is characterized by Otoni 
as the basest of political opportunism.81 Ultimately regarding independence, Otoni judges 
Pedro I to be a liar, a deceiver, and even worse a betrayer of his father after having 
broken his vow of fidelity to the Portuguese crown and government. Given this view, 
Otoni is clear regarding whom he would prefer be celebrated as the “legitimate and 
selfless patriarchs” of Brazilian independence: Tiradentes and José Bonifacio. 
Interestingly, the critic notes that “in place of thrones and statues, one met the gallows, 
the other exile” in a reference to the ignominious actual experiences of each figure. Yet in 
his own time, Pedro I was effectively sent into exile by Otoni himself. Similarly, José 
Bonifacio returned to Brazilian public service after his return from exile. Therefore, he 
takes issue with the short-term historical trajectory of Pedro’s advisor while then taking 
issue with the long-term reinstatement of Pedro into the Brazilian political imagination. 
Ultimately, the statue represents for Otoni Pedro’s continued self-aggrandizement and 
historical theft of credit and glory from those whom he considers the emperor’s memorial 
victims, who are permanently linked through their joint efforts towards independence—
Tiradentes who planned and set independence into motion and José Bonifacio who 
realized that dream—as well as their political and ethical virtues and finally their 
victimhood.82 
This tension between infamy and fame, and how the two could be altered over 
time, are important components of how Otoni discusses the idea of sacralized space in his 
refutation of Pedro I. He contrasts the days that would come to mark the public moments 
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in the Largo do Rocio: the execution of Tiradentes and the inauguration of the statue. He 
portrays the execution met with inspired sympathy on the part of the witnesses there, and 
he contrasts this with what he envisions as the “repressed…spectators” to view the 
spectacle of the statue out of “empty curiosity.”83 Again, Otoni purposefully compares a 
primary eighteenth-century experience with the secondary inaugural experience a century 
later. The original popular reception to the royal family’s swearing their oaths to the 
upcoming constitution, the origins of the Largo’s connection to Pedro, was indeed met 
with vivas and public acclaim. But Otoni is not taking issue with that moment in his 
discussion. Instead, he is dependent upon the idea of Pedro I and Tiradentes as counter 
narratives. He emphasizes the crimes the Crown committed against the memory of his 
martyred patriarch: the denial of a Christian burial for his body (owing to his 
dismemberment), the razing of his home, and the raising of a plaque that denoted the 
mark of infamy at that site. Such a treatment of Tiradentes was meant to cast him into 
infamy for perpetuity. That effort was thwarted, however, when the provisional 
government in the province of Minas Gerais had the plaque removed after independence. 
Ironically, the “shameful monument” that he considered the plaque to be is exactly what 
he described the statue to be. The infamy that Tiradentes was somewhat being lifted from 
was precisely the infamy that Otoni wanted Pedro I to experience in perpetuity. So while 
the easing of the historical condemnation of Tiradentes is for him the righting of wrong, 
the celebration of Pedro I is the wronging of what for Otoni was right in his actions to 
remove Pedro from power.84 
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Otoni’s discussion of sacred historical space also brings up an important point. As 
the writers celebrating the statue made abundantly clear, the truly sacred historical space 
for Pedro I was not the Largo do Rocio in Rio de Janeiro but the shore of the Ipiranga 
River in São Paulo. For example, one poet had São Paulo speak in his ode: “If your name 
shines on my immortal soil, then my soil shines on your immortal bronze.” Interestingly, 
the submission for Rio does not make reference to the other great act of authorship 
portrayed in the statue which was the writing of the constitution. Instead, Sousa, the 
author, uses that stanza to pay tribute to Pedro II. Using the father-son motif, Rio 
celebrates the statue by honoring Pedro’s “son who reigns” who is a “gift” from his 
father.85 The idea of Pedro’s “name accompanying the very land, sun, and water of 
Ipiranga” was embellished even more by adding the element of the Southern Cross 
hanging over Ipiranga and giving Brazil—and Pedro I—a place in the larger context of 
momentous events in the Americas.86 While the poets did not call for it, the project of 
raising a monument to the Grito in São Paulo had already been proposed in 1854 at the 
time when the proposal for a Rio statue was being made. The discourse surrounding the 
question of Rio or Ipiranga (or both) tapped into the ongoing tensions between Rio as the 
imperial capital and the other major cities and provinces of Brazil. Some in the press 
argued that if the monument to Pedro were to truly be national in nature, its logical 
location should be Ipiranga. The power and preeminence of Rio ruled out, however, and 
it was not until the 1880s that construction began on what would eventually become the 
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Museu Paulista and the Parque da Independência and memorial space to celebrate the 
Grito and Ipiranga.87 
In the end, Teófilo Otoni’s efforts to trace a decidedly republican rather than 
imperial historical legacy for Brazil fell short. The Grito was simply too powerful in 
creating the triad of “D. Pedro—independence—liberty.”88 The discussions of Pedro as 
the hero of Ipiranga and independence show clearly that by equating that moment, that 
act, with the independence of the nation, writers of the time made Pedro the defining 
figure of that defining moment. As Otoni found, it was impossible to divorce Pedro from 
that accomplishment, to lift his image from the scene at Ipiranga or try to replace it in the 
public and political imaginings of independence. The indelible image of the Grito won 
out as the primary way in which Pedro and the nation’s origins were defined, bearing 
fruit for the imperial elite’s attempt to spur a new appreciation of the monarchy’s past 
through the historical invention of the Grito.89 
The Giver of Law 
 
That the drama and evocative imagery of the scenes and moment of Ipiranga 
dominated the poets’ imaginations and their pens is not surprising, especially given the 
systematic efforts of the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro to construct a sense 
of nationhood and history on that narrative. Machado de Assis commented on the potency 
and attractiveness of that mythical beginning….the narrative of Ipiranga was tailor-made 
for poetry, parades, and performances. And it constituted one of the historical feats 
symbolically represented in the posing of the statue. Consequently, the vast majority of 
the lines of the celebratory odes focus on Pedro’s meriting the mantle of independence in 
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his historical legacy. What is surprising, however, is the comparative paucity of lines 
written to celebrate the second historical feat conflated in the statue: the promulgation of 
the constitution created by Pedro. Multiple writers do refer to that aspect of the legacy 
captured in the statue, but they do so with single lines, passing references, and often 
homage placed more in the context of Portugal than that of Brazil.  
 There are multiple possibilities to account for this difference in historical 
treatments. First, the effort of the IHGB focused more on the issues of national origins 
and political history rather than constitutional or juridical origins and history. The effort 
was indeed shaping the intellectual discourse surrounding the inauguration, and the 
narrative of Ipiranga loomed in that discussion. A second possibility to explain the 
relative silence on the role of Pedro regarding the constitution is that the writers had such 
a basic level of acceptance for and internalization of that constitution as the basis of their 
political system—with Pedro II at its head—that they felt no need to talk up that 
attribution because it had not been contested and thereby needed no affirmation. These 
explanations center on the intentional ignoring or glossing over of the topic by the 
writers. Whether it was because of the controversial nature of the constitution’s arrival in 
1824 with Pedro’s use of force to shut down the constituent assembly the year before or 
the political turmoil amongst a conservative party facing fracture and infighting as well 
as its opponents, writers celebratory of the monarchy in 1862 consciously limited their 
discussions on the subject matter.  
  Of the few specific references to the constitution in the inaugural poems, several 
were the work of one particular poet, Dr. Luiz Vicente De-Simoni. In one poem he 
described the first emperor as a “liberal prince” who was the giver of independence, 
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liberty, and law.90 In another submission, the same writer defined Pedro I as once again 
the giver of law, liberator of an oppressed people, creator of a great empire, and securer 
of independence and liberty. The constitution was typically just one of these noted 
accomplishments that collectively authors used to justify the “merit and the great 
heroism” of Pedro I.91 A different poet defined Pedro with a list that seemed to value 
Pedro’s style as much as his substance. According to him, Brazilians owed their thanks to 
their first emperor for four things: “strength, attitude, independence, and law.”92 Beatriz 
Francisca de Assis Brandão’s tribute to Pedro follows in this same vein. She names 
Pedro’s planting of three things in “this hemisphere” which were “the constitution, the 
throne, and liberty.” Her triad differs slightly from the more typical ones presented above, 
and it is interesting that she includes the throne, with more of an emphasis on the 
establishment of the dynasty and the empire rather than Brazil as an entity separate from 
that. The often-equated use of “liberty” to mean political freedom from Portugal still 
places the mantle of independence in the triad, but the inclusion of the throne celebrates 
the Bragança monarchy as much as the constitution. A possible explanation for this 
emphasis lies in the author’s appreciation for the emperor’s—and thereby the 
monarchy’s—role in maintaining the territorial integrity of the nation. She portrays Pedro 
I as a combination of youth and royalty but emphasizes the “steady hand” of the young 
ruler in “securing the integrity of the Empire of the Cross.”93 All of these references to 
Pedro’s accreditation for the constitution use more of the laundry list approach to 
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homage.94 His meriting credit for it is always couched in the larger context of the other 
accomplishments of his reign. 
  One author distinguishes himself, though, from the typical vague reference to the 
constitution. Due to the prolific nature of De-Simoni’s contributions to the celebratory 
odes—seven sonnets in various languages—his writings reflect not only the overall norm 
of privileging Ipiranga and independence in most of his poems but also serve as one of 
the few examples of the constitution being discussed first and foremost and beyond just a 
passing reference. In his “Á Inauguração da Estatua Equestre em Bronze do Imperador D. 
Pedro Primeiro. Fundador do Imperio do Brazil,” De-Simoni places the constitution first 
in importance as foundational to Brazil, saying that Brazil owed gratitude to Pedro for 
“giving to [the empire] a law from which all others are derived, a law that wisely secures 
and guarantees independence and liberty.”95 These lines are the only ones in all thirty-
eight poems that go so far as to portray the constitution as establishing the imperial code 
for Brazilian society. And De-Simoni went further in another sonnet, one of his 
submissions in French, to describe that code as “the most beautiful” that safeguards 
“people, property, and lives.” One other poet, the acclaimed Bahian journalist, jurist, and 
the Empire’s Secretary of Justice, Manoel Jesuino Ferreira, labeled that code as coming 
from the “liberal constitution” that Pedro wrote. 96 
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  While De-Simoni takes the time to flesh out his homage to Pedro’s constitution 
based on its merit as the empire’s charter, two other very interesting thematic twists 
emerge in the lines other poets devoted to the topic of the constitution. The first is the 
rather ingenious way that Manoel de Araujo Porto-Alegre finds to celebrate the emperor’s 
forced abdication as a testament to his constitutional fidelity. Porto-Alegre’s sentiments 
echo the prevalent theme of Pedro I as father and progenitor of the nation and Pedro II, 
which involves the theme of inheritance and love. But they also associate the constitution 
with an interesting companion: abdication. The author paints a picture of a self-
sacrificing constitutional monarch in the act of “descending from the throne, respecting 
his son and the law that he gave.” For Porto-Alegre, the emperor “ceded the empire” out 
of that respect and because of destiny, a destiny of the father to pursue his exploits in 
Portugal and of the son to rule by the law created by his father.97 This problem of 
abdication and Otoni’s participation in the revolt that precipitated it will be addressed in a 
separate section that expands further on this theme of abdication as generosity rather than 
ignominy.  
  The second interesting twist to some of the references to the constitution is the 
ongoing seepage that occurs due to the conflation of Pedro’s Brazilian and Portuguese 
historical legacies, in this case as they pertain specifically to perceptions of Pedro’s 
relationship to the constitution. Much like the issue of abdication, the first emperor’s 
portugalidade (Portuguese-ness) in the rhetoric of the inauguration is a much larger 
theme and will be discussed in further detail. Nevertheless, it is striking that for several of 
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the writers, the specific issue of the constitution leads them more and more to the 
Portuguese aspect and identity of Pedro I rather than the Brazilian one. There are specific 
references to the Portuguese law being violated by Pedro’s brother Miguel in his attempt 
to reestablish an absolute monarchy in Portugal and Pedro’s defense of that constitution 
after leaving Brazil.98 There are references to Pedro’s giving liberty and law to two 
worlds. However, most common is the theme that the emperor was a “legislator in peace, 
hero in war.” Many writers echo each other using this concept of Pedro based upon the 
dichotomy of peace and war, and it is precisely the issue of war and the notion of Pedro 
as a “soldier hero” that serves as code for the narrative being Portuguese-based. Whether 
it was Porto-Alegre, Araujo, or others, their mentioning of Pedro “giving laws to the 
world” as well as “justice” come in lines immediately preceded or followed by their 
defining Pedro as soldier and war hero.99 Because his soldier bona fides were purely 
Portuguese in nature, this blended identity of law-giver and soldier reveals the difficulty 
of filtering out one legacy from the other. 
The Counter Narrative: Pedro I as Violator of Constitutional Principles 
On a final note, those few references to Pedro and the constitution (most notably 
the passing references discussed previously) use language that reflects Otoni’s earlier 
problem with independence being portrayed as a “doação” of a monarch rather than the 
product of Brazilian agency and efforts. For most writers, the constitution was something 
Pedro gave and Brazil received.100 One particular writer, I. B. , who 
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presented a poem in Greek before providing a “traducção de um amigo” in Portuguese, 
demonstrates this very notion. For him, Pedro not only “donated” or “gave” 
independence to Brazil but also “endowed” the nation with a “law most wise.”101 The 
writer’s interpretation of the imperial constitution as an endowment—connoting 
something given freely and with generosity—is precisely one of the messages, or 
arautos, that Otoni felt compelled to refute in his pamphlet. The placing of the statue in 
the Praça da Constituição and the incorporation of the nation’s charter into Pedro’s pose 
signified to him—and most importantly to all posterity—“that the Constitution was, if not 
a concession of divine right, at least the spontaneous concession of the philosophy of the 
prince, and a document of his adherence to liberal ideas.”102 Similar to Otoni’s argument 
regarding independence, the key is that this interpretation emphasizes the top-down 
aspect of the drafting of the constitution by an emperor who had, in Otoni’s judgment, 
usurped the drafting and thereby the mantle of having authored the constitution. Just as 
he considered the form of independence achieved by Pedro the “independence of the 
empire” rather than that of Brazil, he calls the 1824 constitution the “constitution of the 
monarchy.” That reality, when combined with Pedro’s act of violently dissolving the 
elected constituent assembly completely delegitimizes the emperor’s constitution.  
That reality is also why a poet like Antonio José Victorino de Barros referring to 
the constitution as the “solemn pact” that Pedro made to the Brazilian people was so 
abhorrent for Otoni as well as other liberal writers at the Diário do Rio de Janeiro. For 
example, that newspaper noted its pleasure that the rains had forced the inauguration of 
the statue off of the date commemorating the constitution because, according to Hendrik 
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Kraay, they found Pedro I to be “the man who least respected it [the constitution].”103 For 
the constitution to be celebrated and immortalized in the statue and in that way, the 
narrative could not be that Pedro I autocratically and illegally dissolved the constitutional 
convention thus violating the democratic rights of participation of the Brazilian people. 
The statue pointedly refuted that historical interpretation and subsequently whitewashed 
the process, valuing instead the product. After all, a nation would not celebrate a crime 
against its fledgling democracy, would it? Just as with independence, the attribution of 
credit for that constitution mandates a certain narrative. And Otoni was well aware that 
that narrative contradicted his position, refuted his criticism, and silently indicted him for 




 When those authors describe Pedro I as a “legislator in peace, hero in war,” they 
are attesting to another prominent identity assigned to Pedro in 1862, which is that of the 
soldier.104 Pedro’s credentials as a soldier stem more from his post-Brazil time leading 
the military campaign against the troops of his brother Miguel who had seized absolute 
power from Portugal’s constitutional monarch Maria II, who was also Pedro’s daughter. 
Pedro’s Portuguese legacy did provide him with military glory. He raised an army, 
victoriously led those troops into battle, defeated his brother, restored constitutional rule 
to Portugal, and even died from the tuberculosis he contracted during the military 
campaign. He was every bit a Portuguese soldier and hero. His military legacy in Brazil, 
however, was more about his not having to fight, at least not directly. As Prince Regent 
                                                 




of Brazil and later Emperor, his direct leadership was limited to facing down the 
Portuguese troops in Rio de Janeiro who eventually left without ever having fired a shot 
against him. That accomplishment did take military and strategic skill. Pedro time and 
again outmaneuvered the Portuguese commanders into unwinnable defensive positions, 
using the limited resources he had to incentivize with money as well as threaten 
punishment with a swelling patriot militia. But the accomplishment of driving all 
Portuguese troops from Rio did not come with any privation or hardship. That sort of a 
struggle for independence took part in the Northeast of Brazil in the provinces of Bahia 
and Maranhão. The new emperor was decisive in asserting an imperial role through the 
participation of a Brazilian naval fleet in those conflicts far from Rio de Janeiro, but the 
ultimate victories had more to do with the leadership of Scottish admiral Thomas, Lord 
Cochrane and the local Brazilian militias than they did to Pedro I.  
 This historical reality of Brazil’s independence did not stop the Rio-centric 
writers in 1862 from giving Pedro credit for having steered Brazil into joining the society 
of independent nations “unstained by bloody national battles” and “without the pain of 
having to shed the blood of a companheiro.”105 He could achieve independence and 
found the empire because before him, “enemies yield” and victory is won.106 However, as 
was discussed in the section regarding the Grito, the celebratory writers focused on the 
independence effort through discussions of Ipiranga to the exclusion of any other aspect. 
Those enemies yielding and victories won in the case of Brazil were reduced to the 
moment of the Grito. It is this fact that makes the repeated references to Pedro as a 





“Warrior King” or “Soldier King” compelling evidence that Pedro’s Portuguese legacy 
had decidedly transfused onto his overall identity in the Rio of 1862.107 The title of king  
was a purely Portuguese honorific and was a title that Pedro held officially for a mere ten 
days before abdicating to his daughter Maria. Manoel de Araujo Porto-Alegre goes even 
further than just using the Portuguese title to describe Pedro. He calls on Brazilians “to 
bow before the image of the immortal triad which the bronze brings to life: King, Citizen, 
Soldier!” Antonio José dos Santos Neves changes that triad to read “duke, citizen, 
soldier” in a move that uses specifically the title Pedro carried after abdicating his 
Brazilian throne and comes in the context of describing Pedro after his death. The choice 
to omit Emperor is still striking, especially given the specific call for Brazilian deference. 
Certainly, both titles—Emperor and King—connote royalty and power, but the choice to 
use Portuguese descriptors in lieu of one of Pedro’s distinctly Brazilian titles by those 
writers, who had the avowed intent of glorifying Brazil and Pedro’s relationship to it, 
makes their words curious. Another explicit reference to Pedro as a “Soldier King” went 
even deeper into that Portuguese legacy by defining the leader as one who made the 
ultimate sacrifice for liberty. He was the “soldier dying for liberty,” a king willing to 
sacrifice his body and his health and ultimately die in order to protect liberty in Portugal.  
This notion of Pedro as Portuguese soldier was a much stronger image than that of 
“cavalheiro” that was often used in reference to perceptions of him during his Brazilian 
reign. This power came from the reality that his role as soldier was a fatal one. The war 
and combat in Portugal was real. It was deadly, gritty, and full of sacrifice. It put him in 
direct physical danger through his active participation in the Battle of Ponte Ferreira, the 
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Figure 6: Representation of Pedro I in the program of the exposition “D. Pedro           
d’Alcântara de Bragança, Imperador do Brasil, Rei de Portugal,” inaugurated                       
in the Palácio de Queluz in Portugal and replicated in Rio in 1987, p. 169. 
defense of Oporto, and the defense of Lisbon. It ravaged his body through his contraction 
of tuberculosis and caused his death, which one writer referred to as his “sleeping in 
Lysia.” This layer of sacrifice mixed with the notions of debt and gratitude and grief 
expressed previously by the writers.108 
 There are some non-Portuguese specific references to Pedro as a soldier. For 
example, the journalist Carlos Testa refers to Pedro as a “soldier liberator” who was the 
“son of kings,” which illustrates a common practice of linking his role as monarch and 
soldier. Antonio José dos Santos Neves, whose military background spawned various 
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patriotic poems and books dedicated to Emperor Pedro II, similarly and generically 
defines Pedro as “the highest, most generous and brave, invincible and noble warrior.”109 
Other writers do attempt to link this soldier identity with the Brazilian legacy. The titles 
of “brave warrior” and “tireless hero of a thousand glories” are linked to the specifically 
Brazilian title of Pedro as a “celebrated Emperor.” Cordeiro refers to Pedro as the 
“immortal warrior” and links that identity with the language of Brazil and independence. 
He states that Pedro, “then fighting for liberty, in majesty made himself first.” While 
Pedro’s exploits in Portugal loom over this identity, here the author links that title, that 
legacy, to Pedro’s making himself first, as in his historical title as first Emperor of Brazil. 
The author also follows this passage with a celebration of the Grito which allows for a 




The Hero of Two Worlds 
 
The discussion of Pedro I as a soldier was an integral part of his larger identity as 
a transnational figure. The writing of Antonio José dos Santos Neves illustrates this very 
point by describing Pedro as the “first hero,” alluding to his standing of Pedro the First 
and shortly thereafter referring to him as “the illustrious and Lusitanian Prince Dom 
Pedro.”111 For Neves, Pedro I could be many things: the founder of Brazil, the hero of 
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Ipiranga, illustrious, and Lusitanian. But the one thing that he was not, according to this 
author’s omission, was Brazilian.  
As the “illustrious hero of the old and new world,” the legacy of Pedro I had to 
walk the fine line of being a Portuguese prince who declared Brazilian independence 
from Portugal, renounced the Portuguese and then Brazilian thrones, and finally saved his 
daughter’s rule in Portugal from his own brother’s homegrown tyranny. I assert that it is 
the intertwined complexity of all of those feats combined that shed light on Pedro’s 
ambiguous portugalidade.112 Fundamental to the articulation of identity is its being 
forged in opposition to someone or something else: the classic us versus them 
demarcation. During the era of Brazil’s independence, the Portuguese became an 
increasingly distinct “them.” It was the Portuguese metropole that emerged as the clear 
villain in the movement for independence, being portrayed by the writers in 1862 as the 
source of “the rages of the tyrants” and “despotism.” The prism through which the writers 
discuss such tyranny is just through the lens of the independence effort. Therefore, the 
only oppressor and villain persecuting Brazil is Portugal. While he had given up his 
Portuguese citizenship and self-identified his nationality as Brazilian, Pedro’s allegiance 
to the Brazilian cause and its origins translated into a larger view of him in 1862 as more 
of a Luso-Brazilian. In essence, he had become a leader of both and citizen of neither.113 
Ironically, it is Pedro’s being cast out of Brazil by Otoni’s uprising on the grounds of 
tyranny and his deeds in Portugal that followed that effectively flip the narrative and the 
definition of Portugal as the villain. Facing tyranny at the hands of Miguel’s absolutist 
coup, Portugal achieved victimhood in the eyes of the writers in 1862, and that 
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victimhood served to elevate Pedro’s ultimate legacy. It became a narrative of Pedro 
redeeming Portugal—and vice versa—following the Duke of Bragança’s exile from 
Brazil. 
Although never defined as being Brazilian himself by the writers, Pedro was 
claimed for having “adopted the patria” of Brazil, for understanding “the hopes and 
destiny of Brazil,” and for being that nation’s “champion” who “confronted for us the 
tyranny of the despots of Europe.”114 In standing up to that “tyranny,” Pedro earned for 
himself the title of “Liberator” of two peoples. The authors used similar phrasings to 
describe this role. He was the “soldier liberator,” the “hero liberator,” or simply 
“liberator” for “two peoples” as well as their “giver of light.” Yet the writers also 
distinguished between the methods used by Pedro in securing that liberty for Brazil and 
Portugal, sometimes disagreeing on those differences and what they signified. For 
example, Porto-Alegre equates Pedro’s role in Brazilian independence as securing liberty 
for that nation while comparing that accomplishment to Pedro’s role in restoring 
constitutional rule to Portugal. Domingo José Gonçalves de Magalhães, however, 
distinguishes the two legacies as such, describing Pedro as the “famous Man who two 
times gave liberty to a country, first with the quill and later with the sword.” Magalhães’ 
words represent the less common definition of liberty as being akin to representative 
government rather than political separation and sovereignty. For him, it was Pedro’s 
authorship of Brazil’s constitution that secured liberty for that nation. This idea holds true 
for Portugal as well since Pedro authored that nation’s constitution, too. But it was in 
Portugal where Pedro picked up the sword to restore the constitution, marking the 
divergent constitutional experiences between the two worlds. One final writer, Joaquim 
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Jacome de Oliveira Campos Filho, portrays Pedro’s link to the two worlds in a way that 
could echo either Magalhães or Porto-Alegre because of the ambiguity of his words. 
Campos Filho approaches the issue through the idea of oath-taking, saying that Pedro was 
“a monarch two times, in two worlds swearing to liberty.” While after these lines he 
alludes to Pedro liberating Brazil, the fact that he swore an oath at Ipiranga as well as to 
uphold the constitution on different occasions complicates a definitive interpretation.115 
Nevertheless, what binds these historical interpretations together is their repeated vision 
of Pedro I as a transnational hero who fuses royalty and liberation in one figure and 
shared experience.116 
 Despite this overwhelming sense of shared histories, Magalhães also felt the need 
to reassert Pedro’s Brazilian legacy over that of his Portuguese one. In his cantico, he 
attempts to reclaim Pedro from Portugal by way of the statue being a “marble tomb” for 
the former emperor. He alludes to Pedro as a shadow and says that the statue makes it 
possible that that shadow “might leave behind the Tejo [River in Portugal] as the Janeiro 
[a reference to Rio and the nonexistent river that the city was mistakenly named for] 
invokes it.”117 While there existed no call at this time for the repatriation of Pedro’s 
remains to Brazil from his interment in the São Vicente church outside of Lisbon, this 
recasting of the statue as tomb and the image of Pedro leaving behind Portugal was 
certainly a metaphorical repatriation. 
Antonio José Victorino de Barros takes this two worlds motif and adds a new 
identity onto it. In speaking of the statue, he says that it is “of the king, of the 
                                                 
115 Magalhães; Porto-Alegre; Andrada Silva; Barros; Manoel Jesuino Ferreira, “Á Estatua Equestre do 





emperor…to show that he was the father of two peoples and the liberator of both.”118 
While other writers routinely used the father-son dynamic to speak of Pedro I and Pedro 
II, Barros is the first to explicitly call Pedro I the father of Brazil. Nevertheless, the leap 
from founder to father for Brazil is not as great as it is for Portugal. Given the long 
national history of that European nation, the assertion that Pedro was the father of that 
nation is more reflective of his role as father to Queen Maria II. Antonio José dos Santos 
Neves lends credence to this interpretation, calling Pedro the “conqueror of two august 
thrones” and the “antecedent of two ruling children.”119 Only sparingly was Maria II 
placed in the context of her brother’s rule in Brazil. Typically, the emphasis on Pedro’s 
heirs and the continuation of the Bragança line was articulated just in references to Pedro 
II and his reign. Nevertheless, these statements reflect just how much writers such as 
Barros sought to link Pedro’s accomplishments on both sides of the Atlantic, making 
them a common Luso-Brazilian experience. Barros demonstrates this clearly, saying that 
both Brazil and Portugal were made greater by Pedro’s deeds. The interpretation of Pedro 
I as father of the nation is a rare one. Overall, the majority of writers are content to 
consider him the Liberator while leaving the familial language only to the relationship 
between the nations’ two rulers. 
The Counter Narrative: Pedro I as the Hero of Only Portugal   
 While it was previously the intent of Otoni to challenge emphatically the idea that 
Pedro I was in any way a hero, in a display of nuances he clarifies that his refutations 
address only the notions of the former emperor as a specifically Brazilian hero. In a 
surprising move, he readily concedes Pedro’s legitimacy as a hero and icon of Portuguese 





history, stating that “the equestrian statue would signify justice and truth if, located on 
Portuguese territory, it would commemorate the courage and heroism with which the 
Senhor Duke of Bragança defeated the absolutist government and restored the 
constitutional system.”120 This statement shows that while Pedro’s “crimes” of usurpation 
during the independence era and tyranny during the closing of the constitutional 
convention and beyond disqualified him in Otoni’s eyes for Brazilian praise, the 
vociferous critic of the first emperor is willing to give Pedro I credit for his deeds in 
Portugal. And Otoni is able to do this without any sense of irony or sarcasm given his 
earlier definition of the Primeiro Reinado as a “dictatorship” or the fact that Pedro I had, 
after all, declared his allegiance to Brazil’s independence against Portugal. It is striking 
that Otoni can praise Pedro for defending the Portuguese people against the absolutist 
regime of Miguel after he has spent the vast majority of his pamphlet establishing that 
Pedro was himself an absolute ruler and a scourge on democratic participation.121 This 
interpretation of constitutional royal authorship and defense of royal rights show a much 
more nuanced view of Pedro’s historical standing in Portugal than in Brazil. It also shows 
the complex layers that went into memorializing Pedro I. Otoni’s ultimate message is that 
for Brazil, Pedro’s legacy is permanently poisoned, leaving no room for redemption.  
 What allows Otoni to look differently upon Pedro’s Portuguese legacy is the 
omnipresence of the emperor’s glaring “Portuguese-ness” throughout Otoni’s 
indictments. Otoni portrays Pedro as always loyal to Portugal and always looking out for 
those Portuguese interests if not solely his own. Rather than the traditional narrative of 
Pedro breaking from the land of his birth and royal title, the critic asserts a counter-
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narrative of the Portuguese prince remaining doggedly committed to maintaining his 
Portuguese claim to power and thereby using Brazil as a stepping stone to that end. Otoni 
reduces the Brazilian Empire that others credited to Pedro I as founding to a “simple 
strategy of war” towards a Portuguese end.122 
 While the many writers celebrating the statue emphasized the transnational legacy 
that Pedro I had, Otoni makes it a point to refute that notion further. He actually praises 
those Portuguese in Brazil who contributed their “valuable donations…undoubtedly born 
out of noble and honorable sentiments that I respect and applaud” to the public fund for 
the Rio statue, calling them “good and loyal Portuguese.” Nevertheless, he labels those 
donations as ones that “without doubt denationalize the monument.”123 Certainly today 
we would call such participation by Portuguese citizens residing in Brazil and 
contributing to a statue located in Rio and depicting Brazilian historical achievements as 
truly transnational. However, Otoni labels the situation as de-nationalism since for him 
there was absolutely nothing of merit in Pedro’s status in Brazil. That interpretation 
hemmed Pedro in as a one-dimensional, one-country ruler. Accordingly, Pedro was a uni-
national hero, not a transnational one.  
 While there are many differences between Pedro’s exploits in Brazil and Portugal, 
the fact that he occupied the role of spearhead allows that prominence to mark the 
historical definitions of Pedro I made by those celebrating his statue. The fact of the 
matter was, however, whether he was the true driving force behind Brazilian 
independence or constitutionalism or not, he was the most prominent figure and thereby 
visible leader of it. With this reality, perception trumps intent or actual accomplishment. 
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And it is precisely such a perception that shapes collective memory. Critics such as Otoni 
could try to build a wall between Pedro’s two transatlantic historical legacies in order to 
distinguish the one from the other and prevent any transference from the Portuguese 
legacy into a larger and more general historical memory of Pedro in the Rio of 1862. Yet 
that was precisely what had already taken place in the political imaginations of many 
residents in Rio de Janeiro. 
 
 
The Magnanimous Father Who Bequeathed the Throne to His Son 
 
What can you do with a general 
When he stops being a general? 
Oh, what can you do with a general who retires? 
 
Who's got a job for a general 
When he stops being a general? 
They all get a job but a general no one hires 
 
They fill his chest with medals while he's across the foam 
And they spread the crimson carpet when he comes marching home 
The next day someone hollers when he comes into view 
"Here comes the general" and they all say "General who?" 
They're delighted that he came 
But they can't recall his name 
 
Irving Berlin, White Christmas  
(1954 Movie Soundtrack) 
   
  The writers celebrating Pedro I’s statue inauguration had to deftly navigate 
precisely this question of what to do with their emperor when he stopped being an 
emperor. After all, the only reason that Pedro was in a position to accomplish those 
heroic feats in Portugal was because he had been forced from power in Brazil. How did 
they celebrate a leader who was basically run out of town? 
86 
 
  They cast it in a positive light. Instead of using directly related words such as 
abdication, uprising, or rebellion, they used euphemisms as well as omissions. All but 
one lone writer completely avoided discussing Pedro’s reign in totality, the period in 
Brazilian history known as the Primeiro Reinado, or First Reign. That choice of omission 
was based on the fact that aside from the glory of Ipiranga and the success of the 
constitution in maintaining Brazil’s territorial integrity under a stable government 
structure, the First Reign was viewed historically as an increasingly contentious period 
that more and more pitted Brazilians versus Portuguese for social, economic, and political 
power as well as democratic participation versus the emperor’s tendency for unilateral 
executive decision-making. Only one writer, Beatriz Francisca de Assis Brandão, 
specifically addresses the period and whitewashes the historical record and Pedro’s 
contested rule. She calls the First Reign a “grandiose epoch,” an epoch in which Pedro, 
“the American monarch,” was given by history “the holy imprescriptible right of 
sanctioning the law and reigning under it.” While most would have to concede that Pedro 
I certainly ended his rule under the law and in observance of the constitution and its 
protocol for the passage of power in abdicating to his son Pedro II, it was precisely the 
perception that Pedro I no longer ruled under the law that inspired the conflicts and 
uprising that drove him from power.124  
  The vast majority of the other writers are content to simply avoid the issue of the 
First Reign in general and focus instead on Pedro’s act of abdication. That act of leaving 
is described as a “heroic abnegation.” This label is striking in two ways. First, it is 
important to note that many other writers similarly attached a level of heroism to the 
emperor’s leaving Brazil. His heroism was two-fold. He was heroic in sparing a conflict 




in Brazil in an attempt to suppress the uprising against him as well as for joining the 
conflict in Portugal to defend constitutional rule. Clearly many writers found it incredibly 
admirable that their nation witnessed such an orderly transfer of power in an historical 
context that was rife with bloody power struggles and political instability. That an 
emperor with long royal credentials would simply leave in 1831 without a fight to hold 
onto power is truly remarkable. Second, the careful use of the word “abnegation” paints 
his exile as an act of self-denial or self-sacrifice. Pedro was a king who “renounced” 
conflict “for the sake of maintaining harmony among his people.”125 By attributing the 
qualities of choice and sacrifice to the exile, the writers were able to give Pedro agency 
even in his loss of power. Porto-Alegre characterizes the events of April 7, 1831 as 
Pedro’s “stepping down from the throne as your own doing, respecting the son and the 
law which you had given, when in the excited night you ceded the empire to the force of 
destiny that called you away to new struggles. [You were] Great on the throne and in the 
extraordinary separation.”126 Such a representation of Pedro’s abdication as respectful of 
the law, magnanimous, and graceful assuaged the impact of abdication on his legacy and 
not surprisingly would serve as a personal affront to Teófilo Otoni and those who 
instigated that exile. 
  Porto-Alegre’s words reveal another crucial element of Pedro’s legacy: abdication 
as a royal act bequeathing his throne and Brazil to his son. The poet José Ferreira de 
Mattos adds to this idea by asserting that Pedro I demonstrated “love and loyalty” 
because he “delegated to your [Pedro’s] son the power of the monarchy for our felicity.” 
This portrayal of abdication as “delegation” done for the happiness of his subjects 
                                                 




emphasizes the historical standing of Pedro II and his father’s legacy of patrimony in 
leaving the nation independent and under the rule of Pedro II. The latter Mattos even calls 
one of Pedro I’s two accomplishments, ranking the transfer of power to Pedro II as 
second only to the freeing of Brazil from colonial rule.127 It is almost as if the relationship 
between father and son is funneled exclusively through that transfer of power on April 7 
in 1831. While one writer cites Pedro I’s “paternal love” in having “entrusted” Pedro II to 
Brazil, another describes this bestowal as having a redemptive quality for the ex-emperor. 
Antonio Gonçalves Teixeira e Sousa calls Pedro II a “gift” and in doing so defines Pedro 
I as the giver of that gift. For those observers in 1862 who used the opportunity to laud 
their current monarch just as much as their first one, the sense of gratitude they felt 
towards the founder of the Empire and the father of the Emperor served as another 
important mitigating factor in the issue of abdication. It did this by casting the father’s 
abdication as the positive event that made way for the young, Brazilian born monarch to 
assume the throne.128 But power was not Pedro II’s only inheritance. Barros cites the “fire 
of liberty lit in whirlwinds” by Pedro I and to which “Dom Pedro Segundo attests.”129 
This quotation is representative of a larger theme of Pedro II having inherited liberty—as 
well as the constitution under which he governed— from his father as a Bragança and an 
American monarch.  
  While often linking the nation’s two emperors together in their discourse, the 
writers of the celebratory odes also drew clear distinctions between their respective 
historical legacies. Pedro I is portrayed clearly as a hero, a liberator, and a soldier while, 
for the same author, Pedro II is the “model for the Kings.” Another author states “Glory, 
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glory to the nation on whose throne after Pedro I succeeds the Emperor Pedro II: the 
father creates the nation: the son brings it prosperity; one made free citizens out of 
vassals: the other happy men out of citizens.”130 These different places that the two 
emperors could occupy in the nation’s memory and historical narratives made it easier for 
the writers to both link them together and delineate them. In addition, Pedro II’s presence 
on the throne provided the imperial government with a direct connection to the subject of 
the nation’s first public monument.  
  As exemplified in a previous quotation that he was “called away to new 
struggles,” what Pedro did after abdication directly impacted how writers in 1862 
perceived the emperor’s abdication. The result ended up fusing Pedro’s aforementioned 
choice to leave Brazil with the legacy of fame and glory he achieved in Portugal. Several 
writers place great importance on the idea of the ex-emperor not just leaving but going to 
something else. Porto-Alegre alludes to this theme, describing Pedro as “stepping down 
from the throne to martial lines [in military service]” and calling him the “decorated 
soldier of liberty.” Embedded in that view of military service is the notion that Pedro left 
Brazil directly for the battlefields of Portugal.131 While it did take over a year in exile to 
raise and organize his forces before Pedro stepped foot onto Portuguese soil at Oporto to 
engage his brother’s army, the historical narrative that emerges in 1862 has Pedro leaving 
with an immediate purpose. This sense of purpose—often portrayed as a sacred or noble 
quest to secure liberty—casts his leaving in a completely different light than the reality of 
his actual exit. In this narrative, Pedro left Brazil behind voluntarily and steps 
immediately into an act of great heroism. 
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 Pedro’s exploits in Portugal succeeded in securing for him an indisputable 
standing in that nation’s history. They also went a long way in rehabilitating and 
redeeming his legacy in Brazil. For example, Campos Filho describes Pedro as “stripping 
himself of crowns and scepters” while also “risking his life to secure them.” By using the 
plural, the author is able to invoke both abdications: Pedro’s renunciation of the 
Portuguese throne after the death of his father King João VI in 1826 and his 1831 
Brazilian abdication. Campos Filho is also able to tie Pedro’s identity as soldier and 
liberator to those acts of abdication.132 Andrada Silva also references Pedro twice 
recusing himself from power, and he also elaborates on his vision of the abdication in its 
larger narrative, and that narrative allows for redemption through Pedro’s liberation of 
Portugal. He is the only one to use the terms “disgrace” and “exile” in terms of Pedro’s 
power and throne to discuss the complications that April 7 spelled for Pedro’s legacy. 
The author never uses any word related to rebellion. Instead, he describes the events as 
the “storm that surrounded him,” yet that storm “passes.” What remains for Pedro’s 
legacy, according to Andrada Silva, are two titles: Soldier and Emperor. He sequences 
those titles chronologically out of order. This ordering represents the understanding, 
however, that without Pedro as soldier, Pedro I could never historically reclaim the title 
of Emperor in the hearts and minds of the Brazilian people. The glory that he achieved as 
a soldier allowed him to lay claim to being Brazil’s emperor in memorium again. Silva 
even links the phrase “the heart of the people” to Pedro’s imperial title.133 One other 
writer, Testa, also recognizes and deals with Pedro’s complicated legacy as well as the 
idea of his redemption. Testa reconciles Pedro’s forced abdication with his status as 
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celebrated icon precisely through the idea of his memorialized redemption and even 
restoration. For him, Pedro found restoration and only “crowns of laurel” upon death: “in 
Lysia the throne is restored.” Two other writers even go so far as to use the former 
emperor’s ruling title of S. M. I., or Sua Majestade Imperial, in the titles of their odes. 
Brandão and Mello both refer to Pedro I in this way.   
The question of which title to use along with which name to use was in many 
ways a proxy war for the larger issue of Pedro’s overall place in history. With abdication, 
Pedro I lost his title of Emperor, and thereby S. M. I.. No longer emperor, his official title 
changed to that of the Duke of Bragança. For his critics, that new title was a badge of 
shame (of his demotion and being neither emperor nor king), and they used it with great 
disdain and pleasure. The idea of Pedro recovering the title of S. M. I.—of it being 
restored to him—and the status that went along with it certainly angered those who 
played a role in stripping him of them.134 Testa himself deals with the most fundamental 
question that placed observers of the inauguration as either in celebration or opposition to 
the statue. That question is whether or not Pedro’s accomplishments outweigh the 
shortcomings that forced him into exile. In sum, is his legacy redeemable? For Testa, that 
answer is clearly yes as he states that paying tribute to Pedro is a just act and that “March 
would extinguish the dissentions of April.”135 Ultimately, Brazilians’ conscious decision 
to pay tribute to Pedro I with the erection of his statue in March on the anniversary of the 
constitution had the power to wash away any stain on Pedro’s legacy. And that reality 
was abundantly clear to Otoni. 
                                                 




The Counter Narrative: Abdication as the Just Consequence for Tyranny   
Otoni’s concern and dismay over the historical oblivion into which the specific 
circumstances surrounding Pedro I’s abdication and the First Reign writ large—what 
happened after Ipiranga and before the military glories in Portugal—seemed to have 
faded is evident in every line that he wrote in his pamphlet. That conscious forgetting, or 
omitting as evidenced above, of the grievances lodged against Pedro I and the conflicts 
that ensued and ultimately resulted in his exile gave rise to what Otoni considered a 
blatantly false narrative. The consequence of the “bronze lie” and the false narrative it 
advanced was not just that a leader Otoni didn’t think deserved acclaim was being paid 
homage to. The previous sections detail how he refuted basically every definition of 
Pedro I as a Brazilian hero. There was more than even that at stake. Otoni makes it clear 
that the statue signifies that “the 7th of April in 1831 was a crime of rebellion for which 
Brazil must contritely ask amnesty, nullifying as unjust the sentence [abdication] that was 
carried out on that day against the first reign.” The fundamental question of what is crime 
versus justified rebellion is one that is at the heart of Otoni’s personal and historical 
dilemma. He defends his participation in what he calls an “act of popular virility” and a 
“popular cause” by labeling Pedro’s reign as one of “persecution.” As a result, the 
statue’s inauguration “slanders his past” in which he risked everything to rise up against 
the sitting emperor, thinking it truly the will of the people against a foreign (Portuguese) 
tyrant.  
To witness a statue to that very tyrant erected decades later was tantamount to 
seeing the Brazilian people restore Pedro I to his imperial throne. Otoni even referred to 
the statue’s supporters as “restorationists” saying that they achieved after his death what 
they were never able to do during his lifetime. Not only does he portray the statue as a 
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form of restoration of Pedro I after his abdication and death, but Otoni also takes that 
notion even further with his invocation of the macabre yet dramatic likening of Pedro I’s 
legacy to that of Ignez de Castro. The fourteenth-century queen consort of the very first 
King Pedro of Portugal, Ignez de Castro was posthumously crowned following a round of 
fatal political intrigue, and Otoni equates this act with that of the statue’s erection. The 
statue was “the new coronation of Ignez de Castro.” This metaphor reveals the extent of 
Otoni’s insecurity about how his insurrection would be newly defined through the 
statue’s contemporary—and historically retroactive—meaning. The “dictator” against 
whom he rebelled was being restored in prestige after exile and even death. Since Otoni 
does not use the inauguration event to indict the monarchy as a whole, it is not the 
restoration of a monarch that he finds so offensive. It is the restoration of Pedro I’s 
political and royal legitimacy in Brazil that offends him to the point of equating the 
inauguration of the statue to the historical experience of Ignez de Castro. 
Such a supposed restoration cut to the very core of Otoni’s own sense of historical 
place by questioning who out of that conflict of 1831 deserved credit or condemnation in 
1862. For him, Pedro I cannot merit that statue and be the tyrant he forced into exile. 
There is no room for redemption. Consequently, the statue vindicates Pedro I—in 
everything, not just the two aspects of his rule portrayed in the statue—and thereby 
criminalizes Otoni. His is a zero-sum game: the legitimation of one necessitates the 
invalidation of the other. After he asks what possible Brazilian motive could exist to 
explain the statue, he answers that it is the statue’s supporters’ desire that it symbolize 
“an atonement” for their generation and the nation. Such an interpretation emphasizes 
Otoni’s sense of being historically judged and condemned rather than himself being 
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celebrated as “the son of liberty” and the “veteran” of April 7 who turned imperial 




Since Teófilo Otoni’s self-perceived legacy was conversely related to that of the 
emperor whom he deposed, the issues surrounding the statue’s inauguration remained 
black and white for him and the stakes remained high. This dynamic serves as an 
important glimpse into how a broader historical narrative is comprised of the stories of 
individual, every-day people who participate in—and contend with—the events and elite 
of their day.  More importantly, it is a reminder of how all participants have a highly 
personal and invested stake in how those events are remembered. In what Sandes calls 
the “dispute of memory” represented in the contest between those who would glorify the 
7th of September and those who would the 7th of April, the public discourse in 1862 
demonstrates that the official imperial vision of history that sought to ingrain the Grito as 
the narrative of the nation’s founding was succeeding and loomed much larger in the 
political and public imagination.137 Pedro I’s identity as the hero of Ipiranga, the giver of 
the constitution, the father of Pedro II, and the valiant champion of liberty in Brazil and 
Portugal was being advanced by a multitude of writers and becoming part of the nation’s 
collective memory. 
 At the same time that the imperial elite were succeeding in their attempt to craft 
and inculcate this royal version of Brazil’s national origins, the nation was nevertheless 
changing. While a certain part of the population may have espoused the owing of a 
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generational debt of gratitude to the Empire’s founder, another part—that radical Liberal 
part—was beginning to emerge as a source of generational tension. Thus the empire’s 
elite could achieve a consensus on the historical and memorialized moment of the 
nation’s origins without any sort of guarantee for how that imperial narrative would play 
out in the future. In terms of the theme of the passage of time and its impact on a people 
and how they interpreted the past and themselves, that sense of the raising of the statue in 
the public square as overdue could coincide with a new belief that institutional reform 
was similarly coming due. While elites before were content to challenge for power within 
the existing system, this new generation was contemplating radically altering the very 
cornerstones of Brazil’s political, economic, and social structures: slavery, the monarchy, 
and the political organization of the state. Keep in mind that this change was not looming 
on the immediate horizon when the statue of Pedro I was inaugurated. Slavery would not 
be abolished for another twenty-five years. Similarly, Pedro II would rule for almost 
three more decades. Yet neither that continuity nor any continued national projects 
carried out by the ruling elite could stop the inevitable passage of time and process of 
change. Because of this reality, change is a fundamental aspect of identity, whether it is 
one’s personal sense of self or a nation’s larger identity adjusting to new circumstances. 
Yet there is no denying the power of those foundational experiences, myths, and beliefs, 
especially regarding one’s origins, on the core components of an identity. And when we 
are speaking of the state, there is also no denying that those in power have the benefit of 
the control of the means of state-sponsored public representations of power in terms of 
shaping that core. Yet public perception—or reception—of political and historical 
narratives offered up by the state does not always matter in the real exercise of power. 
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Both the imperial elite and the upcoming republican elite that came into power in 1889 
























Chapter Three:  
An Imperial Statue in a Republic’s Public Square 
In 1893, the statue of Pedro I in Rio de Janeiro remained the same: a bronze 
colossus in a public square of the capital city testifying to Brazil’s imperial origins. What 
had changed dramatically was the political landscape of Rio and the nation. That empire 
which the statue glorified no longer existed. Gone was the parliamentary monarchy 
established by the constitution written by Pedro I in 1824 and ruled by his son Pedro II 
for almost half a century. What stood in its place was a fledgling republic ushered in on 
November 15, 1889 in a coup d’état instigated by the army garrison in Rio. The change in 
government was sudden and unexpected and received by an “indifferent” and even 
“bestializado” or “stultified” general population that basically went about its business 
while the newly empowered elites contested each other and Brazil’s past in order to 
reshape the political landscape of the Republic.138 
In this period of the first few years of the republic known for the passivity of 
Rio’s onlookers, it is striking that “o povo” took it upon themselves to tear down the 
wooden framework of a bandstand being built to cover the statue of Pedro I in 
preparation for the celebration of Tiradentes Day, the new civic holiday honoring the 
republican martyr. Certainly it was not the sort of mass popular protest that characterized 
the “Vaccine Revolt” of 1904 and that sprung out of the state’s intrusion into the homes 
and personal sovereignty of the urban poor in Rio.139 Rather, the “bandstand incident,” as 
                                                 
138 The Portuguese term for “stultified” was “bestializado,” a term used by multiple commentators in the 
Rio press in in 1890 and the title of the seminal work by José Murilo de Carvalho, Os Bestializados: o Rio 
de Janeiro e a República que não foi (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1987).  
139 The revolt that occurred in 1904 in Rio was a response to the modernization attempts of the 
administration of President Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves. Following the protocols of the obligatory 
smallpox vaccination program that was part of the larger public health campaign directed by Dr. Oswaldo 
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it was referred to in the press, was a truly minor conflict. It involved small groups of 
people and resulted in very little property damage and injury. Those involved even 
reportedly cheered when the police arrived. Yet, just as the inauguration of the statue of 
Pedro I in 1862 revealed contested views of the nation’s history within the context of the 
empire itself, the public rhetoric in 1893 reveals the even more complicated discussion of 
how an incipient republic deals with its imperial past. For supporters of the monarchy and 
the imperial government in 1862, Pedro’s statue served as an homage to the nation’s and 
the monarchy’s origins as well as to the accomplishments of their first emperor. For 
critics of that emperor like Teófilo Otoni, the statue was a symbol of an historical lie and 
misappropriated accolades. For critics of the monarchy and the state of Brazilian society 
and politics in general, Pedro’s statue became a symbol of the nation’s unfulfilled 
promise.  
It was this notion that Brazilians could do better in the increasingly modernizing 
world around them that motivated the different groups involved in the proclamation of 
the Republic and its immediate state-building period. And just as the imperial political 
and intellectual elite made a concerted effort to not only construct a national narrative 
that glorified the empire and its figures but to also indoctrinate that historical vision into 
the public imagination, the republican elites sought to do the same for their own regime. 
For the imperial imagination-makers, it was relatively easy to draw the distinction 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cruz, public health workers could forcibly enter homes with the help of the police and administer the 
vaccine against the patient’s will. An opposition made up of groups identified by Jeffrey Needell as 
“militant republicans, politicized army officers, and opposition journalists” actively and publicly held mass 
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meetings translated into hostility, violent police repression, and riots which in turn led to an attempted 
military coup against the government. Rodrigues Alves’ administration survived but effectively had to lay 
siege to the city to reclaim control and was forced to put aside the obligatory vaccinations. See Jeffrey 
Needell, “The Revolta Contra Vacina of 1904: The Revolt against “Modernization” in Belle-Époque Rio de 




between Brazil’s colonial and independent eras. Nationhood involved a clear break from 
the past, and it involved a foil completely foreign in the form of Portuguese rule even if 
Pedro I carried his portugalidade with him into the First Reign. Despite that fact, and 
despite his abdication, the previous chapter’s discussion of how Pedro I was ultimately 
defined in public perceptions makes clear that his standing as the hero of Ipiranga and the 
proclaimer of independence  had been cemented—or bronzed in this matter—by 1862. 
His actions had become an integral part of Brazil’s founding myth and historical 
narrative. His Brazilian-born son had ruled for almost fifty years and steered Brazil away 
from the turbulent experiences of many Nineteenth-Century Latin American nations 
which involved territorial fragmentation, political and constitutional instability, and the 
armed struggles that resulted from caudillismo. The fact that Brazil had avoided such 
internal conflict and destabilization during the First and Second Reigns served to secure 
the monarchy’s place in the nation’s history.140 Given this reality, the republican 
intellectual and political elite faced a much more complicated task of constructing a 
republican narrative for a country with a codified monarchical history. 
With Pedro II and the rest of the royal family exiled in Europe, the most visible 
symbol of that imperial past and monarchical rule was the statue of Pedro I.  However, 
the statue would never serve as a rallying point for monarchists. It would never advance 
any imperial designs to undermine the republic. Neither Pedro I nor his statue held that 
sort of power in the Rio de Janeiro of 1893. Nevertheless, the leaders of the fragile 
republic still trying to organize the government and exert control over all of Brazil’s 
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territory did not know this. For many of them, that statue posed at the very least a 
symbolic threat, a menacing taunt to their work and power, and at worst an actual 
existential threat of mutiny and revolt. Because of this habitual threat perception, the fuss 
over a torn-down bandstand could escalate into very heated public discussions regarding 
whether or not the new Republic should carry on the traditions began during the 
monarchical era, whether a statue to the first emperor merited a place in the public square 
of a republic, and whether those who criticized the covering of the statue were patriots or 
traitors. All in all, this is a chapter about how the uncertainty of the new regime created 
opposing viewpoints over what in its past the nation should celebrate and how it should 
do so in order to honor its changed ideological base. It is a study of how the process of 
national identity formation accommodates political change. 
There is much to tell of this story of the covering of Pedro I’s statue and its 
aftermath. The current chapter serves as part one: an examination of the new political 
situation in Brazil after the proclamation of the Republic as well as the public discussion 
about the covering of the statue leading up to and immediately after its demolition at the 
hands of vigilantes. After some basic background information on the origins and 
characteristics of Brazil’s new republican government, I will return my focus to the 
public square and the statue of Pedro I. The change of the square’s name to Praça 
Tiradentes to honor a decidedly republican historical narrative will be discussed, as will 
the change’s relative lack of significance in the public sphere. The club responsible for 
the bandstand construction that sought to erase the statue, Club Tiradentes, will be 
introduced, and the conflict and destruction of the bandstand will be recreated from 
newspaper accounts. I will explore the different reasons that the covering of the statue 
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was criticized. Those reasons involved the role of “the people” in judging the treatment 
of the statue to be an insult to Brazil’s past, the role of art as a marker of a people’s 
culture and degree of civilization, and the importance of history to affirm a nation’s 
greatness and self-awareness. In order to understand the political aftermath of the 
incident, I will document just how high the stakes were at the time for supporters of the 
Republic. For many, their fears dominated how they perceived that Republic…fears of a 
lurking monarchical threat as well as fears of an internal betrayal by republicans of a 
different ideological affiliation. That sort of climate turned the public responses to the 
tearing down of the bandstand into a “True Republican” litmus test and a significant 
moment of reflection on the state of the nation’s political construction.   
 
The Proclamation of the Republic:  The New Political Landscape 
 
As a nation and a people, Brazil had undergone many changes since the 
inauguration of Pedro I’s statue thirty years prior. As discussed in the previous chapter, a 
new and increasingly critical Liberal voice was emerging. In addition, the existence of 
new loci of economic power outside of Rio as well as within it precipitated new and 
coalescing calls for reforms of the government’s slavery and immigration policies as well 
as reforms to the very nature of the government itself. By the 1870s, São Paulo’s 
emergence as a powerhouse fueled by the lucrative coffee trade in particular and an ever-
expanding economy in general increasingly made that province a rival to Rio de Janeiro’s 
standing as the region’s—and nation’s—seat of power. To serve their needs, the Paulista 
elite certainly sought to exert more influence in the national government, but they also 
sought the decentralization of power in the federal system in order to achieve a greater 
degree of self-governance and autonomy. Along with this impetus for political structural 
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reform, the need for labor on new plantations along with a growing and diversifying 
urban population that wanted greater opportunities and became increasingly associated 
with an abolition movement saw various interest groups coalesce to push for immigration 
and slavery reforms. The republican party of the 1870s and 1880s offered access to these 
advocates and interests in the pursuit of decentralization and abolition despite the fact 
that those dual purposes put the constituent groups at odds with each other in terms of 
whose interest was being served. Regardless of this growing agenda, the Republican 
Party affected little political representation or change. There was no swelling Republican 
presence or ascendancy. The overall opposition to the monarchy was ultimately 
fragmented and disorganized outside of hotbeds such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and 
Rio Grande do Sul. Those locations saw a more radical opposition take form in their 
urban areas with the focal point being the capital of Rio de Janeiro.141 In contrast, the 
historically entrenched landed class in the southeast of Brazil that did not include the 
progressive-leaning Paulista or Minas Gerais planters remained favored by the monarchy 
with titles of nobility and political power and thus remained defenders of that monarchy. 
That support held until the Crown failed to compensate those same planters—especially 
the older generation—for the slaves who were freed in 1888 by the Golden Law of 
abolition. Similarly, Pedro II’s defense of royal authority beginning in the 1870s against 
the Roman Catholic Church had also alienated some of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Thus 
while the emperor was losing longstanding historical allies, he was also missing out on 
the opportunity to make new ones. According to E. Bradford Burns, the emperor was 
“reluctant to recognize the increasing importance of the merchants and industrialists” and 
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even “ignored the restless military officers” rising up from the middle classes. The result 
for the monarchy was a diminution of its elements of support at precisely the time that the 
political and social climate was witnessing increasing “indifference or even hostility” 
being directed toward the monarchy.142  
Therefore while there was no triumphant republican ideological swell in the 
1880s, there was nevertheless a political power vacuum which was the result of Pedro 
II’s inability to govern because of his declining health and increasing age as well as the 
lack of a male heir and the perceived lack of legitimacy for Princess Isabel as a regent or 
future sovereign. While her role in securing the passage of that Golden Law of abolition 
in 1888 endeared her to the abolitionists and urban poor, it did not legitimize her in the 
eyes of many of the male-dominated groups of elites outside of the monarchy’s 
remaining supporters. The political vacuum that resulted provided just the kind of 
opportunity a small clique of junior army officers was looking for. Without Pedro II’s 
attentiveness to deftly mediate their demands and de-escalate their radicalization as had 
been customary in the past, that group seized the moment to claim a place for themselves 
in the government.143    
The proclamation of the Republic was therefore not the culmination of some great 
democratic movement but a spur-of-the-moment action that met no resistance. Its lack of 
coordination and suddenness allowed for a disparate group to achieve regime change 
through that coup, but the fact that those different groups had competing ideologies and 
leaders meant that there were corresponding cleavages within the elite from the very 
beginning of the republic. Lt. Col. Benjamin Constant led the positivist strain and exerted 
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tremendous influence from his role as Army Academy instructor. Positivism’s growing 
influence on Brazilian thought and policy stemmed from its perception as an ideological 
roadmap that, if followed, would allow Brazil to progress in its development to the levels 
of material wealth and technological and industrial advancement of the nations 
considered the leaders of the Western world like Great Britain, France, Germany, and the 
United States.  The way in which the French philosopher and sociologist Auguste Comte 
connected the ideas of observation, hypothesis, and experimentation—the scientific 
method—to the concept of a society’s ability to advance and better itself struck a chord 
with many Brazilian and Latin American elites looking for ways to emulate and achieve a 
status comparable to those model nations. As interpreted by those elites, the State should 
ideally take over the role of promoting capitalism and directing that material and 
technological progress. Political stability and social order were perceived as prerequisites 
for any of those societies to begin adopting what Burns calls the “outward manifestations 
of progress” seen in those envied north Atlantic civilizations.  
In Brazil, these ideas came to be most popular in the emerging middle class that 
included those coming out of the technical and military schools, especially those in the 
engineering field, which were primarily centered in Rio de Janeiro. These new graduates 
would be actively seeking a means to improve their social and economic prospects. Burns 
notes that the Brazilian positivists advocated for “the abolition of slavery, the 
establishment of a republic (albeit not a democratic one), and the separation of Church 
and State.” By the time of the bandstand incident, all of these “advancements” had been 
achieved, as had the introduction and expansion of technology such as steam engines, 
steel production, railroad transportation, and telegraph communications. Over the last 
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decades of the nineteenth century, the tenets of this Brazilian positivism coincided with 
the overall desire of urban and economic groups for a similar level of progress not 
expressed in any formal ideology. Amidst this general climate in favor of development, 
Benjamin Constant de Magalhães, an engineer himself, emerged as Brazil’s most 
influential positivist. Burns cites the popularity of the mathematics professor and his key 
placement at one of those schools, the military academy, as the reasons for his ability to 
inculcate the nation’s young cadets. Constant went further than most Brazilian positivists 
in his advocacy for the republican form of government, and the students he taught came 
to see that type of political organization as their “their best hope for the future” and for 
improving their prospects.144 
Those positivists often allied themselves with the Jacobins. Brazilian Jacobinism 
was born out of the local republican clubs and patriotic battalions (like the Club 
Tiradentes which would play a central role in the bandstand incident) that had sprung up 
immediately prior to and after the proclamation of the Republic. Radicalized in response 
to what they perceived as the failure of the republican movement to live up to their vision 
of ideological purity, the most visible Jacobins in Rio were the newspaper editors Anibal 
Mascarenhas and the ultra-radical Deocleciano Martyr who was later implicated in the 
assassination attempt of President Prudente de Morais in 1897. Their readership was 
small and their publications short-lived, but their vitriol would serve to challenge any 
concessions made in the formation of the republican state. Their eventual cultish devotion 
to future President Floriano Peixoto and the continuation of military control of the 
Republic drove them to violently oppose civilian leadership and ultimately led to that 
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assassination attempt.145 Despite these realities, both the Jacobins and the positivists 
valued the role of policy in social evolution, both rejected the need for representative 
bodies for governance, and both disliked professional politicians. They shared these 
characteristics because they both attracted the new class of “technocrats” looking for 
power in order to bring about Brazil’s transformation into the modern world. They 
envisioned a “civic cult” that would achieve that great end, but they also felt the need for 
political legitimacy in the form of party affiliation. The military upstarts brought in the 
Republican Party in order to legitimize their actions and create the appearance of a 
political end to the coup’s beginning.  
The coup’s most senior military participants, themselves brought in to legitimize 
the actions of the junior officers, would end up being the republic’s first two presidents, a 
testament to the continued military nature of that new republic and the stark reality that 
the military was the one institution that possessed the required level of organization and 
strength to administer the state. Those leaders sought to replace the previous political 
elite whom they considered hostile to the interests of the army. Feeling that their service 
to the nation during the Paraguayan War had been slighted and their deserved influence 
on the government’s policies thwarted, those frustrated military men sought a new 
political system that would advance their specific interests. The result was that they allied 
themselves with whichever group seemed best able to serve those interests. Eventually, 
the liberal republican vision won out, and the apparatus of the state was finally 
consolidated by 1894 and lasted until 1930 as an oligarchy protecting the traditional 
export agricultural interests. The same structures of inequality and hierarchy from the 
time of the empire still existed, but the leadership had changed. Perhaps this is why the 
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military parade held to declare the Republic’s existence was met only with silent stares 
from the onlookers in Rio.  
Echoing José Murilo de Carvalho, Francisco das Neves Alves uses the term “great 
ideological confusion” to describe the period after the republic’s proclamation, with the 
so-called liberals who followed the American model, Jacobins modeled after the French, 
positivists, and other groups such as the coffee barons and Portuguese merchants vying 
for power and trying to assert themselves in the incipient republic. In addition to the 
intra-republican jockeying for power, there also existed tensions between the civil and 
military apparatuses that arose given the intention for a republican democracy alongside 
the actual military control of power through the figure of Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, 
the older army generation figurehead coopted for the republic’s proclamation. While his 
cabinet may have been civilian, Deodoro’s government left no doubt that the army and its 
leadership was the ultimate decision-maker. The nation’s first republican leader ruled as a 
dictator until the government was formed and he was officially elected Brazil’s first 
constitutional president. However, his practices remained denounced by his civilian 
critics as dictatorial and his choices for the government’s ministry became suspect for 
their own anti-democratic intentions and practices. Those critics revealed an anxiety that 
they had horizontally traded imperial and monarchical rule for that of a military dictator. 
Deodoro’s response to an economic downturn and the obstructionist Congress was to 
simply dissolve the National Congress in November of 1891. The backlash against that 
act was the first president’s undoing, and he resigned the government to his vice 
president and political rival, Marshal Floriano Peixoto.146  
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In the end, the “crisis of identity” resulting from the contestations for power in the 
first decade of the republican regime did not bring about the republic’s demise. Instead, 
E. Bradford Burns finds the period as exemplifying the “conciliation and reform” theory 
of José Honório Rodrigues, the acclaimed twentieth-century Brazilian historian who 
contributed greatly to our understanding of that nation’s rich historiography and 
methodology, which asserted that Brazil could go through major changes peacefully. The 
bottom line was that even with the different groups on the republican spectrum trying to 
operate the government and carve out a path for the new republic, it was able to maintain 
order and keep its territorial integrity.147 Yet, as Suely Robles Reis de Queiroz reminds 
us, the early moments of the Republic were anything but tranquil, and “years of civil 
disorder” took their toll on the psyches of the members of those groups.148 As a result, 
those republican operatives were very well aware of their own “crises” of identity, 
economy, and political consolidation. In 1893, many were still on edge when a festival 
bandstand set them off. 
 
The Statue of Pedro I in Newly Re-named Praça Tiradentes 
 
 According to José Murilo, despite the intra-elite contestations for power discussed 
above, the intellectual and political elites of the 1890s were nevertheless operating under 
a republican ideology with utopian elements that idealized “popular involvement in 
political life.” Because of this belief, it was incumbent upon those republican elites to 
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reach out to the “mundo extra-elite” in order to cultivate in the populace a shared vision 
of what the Republic was and should be and thus inspire greater political participation. It 
was precisely this intent to express and justify their ideology to that non-elite world that 
made their “manipulation of the social imagination” particularly important in those early 
days of the Republic. José Murilo makes this statement because he defines those days as 
“moments of political and social change” as well as “moments of the redefinition of 
collective identities.” Given this context, the Brazilian republicans of 1889 took their 
cues from those of 1789 France in attempting to create a new society and a “new man” 
along with their new political system.  
Ludwig Lauerhass, Jr., similarly discusses the importance of the French 
“prototype” of nationalism in the introduction to his study of Brazilian national identity 
formation, Brazil in the Making. That model was one characterized by “the demands of a 
more modern form of urbanized, industrial society in league with a secular, national 
state” which would work “in concert to turn peasants into Frenchmen and 
Frenchwomen.” Lauerhass, Jr. identifies those specific state mechanisms of the creation 
of nationalistic sentiments as “the school system, the army, improved transportation 
networks, new communications media, and the bureaucracy.” The new regime’s elite 
would set to work using this blueprint to make those new “Brazilians” with what E. 
Bradford Burns calls a “piecemeal approach” that saw limited success. Nevertheless, the 
fundamental legacy of Revolutionary France that “political legitimacy was based on the 
people and the nation rather than on loyalty to a monarch” remained ever-present in the 
Brazilian republican elites’ conceptualization of their claim to power. It was precisely 
Brazil’s unique historical experience in the nineteenth century as an independent 
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American monarchy, rather than a republic, that complicated this element of collective 
identity formation. Lauerhass, Jr. distinguishes between that Brazilian experience and 
those of the eventual Spanish American republics by noting that their national identity 
formation was necessary in the early 1800s in order to “legitimize their claims for 
separation from each other as well as from their former colonial masters.” However, with 
Brazil’s continuation as a monarchy despite political separation from Portugal, he asserts 
that the “political imperative to replace dynastic with national identification” did not 
happen as early in Brazil. And as we saw in the previous chapter, imperial elites in the 
mid nineteenth century actively worked to fuse the nation’s identity with the monarchy 
for that designedly imperial narrative and identity advanced by the statue’s inauguration. 
Lauerhass, Jr. does indeed concede a concern on the part of those imperial elites with 
“the identification and construction of their own culture,” their imperial culture I would 
add, but he does not qualify the experience as being representative of that Western 
concept of national identity formation.149 That process would only begin in 1889, and it is 
why the reeducation of the populace with the objective of wining and transforming the 
hearts and minds…the very souls…of the people became a priority of the new Republic. 
Therefore, just as important as their gaining control of the actual mechanisms of  
state power was the new republican need to infuse the popular imagination—especially of 
those non-elites—with republican values. They needed to put a republican ideological 
stamp on not only those “souls” of the people but also their “aspirations, fears, and 
hopes.” And for an uneducated and still mostly illiterate populace, José Murilo notes, the 
new regime required more accessible and universal means to inculcate those ideas. They 
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Figure 7:  Publication of the name changes ordered by the 
Intendencia Municipal. Source: Novidades, February 26, 1890, 
"Avisos," "Intendencia Municipal." 
needed to construct and employ images, allegories, symbols, rituals, and myths in order 
to define that new republican society. As part of that process of articulation, they 
subsequently needed to define everything from the specifics of what the Republic’s 
identities and objectives should be to who its enemies were. Ultimately all of these things 
went into the republican intellectual effort, reminiscent of that earlier imperial national 
project, to “organize its past, present, and future.”150  
The first step in this 
existential endeavor was an easy 
one. On February 21, 1890, the 
council of the Intendencia 
Municipal mandated changes, en 
masse, to the names of the public 
squares, streets, and lanes in Rio de 
Janeiro. Gone were any references 
to the royal family or the imperial 
past in the names. They were instead 
replaced by names commemorating 
the new republic. Showing a 
recognition of the symbolic 
importance of the public square, the 
council listed four royal historical 
spaces at the top of its list (see Figure 7). The Praça da Acclamaçao, where both Pedro I 
and Pedro II were acclaimed as Emperor, became the Praça da República. Pedro II’s 
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square became that of the 15th of November, and his daughter’s square—which had given 
her the honorarium of the title “Isabel the Redeemer” for her role in the abolition of 
slavery—became the Largo da Lapa. Finally, while it could do nothing to address the 
existence of Pedro’s statue, the replacement of the square’s name of the Praça da 
Constituição with the name of Tiradentes did clearly signal the authorities’ desire to 
eradicate the empire in name and plant republican civic reminders in their place. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the renaming and the association of that historical 
space with the death of Tiradentes, the leader of the 1789 rebellion against Portuguese 
rule, allowed the new elite to symbolically replace the Portuguese prince with their 
republican martyr…at least on paper. 
 The change in the name of the square in which Pedro I’s statue was located came 
as part of a general visual reorganization of the capital city. During the same week that 
the name changes were decided upon, the city intendancy also held sessions to approve 
the reconstruction of palaces and theaters and the construction of buildings for industries. 
The public works continued with the construction of new walls, bridges, viaducts, and 
sluices. Overall, the council articulated an emphasis on the works reflecting new visions 
of hygiene, security, and art. Yet, if the campaign’s intent was to stimulate a public 
reception to all of these efforts, it clearly failed. While the list of denominational changes 
were publicized three separate times in just the Jornal do Commercio alone and at least 
once in O Paiz, the notices generated no editorials or letters or discourse of any kind in 
the month following the announcement. Even on the occasion of the republic’s first 
celebration of Tiradentes Day in April of 1890, the significance of the change in the name 
of the public square to honor that historical figure did not rate an appearance in the 
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discourse of the day. There were simply other matters more pressing in nature, things that 
had real—rather than imagined—implications for the state of the republic. The letters 
published in the newspapers show a special interest in the financial security of the 
country, with several letters discussing the state of Brazilian banks and the decisions 
facing finance minister Rui Barbosa. In addition, writers were concerned with the public 
works projects, education, the upcoming constitution, and the workings of the Republican 
Party. 151  
 As an indication of just how indifferent the public was to the symbolic renaming 
of the statue’s public square, most writers never even used the new name when referring 
to that site. For that matter, many never did when the city government during the Empire 
changed the name to Constituição. That square had had many different names throughout 
the history of the city, some of which stuck more in the public memory than others. The 
first name was the generic “Largo do Rocio” meaning “large square.” Then the square 
was named to reflect the gypsy presence there. When the Portuguese royal court arrived 
in 1808, the square took on the name of “Campo da Polé” due to the stone pillory placed 
there in the intendant’s public order campaign. Finally, in 1822 the square took on the 
moniker of “Constitution” reflecting the royal family’s public oath-taking there.152 All in 
all, the locale had a very fluid denomination depending usually upon its function and 
inhabitants. Therefore, it is not surprising that writers often reverted back to one of the 
pre-republican names for the plaza. Even with the celebration of Tiradentes Day in 1890, 
writers often used the Rocio name or felt compelled to add in the Constitution name to 
                                                 
151 Jornal do Commercio, February 22-March 17, 1890; O Paiz, February 22-March 17, 1890. 
152 Green, 183. 
114 
 
help the participants in the festivities navigate their way around the city.153 By the time of 
the bandstand incident in 1893, the Tiradentes name homage had still not fully taken hold 
in the public imagination. A quantitative survey of the incident reports and editorials 
regarding the bandstand in the various Rio newspapers reveals basically an even split 
between those writers who used the name Tiradentes for the praça and those who did not. 
Those writers who used other names more often than not referred to the praça as Rocio, 
but several also used the imperial name of Constitution. This scattering of alternate 
names served to decrease the visibility of the name change and demonstrated again the 
difficulty of affecting change when it came to the locals’ use of place names. Two 
examples of this reality in the survey stand out. First, in one newspaper, the Diário de 
Notícias, a writer used the imperial constitution designation when describing the permit 
shown to them that gave the right to erect the bandstand. The language of the permit itself 
used Praça Tiradentes. Secondly, and much more strikingly, the mayor of republican Rio 
de Janeiro himself, Barata Ribeiro, referred to the bandstand’s location as the “largo do 
Rocio” in his letter to the Club Tiradentes informing them of the city’s decision to require 
the removal of the bandstand.154 
 In terms of the public perceptions of specifically the statue of Pedro I in that 
newly renamed square, there was remarkably little discussion of what would later be 
termed the “incoherence” of the statue existing in Tiradentes’ square.155 There is only one 
reference to the possible destruction of the statue in 1890, and the editorial response was 
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a clear repudiation of such a proposal.156 Such an idea of physically removing the statue 
would have been in line with the prior act of erasing the obelisk pillory from that very 
square in order to alter its identity and mark the commemoration of the constitution. 
James N. Green refers to the work by historian Pierre Nora regarding social memory, 
noting that “temporal and topographical memory sites and monuments emerge at those 
times and those places where there is a perceived or constructed break with the past.”157 
The statue had been a memorial to Brazil’s break with its colonial past. A growing call in 
the early 1890s would have been understandable given this tendency. However, it would 
not be until 1894 that a proposal to move the statue from the republic’s city square would 
gain any traction in the public sphere, and even then it was eventually rejected, as I 
discuss in detail in Chapter Five. 
Before the bandstand incident ignited commentary, Pedro I and his statue only 
rated passing references in miscellaneous columns in the newspapers. While there were 
some mentions of the role of the statue in the commemorations of September 7 and its 
incongruity in the Republic, there was no follow-up or discussion. Similarly, when the 
Gazeta da Tarde in 1890 commemorated the anniversary of the uprising that drove Pedro 
I out of Brazil, it only reprinted critical words made by a republican in 1862 to protest the 
inauguration. That reprint did not trigger any public response in 1893. The other 
references to the statue involved an art world high society function honoring an artist 
involved in the statue’s creation, a reference to the statue’s pedestal, a criticism that for 
the September 7 commemoration the statue of José Bonifácio should be lit along with 
Pedro I’s, and finally in 1891 a blurb that a man was arrested for climbing onto the horse. 
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The police report published for  the latter made clear that there was no grand monarchical 
symbolism at play, quoting the man arrested as saying he wanted to “ride the horse of the 
deceased monarch” to get to “an unknown land.” Such an arrest would take place later in 
1895 as well. What these anecdotes show is that the public certainly did not latch onto the 
statue for any political protest and that the republican regime did maintain order 
regarding the statue by policing its trespass.158 There was one later commentary made on 
the statue in 1899 in which a cartoon artist portrayed the figure of José Bonifácio, whose 
statue is located just a block away from Pedro I’s, visiting the emperor’s statue and 
offering him a stool to get down from his horse. The symbolic dismount captured the 
significance of the end of the empire, but it did not foretell any actual consequences for 
the statue’s continuation in the public square.159 
 In fact, in a survey of the public discourse surrounding the commemorations of 
Tiradentes Day on April 21 of 1890-1892, there is not a single mention of the statue 
being perceived as an affront to the memory of the martyr or the republic’s festivities to 
honor him. This absence is especially notable given that one editorial did in fact make 
note of the discord the writer and many others felt with those who did not participate in 
the commemorations. That the editorial writer would note that lack of unanimity but not 
care about the statue points to the prevailing wariness not of symbols of the past but of 
sentiments of the present.160 Not only was the statue not a lightning rod for criticism, but 
Praça Tiradentes itself was not even a focal point in terms of the celebration of historical 
space. The papers note that the commemorative procession did pass through that praça 
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and that a twenty-one gun salute rang out there, but the main attractions for the festivities 
were located in the largos de S. Francisco de Paula and Carioca. Those two locales had 
bandstands erected and held public ceremonies.161 Another newspaper emphasized the 
Rua do Ouvidor as the site for ornamentation and illumination and a commemorative 
base area rather than the statue’s praça, which the writer, by the way, referred to as Rocio 
rather than Tiradentes. An alternate historical site related to the execution of Tiradentes 
also took greater prominence in the celebrations in 1890: the “Old Jail” where Tiradentes 
was held before his execution. The chroniclers of O Paiz gave the Tiradentes Day 
celebrations much greater visibility with its own section on multiple days before, during, 
and after the holiday and by trumpeting the civic and historical narrative associated with 
the martyr. That greater space and detail put the inclusion of Praça Tiradentes in the 
procession as being en route to the larger commemoration at the old jail.162  
For the next year’s observance of Tiradentes Day, Praça Tiradentes was equally 
inconspicuous. By the time that the 1892 anniversary came around, the public was 
already being notified of the historical reevaluation of the precise site where Tiradentes 
was executed. In a six-part series coordinated to end on the day before Tiradentes Day, 
Miguel Lemos, writing under the moniker of the “Apostolado Positivista do Brazil,” 
asserted that the sacred site of the execution was instead on the Rua Visconde do Rio 
Branco rather than the public square where Pedro I’s statue stood. In the lead-up to the 
next year’s commemoration, this issue would be brought up again and disputed. In a 
letter published in the Gazeta de Notícias, Alvaro Caminha refuted the conclusions of 
Miguel Lemos that placed the execution site at #38 Rua Visconde do Rio Branco. 
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Caminha said that Lemos erred in his attempt to reconcile the old and present street 
names and layout of the city and in his overlooking of the use of the word “campo” in 
descriptions in 1792 that noted the large amount of space needed for the regiments of 
troops present who reportedly witnessed the execution. Given those clues, Caminha 
insisted that the correct memorial site would be the Campo de Santana (see Figure 8 and 
note that Praça Tiradentes and the statue would have been located at # 17, the location of 
the Royal Theater). He noted the significance of solemnizing the death of Tiradentes in 
the wrong place and offered his own findings for the consideration of accurate future 
commemorations.163  
Given these alternate conceptions of sacred historical space, it would have seemed 
as though the incongruity of the statue in the public square named for another would have 
been lessened. After all, in the centennial celebration rhetoric published for the 1892 
Tiradentes Day festivities, there is no mention of the presence of Pedro I intruding onto 
that stage. The square bearing the name of the figure being celebrated is again noted as 
having only a small role in those festivities, and the descriptions of the day showed no 
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Figure 8: Map of Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro. Source: Neill Macaulay, Dom Pedro. The Struggle for 
Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 94-95. 
epic state effort at commemorating such an important anniversary. Instead, a civic club, 
the Club Tiradentes, took the lead and in doing so seemed to make themselves as visible 
as the martyr himself.164 
 Club Tiradentes was a civic cult devoted to the memory and lesson of its 
namesake. O Tempo did a little write-up on the club the day after Tiradentes Day in 1892, 
the centennial commemoration that saw the group actively cultivating an official state 
cooperation and participation. The article described the club as being founded during the 
empire twenty years prior “by a group of republican and patriotic young men” who were 
“few…but resolute.” The group is portrayed as being antagonistic towards the institutions 
of the empire but always respectful to the royal family and the members of that 
                                                 




government. Since just after Tiradentes Day in 1890, Club Tiradentes had been led by 
Sampaio Ferraz, whom José Murilo de Carvalho describes as a radical propagandist and 
Jacobin. He also held the position of Chief of Police in Rio de Janeiro for a short time, as 
noted in an 1890 newspaper.165 By 1893, the year of the bandstand incident, Club 
Tiradentes had made a conscious effort to make itself the most visible and influential 
civic club in the public sphere. There were various other Clubes Republicanos that took 
part in some manner going back as far as the first Tiradentes commemoration in 1890. 
One Club Republicano, the chapter out of Niteroi, even claimed primacy as the first 
political society in Rio de Janeiro to propagate the idea of the Republic, perhaps 
attempting to assert itself in 1894 following the over-exposure of Club Tiradentes the 
year before.166 The bottom line in 1893, however, was that the Club Tiradentes and its 
commission were the ones in charge of that year’s commemorations of April 21. And 
they were the ones who decided to cover the statue of Pedro I. 
 
The Bandstand, Its Critics, and Its Demolition 
 On April 14, 1893, the Club Tiradentes quietly obtained a license from the 
municipality of Rio giving them permission to “tapar” (cover up) the statue of the Praça 
Tiradentes.” 167 The officials found the request unremarkable and certainly not 
controversial and thus approved the construction in that public square of a bandstand that 
would rise high enough to conceal the figure of Pedro I. By April 18, many students from 
the National School of Fine Arts had taken notice of the work, realized its objective, and 
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written a letter to the editor of O Paiz to protest the covering of the statue and call for the 
authorities to stop the construction. That letter was published the next day in the 
newspaper along with an editorial piece criticizing the erection of the bandstand and 
similarly calling for its cessation. By around 9 a.m. that same morning, some authorities 
met and decided to put an embargo on the raising of any more of the structure around the 
statue and ordered that the planks already reaching Pedro’s figure be sawed off. At 
around 5:30 that evening, a group of people, including a National Guard captain and a 
police brigade captain, gathered at the site and began to pull down the boards of the 
bandstand. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived but did nothing to stop the partial 
demolition of the bandstand. They kept the peace, but they did not stop the group. 
Around 11 p.m., the highest city officials such as Mayor Barata Ribeiro and his chief of 
police met and decided that all construction works around the statue should be stopped 
and the bandstand completely demolished the next day. Ribeiro withdrew the police force 
and notified the Club Tiradentes commission and Sampaio Ferraz of his decisions. When 
that next morning came and the statue was still covered by boards, a similar group tore 
down the bandstand until nothing stood (see Figure 9).168 
The idea of covering the nation’s first public monument with a bandstand was 
roundly criticized even before the first board was ripped down. In its editorial alongside 
the protest made by the art students (which will be discussed in greater detail), O Paiz  
called the protests of the students and others “personal reclamations” against the act and 
                                                 





Figure 9: Depiction of bandstand-covering incident, Revista Illustrada, May Edition, 1893. 
described them as “persuasive and just” and the coreto, or bandstand, itself “misplaced 
and “a bad idea.” On the next day, before protestors took the final demolition of the 
statue into their own hands, that same newspaper editorialized that the coreto’s 
continuation violated “the most rudimentary good sense” and came from a “demagogical 
spirit.” It called the construction “disgraceful” and went so far as to assert that the Club 
Tiradentes did it with the “deliberate intent to incite.” Given this interpretation, the same 
editorial portrayed the demolition of the coreto as “a disarmament,” basically describing 
the outcome of the protests as having thwarted the club’s intentional instigation. The 
attack on the club went further, labeling the act as “irrational” and the “epithet of the 
proudly ignorant.”169  
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 While the condemnation of Rio’s well-known conservative newspaper could be 
dismissed by some as ideologically and politically opportunistic, the fact that the coreto 
was immediately criticized by four other newspapers lends evidence to the fact that it was 
widely unpopular. The Diario de Notícias called “the eclipsing of the statue of Pedro I” a 
“discordant and regrettable note” as well as a “disgraceful or unfortunate incident” that 
became an “impediment of the festivities that the Club Tiradentes has held for twelve 
years.”170 The fact that this newspaper even had a front page section titled “The Incident 
of the Statue” shows the public notoriety of the disturbance. The Gazeta de Notícias was 
more understanding in terms of the club’s motivations. Its editorial referred to the statue’s 
covering as “an exaggeration of convictions” but nevertheless an idea “outside of good 
reason.”171 In contrast, the Revista Illustrada was one of the few periodicals to actually 
name Club Tiradentes as the party at fault and call them out publicly. In an editorial 
labeled “Justified” to describe the public protest of the coreto, the Revista called the 
statue covering an “idea so cheap, so foolish that there is no way it would ever find 
support in public opinion.” They went further to characterize the plan as one in which the 
club had attempted, with the initial “agreement of the highest representatives of the city,” 
to “bury the statue of Pedro I, erected there in the Largo do Rocio.” The word choices are 
striking in this statement. The idea of burying the symbolic representation of the deceased 
first emperor is of itself telling of what the journal considered the true motivations of the 
club. Secondly, their conscious choice of referring to the site as the Rocio came to be a 
way to further repudiate the increasingly perceived radical identity of Club Tiradentes. 
While the Revista Illustrada might have called the act “so messed up, so foolish,” the 
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editor of O Apostolo called it an outright “profanation” of the nation’s past, and the title 
of his article, “Patriotism,” pointed to the larger issue of how loyalty to the patria would 
be judged in the public sphere.172 These general criticisms are reflective of the wide 
spectrum of political thought and discourse present in the early Republic. That so many 
organs could agree that the building of the coreto was wrong is striking, and they did so 
for various reasons. For some, it was the presence of popular reaction and involvement 
that delegitimized the coreto. For others, it was either a question of respecting art as a 
marker of a society’s civilization or of a people’s self-awareness of their own past. All in 
all, these factors were more generalized in nature and large in scope. The outrage over the 
covering of the statue was not grounded in some deep-seated adoration of Pedro I himself 
and the need to personally defend him and his statue. It was quite the opposite. How the 
writers at this time specifically defined their first emperor given this context will be 
discussed in the following chapters. Yet those notions of Pedro and the imperial past he 
was a part of were no more important than what had become a larger fundamental 
question. That larger question was how a divided new political elite dealt with each other 
as they tried to construct a coherent historical narrative out of contested views of the past. 
All of these issues come together to provide a fascinating look into the memorial psyche 
of Brazilians in 1893. 
Defending the Statue: The Popular Element 
 From the very beginning of the backlash against the covering of the statue, there 
was a clear portrayal on the part of editorial writers that a large part of the Rio population 
was against the coreto and supportive of those who acted to remove it. Just as the 
imperial elites writing in 1862 invoked the acclamation of an undefined yet unified 
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“people” as an element of legitimation for the statue’s inauguration, here we see a similar 
rhetorical practice. One writer cited the “general reclamations” of “the people” that were 
the true inspiration for the incident’s coverage and were simply being echoed in the press. 
That same writer asserted that the idea to completely cover the statue “repelled a great 
part of our population” while another noted that “a population protested” as one.173 The 
editorial of another paper went further, emphasizing the public nature of the statue as 
being at the root of the “popular indignation” that resulted and eventually led to the 
coreto’s demolition at the hands of the public. While this writer similarly referred to the 
protests as being the “reclamations of the people,” he also commented on the significance 
of an act committed in the public square. In just the initial report of the incident, he 
portrayed the bandstand as “concealing from the eyes of the public…the statue of Pedro 
I.”174 Underscoring this appreciation for the statue’s place in the public eye and 
imagination was the prevailing yet incorrect notion before the altercation that the 
construction surrounding Pedro’s statue was actually preparatory work being done in 
order to ship the statue to Chicago for that year’s World’s Fair. This interpretation of the 
events reveals that those members of the public considered the statue to be a legitimate 
representative object of Brazilian society. To then learn that the purpose of the 
scaffolding around the statue was actually to hide and denigrate it rather than exhibit it as 
a symbol of Brazilian greatness for other nations to see was certainly a jolt, and it led to 
such vitriolic speech as the covering being the degradation and “vandalism” of a 
monument of “art, history, and patriotism.” This same writer applauded the “unanimous” 
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alerting of the people by the press and the public’s resultant protest.175 While this 
quotation shows that there was some dispute between what the driving force of the 
protest was, the papers or the people, the critics of the bandstand could all agree on how 
to label the group responsible for its demolition: “a group of populares, or simply, “the 
people.” Those “populares” included Captain Martinho de Moraes of the National Guard 
and Captain Hyppolito Coutinho of the Police Brigade, a point which will be analyzed 
further in a discussion of the perceived republican-on-republican-crime and “purity” 
witch hunt that followed the incident. There is no specific information on just how 
organic and spontaneous the grouping would have been, but given the presence of two 
commanders, the “popular” aspect of the group can certainly be debated. The fact that the 
Gazeta de Notícias described that group as having “invaded” the square and responded to 
the coreto as “demolishing it with extraordinary rapidity” lends a certain level of 
organization and purposefulness to the actions. The nature of the vivas given by that 
group as their “work” was “interrupted at times” also reveals a less than subversive 
nature. They gave cheers “to the Republic, to Marshal Floriano Peixoto [the nation’s 
President], and to Liberty.” The reporting that the police allowed the group to continue 
the demolition after they arrived was greeted with approval by the coreto’s critics for 
having “agreed that the people were right. Very well.”176 
 While the police who arrived on the scene displayed an unambiguous solidarity 
with the protestors, overall in the papers there was also a distinct awareness of a 
significant divide between the people who were protesting and the higher city authorities 
responsible for the debacle. For the writers of O Paiz in particular, the incident became 
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an issue of law and order. The editor said that “in a country of laws and authorities, the 
citizens, when they are prejudiced or offended must appeal to them.” He continued by 
saying that while the paper “will never advise the people to acts of reprisals or to take 
vengeance into their own hands,” he reaffirmed that “the public protest of the extravagant 
and foolish coreto was opportune, just, and worthy of respect.” The paper did, after all, 
seem to have a vested interest in the outcome of the confrontation. In its editorial, it so 
much as called for the people to act, saying that the lack of progress on the part of the 
municipality on removing the coreto by that day’s morning “will obligate the demolition 
on account of the municipality.” The Gazeta de Notícias added to the expectations that 
morning, making it clear that 9 a.m. was the target time for the subsequent demolition of 
the coreto. The heightened expectations and timetable explain why the people went from 
being referred to as a “natural spectator” of the dismantling of the bandstand to an active 
governmental proxy. It was natural for the people to have a presence on the scene and 
play a role in the demolition. Yet this notion of a call to action because of a lack of faith 
in the authorities can be seen in their account saying that “o povo” “knew” or had a sense 
that the coreto would not be taken down by the authorities and that a “group less calm 
attacked the condemned construction” the second time when the boards still stood around 
the base of the statue that next morning. The “public unrest” had no “capricious” element 
to it because, for O Paiz, the protestors were left with no alternative. While the vigilante 
aspect of the intervention was not something they desired (they make it clear that they 
would have “reproved it”), the necessity of it stemmed from the municipal powers not 
addressing the issue forthwith and as a result of that, responsibility returned “to the 
people.”177 The Revista Illustrada similarly validated the intervention of the people. Its 
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editor cited an ongoing “lack of confidence” on the part of the people towards the 
“enforcers of the law” if not the laws themselves. The editor made it clear where the 
blame should lie: the “Jacobinism of half a dozen imbeciles.” Given this, when the 
people’s peaceful demands and their “just protest” were not met by the authorities, their 
“rightful indignation” led to their “gathering in mass.” The result was the destruction of 
the coreto in two minutes.178 There is a possible other incendiary factor in the events that 
only one journal included in its account of the incident. The Jornal do Brasil added the 
presence of a rival group to the scene where the aforementioned “enormous group” came 
after hearing that only Pedro I’s head was showing above the concealment. This 
newspaper cited that “other group” meeting in the square to “reconstruct the same 
coreto” and described them as “working with enthusiasm.” This assertion of the active 
reconstruction of the coreto is not present in the other papers’ accounts, but it would go 
towards explaining the intensity of the subsequent demolition leaving “not one scrap of 
wood remaining.”179  
The Club Tiradentes adamantly denied any attempt on their part to reconstruct the 
coreto after the municipal order to halt construction. In general, their response in the form 
of a letter written by their leader Sampaio Ferraz and published in all of the papers 
asserted the club’s innocence in its actions and indignation for the public reaction. It is a 
fascinating example of both victimhood and naked aggression. The letter specifically 
refuted the coverage of O Paiz, and Ferraz affirmed that he did recognize the gravity of 
what transpired while simultaneously he sarcastically and indignantly rebutted the 
interpretation and condemnation of that newspaper. In his writing, there is a sense of 
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incredulity on his part about the response to the coreto’s construction. He “did not attach 
any great importance” to the planned construction and did not foresee any backlash. The 
primary reason for that ease of mind was the practical existence of the club’s license from 
the prefeitura to construct the temporary edifice. He asserted the city’s complicity in 
allowing the “abominable offense” in their granting of the license. He seems to assert that 
while they had a license to completely cover the statue, they had not in fact done so 
intentionally out of response to the protests which he blamed for interrupting their 
construction. Putting sarcasm aside, Ferraz painted an inoffensive little picture of the 
club’s effort, which was basically finished, with paint even being applied to the “modest 
stage of wood where the music of the brilliant naval battalion would be played.” Given 
this portrayal of the innocence of the club’s coreto, Ferraz indicted the intervention and 
its destruction as an “assault” and a “premeditated crime,” defiantly turning around the 
charge made by O Paiz of the coreto itself being a premeditated instigation. Rather than a 
“group of populares,” to Ferraz the public interventionists were “a half dozen senseless 
people” who were the pawns of “enemies of the Republic” and “fervent Pedro I 
worshippers.” To that gullible group, the club offered no provocation by continuing to 
cover the statue, and its president affirmed their responding to the protests with 
“prudence and moderation” in contrast to the heated zeal of the others. That sense of 
victimhood stemming from the “attack” they suffered would be echoed by a letter writer 
several days after the incident who lamented that the “affront in all of this was that which 
the historic Club Tiradentes suffered” and whose members, “all of the propagandist and 
ardent republicans,” were expected to “take down their own work.” That letter-writing 
member was especially indignant at their not even having enough planks left to make a 
130 
 
proper bandstand afterwards, perhaps providing some insight into the one of the reasons 
the club nixed all of its commemorative festivities. The club-as-victim theme would be 
on full display again when they met afterwards to address the incident, and as will be 
discussed in a following section, the meeting became more about identifying and 
punishing the club’s perceived enemies. After all, it is not surprising that the club would 
not take kindly to the idea that its actions were an affront to the very statue it considered 
an affront.180 
 Interestingly, some writers noticed the irony of the statue’s prominent public 
visibility after Club Tiradentes’ attempt to cover it. One writer described the praça as a 
magnet for curious onlookers, the number of which required patrols and policing to 
manage the scene. Such a large public interest or curiosity for the statue was in stark 
contrast with its virtual invisibility before the incident. Before, a few inhabitants might 
pass by the statue, but all basically ignored it. That past differed greatly with the presence 
of many people in 1893 purposefully visiting the site, and when there, “contemplating it.” 
The same writer went so far as to call the people’s visiting of the square a “pilgrimage” in 
which the pilgrims could be seen “all looking above, to the monarch of bronze giving the 
charter atop a horse.” The writer ends his commentary by saying that there was a “public 
for everything,” thus calling into question whether such hyperbolic description was 
simply tongue-in-cheek or sincere but with a sense of dismissal for those “public” 
proclivities. Either way, his commentary certainly revealed the irony of the bandstand’s 
consequences and was seconded by another commentator. That writer grappled with the 
significance of the public reaction by positing that maybe the real reason that the 
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bandstand was demolished was that the statue had finally won over during the Republic 
“the glorification of the people” that it lacked before since it had been met with “popular 
indifference during the times of the monarchy.” Adding to all of this irony is the reality 
that there was virtually no public discourse showing the subject of the statue—Pedro I—
getting any love from the people in all of this. If anything, such discussions revealed a 
grudging recognition that the statue of him had a place in history and the public’s 
imagination even if its subject did not.181 
Defending the Statue: Respect for Art 
 Commentators also defended the intervention and demolition of the bandstand on 
the grounds of the statue’s status as a national work of art. In fact, the earliest and most 
proactive critics of the construction were the students of the National School of Fine Arts. 
Their letter was what triggered the newspapers’ scrutiny of the covering of the statue. As 
students of art, they felt compelled to criticize those responsible for the structure built 
around the statue (without naming the club by name) as disparagers of art. They 
condemned the bandstand as “the construction of an ugly mass of pine and multi-colored 
rags,” an indictment that showed their interest in the aesthetics and appreciation for art 
rather than any political or ideological partisanship. In fact, the students made it a point to 
make that distinction clear, saying that they came “not to discuss politics or whether or 
not the historical fact of the independence of our country is or is not well represented in 
the person of the first emperor: to others we leave this task.” Therefore from the start, the 
students sought to avoid any participation in any debates about the statue’s historical 
value or legitimacy. As such, they attempted to insulate themselves from any charges of 
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being secret monarchists or Pedro I admirers or restorationists. Their criticism of the 
coreto could not be misconstrued as an attack on the standing of Tiradentes because it 
was never a defense of Pedro I. They stood up to protect only the statue because it was, in 
their eyes, an “incredibly important artistic monument” that merited respect. That reason 
alone was enough for them to take a public stand and call on the authorities to stop and 
remove the construction. They were not calling for vigilante action. Their motive was to 
raise public awareness of the coreto and create public pressure on the city government to 
act.182 
 The students’ argument struck home with several of the editorial writers of the 
time. Multiple writers noted the work as a product of the statue’s artist, Louis Rochet. 
The editor of the Revista Illustrada supported the students for having “energetically” 
protested against what that paper called the “desecration” of Rochet’s acclaimed work. 
On a similar note, the editor of the Gazeta de Notícias noted that Club Tiradentes had 
been asked to reduce the size of its bandstand so as to not hide or “prejudice” the 
“beautiful monument of Rochet.” Such a recognition of the statue as a work of art opened 
up the discussion to the larger topic of the relationship between art and a nation’s 
standing, culture, and history. While the bandstand had immediately been “destroyed for 
the love of art,” for some it was also done out of “respect for the traditions of the 
formation of the patria.”183 The students themselves contextualized the appreciation of 
art and monuments as a marker of civilization. What was especially important to them 
was the appreciation of a people for its own art, an appreciation and a self-awareness that 
indicated what level of civilization or savagery a culture had attained. The Revista 
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Illustrada added to this point by making note of the singularity of Pedro I’s statue in the 
nation’s monumental art scene. The writer there justified the public action against the 
coreto by asserting the statue was “the only monument worthy of a modern civilization 
that we possess” while another writer for the Diário de Notícias called it “one of the few 
good monuments of our capital.”184 That linking of the concepts of modernity and 
civilization in the quotation above reflects the larger Brazilian intellectual tendency to 
define “civilization” by those model societies of Europe, a point which will be explored 
further in the following paragraph. An editorial in O Paiz similarly called for the public 
to put politics aside to consider the situation being more about “our customs and our 
degree of civilization” while another article in that paper the day before reinforced that 
relationship between art and society. The editor said that he and his colleagues would act 
because they did not want the “Brazilian people to be exposed to the stigma of the less 
educated.” He went on to say that “everywhere that is known for having even 
rudimentary principles of civilization and good customs, statues are objects of cultured 
respect, be it for their historical value or…through the veneration of art.”185 This charge 
by O Paiz served multiple purposes in that it advanced the importance of the appreciation 
of art, but it also served as a way to insult the club on the grounds of culture and 
education. It also showed that the editor could take something as innocuous as the 
defense of art and use it to offend in the sensitive climate of the day.  
 The art students and the journalists were very well aware of the comparative value 
between Brazil’s new experience with plotting a republican course after a history of 
monarchical rule and that of France, one of those European societies which served as an 
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exemplum of civilized nations. After all, the Brazilian Republic consciously chose 
Bastille Day, July 14, as one of the Festas Nacionais for the nation to honor, crediting it 
for the “Republic, liberty and independence of the American people.” The fact that the 
bandstand critics could point to the most rabid republican experience in history and in 
essence say, look, even France had respect for art and monuments and never did these 
types of things, provided them with kind of a republican radicalism gauge for the 
question of art.186 The students actually used the opportunity for a not-so-veiled critique 
of the Brazilian elite constantly aping the French in all things cultural. If they could not 
convince the public that all statues should be “esteemed, even venerated, solely for their 
artistic value,” then they would settle for pointing out the cultural guide of the French that 
modeled respect and even veneration for a nation’s own monuments even when they 
were from a period cast aside and repudiated.187 
 The defense of the statue based on these ideas of art did not challenge the 
symbolic or historical meaning of the statue. They intentionally divorced Pedro I from his 
statue in the question of its covering. But in doing so, they were also advocating for his 
statue having greater security in the public sphere. Not surprisingly, Sampaio Ferraz 
refuted the disrespect of artwork argument. And he considered the students’ labeling of 
the coreto construction an “ugly mass of wood and rags” an affront. He then turned the 
argument around by mocking Pedro I. He said that he was replying to those decrying 
their “fervent love of art” by clarifying that the real offense taking place in the praça was 
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the “excoriation that had been practiced against the bronze” in defiling the metal to create 
a statue to such an odious figure. For Ferraz, it was the bronze that had been wronged and 
needed the students’ protection. 
Defending the Statue: Respect for History 
 Not only did journalists link the idea of art and a nation’s “traditions” to the idea 
of a civilized society, but they also placed the statue of Pedro I in the context of a nation 
respecting its past. They grappled with what the implications of repudiating a historical 
figure would mean, and many worried that it was equivalent to the repudiation of the 
nation’s own history and in some ways, the nation itself. As will be discussed in detail in 
this section, some saw the covering of the statue as an example of a hatred for history 
while still others signified that Brazil would have no history. That idea of a nation 
without a past was a troubling one since it tied into so many other ideas regarding 
collective identity and Brazil’s desire to stake its claim to a glorified and exceptional 
past. It seemed to many that the war between Tiradentes and Pedro I for national iconic 
primacy in that public square threatened Brazilian history in general.  
 In one of the Gazeta de Notícias articles, the statue was described as a “work of 
art that adorns the plaza and a monument erected to the memory of one of the instigators 
of the independence of Brazil.”188 This writer condemned the act committed by Club 
Tiradentes by validating the statue on several levels. First, he echoed the writers in the 
previous section by affirming the statue as a work of art. Secondly, he noted that it was 
raised with the objective of memorializing one of Brazil’s most important historical 
moments. Lastly, he established Pedro’s historical credentials as having played a role in 
that moment. A writer for the Diário de Notícias wrote similarly, stating that the statue 
                                                 
188 Gazeta de Notícias, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua.” 
136 
 
“reminds Brazilians of the historical fact of the proclamation of the independence of 
Brazil, the beginning of its national life, succeeding in that which the well-deserving 
catalysts of the aborted revolution of 1792 dreamed of.”189 This 1893 writer once again 
affirmed Pedro I as the proclaimer and his proclamation, the Grito, as equal to Brazilian 
independence. This portrayal carved out memorial space for Pedro I by narrowing his 
legacy down just as they did in 1862. Despite the fact that the legitimacy of Pedro’s role 
in independence would be strongly contested by others, this type of defense of the statue 
serves as a good example of how a monument could possess multiple layers of legitimacy 
and importance as the statue of Pedro I had become a piece of history itself.  
The greatest evidence of this complexity can be found in the comments of a 
journalist for the Diário de Notícias writing a week after the incident. There he noted 
how different groups will sacrifice and sell the symbols of other groups in order to glorify 
their own symbols. He provided a hypothetical scenario of the monarchy being restored 
and selling all the positivist goods to remake the statue to illustrate his point. Because he 
saw the casting out of statues in the attempt to repudiate the past as a vicious and 
pointless cycle, he recommended that those offended by Pedro I’s statue raise “a 
monument to the Republic [and] make it huge in order to obfuscate the other, but leave 
what is there, there, that never did harm to anyone. And don’t be giving to this statue the 
importance that the man that it symbolized never had in life.” That he could dismiss 
Pedro I as an historical figure yet defend the perpetuation of his statue in the public 
square shows the interplay of ideas of legitimacy and illegitimacy in remembering the 
past. His warning to the republicans that their portrayal of the statue as a threat to the 
government only served to elevate Pedro I’s importance was an indictment of what he 
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perceived as their weakness born out of their fears and actions. His desire that they not 
empower Pedro’s legacy by empowering his statue, alongside his desire for the statue to 
be left in the public square, certainly reflected a multi-layered vision of national 
memory.190 
The contestation of Pedro I’s legacy made these discussions tricky for most 
writers. Another journalist for the same newspaper as just above made the point that the 
statue was much more than a mere representation of the first emperor. After prefacing his 
topic with a reassurance of his republican virtue, a common occurrence before any 
criticism was uttered against the bandstand, this writer said that “the statue of d. Pedro I, 
founder of the Brazilian nationality, is not a monument meant to perpetuate the glory of a 
man or of a dynasty; it is something more elevated and noble: it is the eternalization of 
national glory.” That the monument had been erected to commemorate a national glory 
(as discussed in the previous chapter) rather than just a personal one for Pedro I or an 
imperial one for the monarchy meant that for this writer the events that took place during 
the monarchical past could not and should not be repudiated or excised from the nation’s 
perceived past. This writer based this assertion upon the idea that the 7th of September “as 
a great date” should be “consecrated and respected” as a celebration of the 
“emancipation” of Brazil. Pedro’s role—on that day—secured for him a place in that 
celebration. In the writer’s eyes, the statue covering was an act that marred “the brilliance 
of this memorable date [September 7]” even though it was in the service of another 
“equally glorious” date. Again, his concern was not with the covering as an insult to 
Pedro I. Instead it was out of the insult being done to the symbolic representation of 
Brazil’s independence. The writer went on to discuss how a nation treats its monuments 
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by saying that “there are examples of monuments attacked out of the fervor of political 
passion” and that the “multitude” has acted “against its own glory” in the attempt to 
“injure individuals or combat principles.” Here he makes the point again that the attempt 
to erase Pedro I or monarchism from the plaza was almost like an act of self-mutilation. 
Where this writer saw a nation acting against itself by covering the statue, another 
commentator found it to be an act of denying one’s own history. In a letter calling for the 
Brazilian public to learn its history, a writer made a call for “new” republicans to respect 
history even if it included monarchical symbols and representations.  He used the 
example of the military group known as the Voluntarios da Patria, which earned 
distinction beginning in the Paraguayan War in the 1860s, to make the point that the 
emblem of the crown that they wore on their uniform was part of the group’s own 
history, not just that of the monarchy’s. Telling that venerated group to change its 
emblem would be akin to telling it to deny its own history and identity during the empire, 
which to these writers was tantamount to a crime against themselves. In addition to self-
harm or denial, “the idea of covering a national monument to honor the memory of a 
patriot” was at odds with “the feelings of the people.” A colleague agreed with this point 
and similarly condemned the “unfortunate idea of commemorating the proto-martyr of 
the Republic in a means so prejudicial to one of the glorious traditions of our 
homeland.”191 While the latter writer argued that casting aspersions onto the statue 
unwittingly did the same to that year’s Tiradentes Day, the former emphasized that 
prevailing notion of popular will and validated the vigilantes, making the case for a more 
inclusive sense of history and national commemoration.  
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 The editor of O Apostolo repeated the definition of Pedro I as the “founder of the 
nationality of Brazil,” given that the first emperor helped achieve political separation and 
statehood for Brazil as a nation. In his comments regarding the statue’s visible presence 
on Tiradentes Day, he also revealed those “ideological cleavages” that José Murilo de 
Carvalho identified. He noted that “the republicans would not like to see the statue” or 
have it there in the plaza along with the festivities. This distinguishing of the republican 
problem with the statue shows the different ideologies at play. The positivist writer did 
not find the statue as a symbol of the monarchy to be threatening. In the positivist view of 
society following a line of progress, evolution did not allow for a reversion to the past 
state of that society. There was no need to eradicate the past to secure some sense of the 
present. With that in mind, he ended his commentary by saying “make your carnival, but 
don’t profane our tradition.” He reduced the republican need to construct their imaginário 
as a spectacle that had no business undercutting a previously established tradition. 
Another writer similarly reduced the covering of the statue as a “manifestation of hatred 
of the past.” 192 
This question of how republicans viewed monuments and tradition was also taken 
up in the Diário de Notícias. According to their journalist,  
the best republicans are not those who hate the statues because they make them 
remember the institution against which they fought, forgetting that their hatred 
will mainly injure dear national traditions: they are those who know to offer an 
owed homage—free of political preoccupations, under the influence of the greater 
democratic spirit—to the great figures and the great events of our homeland.193 
 
Like the proponents of the statue as art, this writer advocated for an apolitical approach to 
national memory that would emphasize the patria and its defining moments rather than 
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any one particular regime. He countered the radical view of national memory and 
advocated for an integrated vision of Brazilian history that could still recognize the 7th of 
September and be self-aware and gracious enough to acknowledge all historical figures, 
even imperial ones.  
 The mayor himself, Barata Ribeiro, spoke of the importance of history for a 
people in his statement issued on the night that he ordered the bandstand stopped. In an 
attempt to allow Sampaio Ferraz and the club to keep some level of control and agency of 
the situation, Ribeiro asked/demanded that the club’s president intervene before he and 
the authorities had to. He said he did that because he was “convinced that in his spirit 
[Ferraz’s] will be a profound conviction that a people without traditions is a people 
without history and therefore without moral value.”194 This justification of the municipal 
intervention to stop the covering of the statue—and the indignant responses it engendered 
by the likes of Ferraz—provides a glimpse into the intensified duel over how to honor 
national history when many notions of the past were disputed. Ribeiro argued that there 
was a moral component to honoring the nation’s tradition and history. This assertion is 
not in dispute. In fact, the moral aspect of the incident is what made it so volatile for 
those who considered the statue of Pedro I to be an ever-present affront to the memory of 
Tiradentes. For them, the statue was the symbol of all that Tiradentes opposed and died 
for. It was the anti-symbol of the Republic as much as Tiradentes was the chosen symbol. 
It represented a regime repudiated and therefore deserved no place in perpetuity. At the 
heart of the issue was the ongoing debate as to whether symbols of the venerated and 
repudiated could co-exist in national public consciousness. Ribeiro called for that 
                                                 




coexistence. The incident showed that many people were actually more attuned to 
coexistence than the idea of casting out one for the other. The covering of the statue was 
privileging Tiradentes while, as previously noted, “prejudicing” Pedro I. But in the eyes 
of the radicals, protecting the statue was privileging Pedro by interfering with their plans 
to commemorate Tiradentes Day. 
 The incident led to more than just interference in the commemorations. On the 
night of April 20, the club met to discuss their circumstances, and their response to the 
public actions and discourse taken against them was to protest by cancelling their 
observance of Tiradentes Day. While one newspaper just gave a small blurb about the 
group “suspending” and then “annulling” all of the festivities they had planned, the 
Jornal do Commercio actually published the club’s statement. Club Tiradentes informed 
the paper that they had “decided to abstain from celebrating the anniversary of the death 
of Tiradentes…in view of the events of yesterday.”195 This new development, leaving 
Tiradentes Day to be virtually unobserved, added a new twist to Ribeiro’s words about 
tradition and history. A commentary made in the Gazeta de Notícias on April 22 even 
quoted the mayor, whom he called an “eminent republican above suspicion,” regarding 
the absences of tradition and history corresponding to a moral absence to describe the 
lack of observance of Tiradentes Day. For this writer, the “respectful and enthusiastic 
consecrations made to the martyrs of the democratic idea by a grateful posterity are 
worthy testimonies of a people who respect themselves and attempt to affirm their own 
vitality.” The absence of that celebration, then, would show ingratitude and a lack of self-
respect. The incident and aftermath showed a people going back on their traditions and 
                                                 




therefore having no history, and while this writer never stated it explicitly, the 
responsibility born by the Club Tiradentes in reinforcing that negative image that Barata 
Ribeiro warned about was clear. Ultimately, the decisions to cover the statue and then 
cancel the festivities both came to be viewed as errors in judgment. An editor for the 
Diário de Notícias called the decision to not hold the commemorations for Tiradentes “no 
less unfortunate” than the bandstand idea and blamed it on the “stubbornness” of those 
who called off the festivities. He charged that “shame” had taken the place of 
“fraternity.” He also warned that it was time that “each citizen take his role seriously. For 
the glory of the homeland and the greatness of the Republic.” The writer Paschoal in O 
Tempo conceded that it was the club’s “incontestable right” to nullify the festivities, but 
he lamented “that for a motive so frivolous” the “golden date” was not being celebrated, 
which he called another “undeniable right.” Comments like this underscored the growing 
image of the Club Tiradentes putting their desire to retaliate against the municipal 
authorities ahead of carrying out their homage to Tiradentes. The fact that the club was 
originally asked—but refused—to simply reduce the size of the bandstand so as not to 
hide the statue revealed the club’s dogmatic and defiant approach to the conflict. In 
essence, their war against Pedro I, his statue, and the authorities who went back on their 
license mattered most, and this stance communicated to many in the public that the club’s 
protest was more important than their namesake. After all, in the statement that the club 
released, there was not even a hint of paying homage to Tiradentes, only a focus on 
themselves. Another writer in the Diário de Notícias specifically called the club out for 
what would today be called taking their ball and going home. The editorial described the 
club’s resolution to abstain from holding any festivities as one of “indignation, spite or 
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misunderstanding of the scruples of dignity” stemming from the conflict. The writer was 
the first to also note the irony that the club refused to carry out their preexisting program 
to honor their patron. He demeaned their indignation by calling the incident just a “little 
trouble” and mockingly said it was a “good way to honor the immortal memory of the 
great citizen” for which they were named. This writer was just one of many who 
criticized Club Tiradentes for allowing pettiness to carry the day instead of civic duty and 
commemorative tradition. 196  
For these critics, the bandstand incident revealed the need to reaffirm the past. For 
the members of Club Tiradentes and their ideological compatriots, the continued public 
criticism they were forced to endure confirmed their need to scrutinize the present. They 
were a club and ideology under assault at a time that the long-term survival and 
consolidation of the Brazilian Republic were far from certain. Rather than adorers of art 
or appreciators of history, they saw enemies of the Republic. And that sense of 
vulnerability and threat affected what that group did before, during, and after the 
bandstand brouhaha. Before we investigate how the writers at that time specifically 
viewed Brazil’s imperial past as a whole and the legacy of its first Emperor in particular, 
which will be the subject of the next chapter, we must first understand how they viewed 
their republican present. An analysis of what Brazilian writers were saying about the 
relative strength and nature of the Republic they were forging reveals considerable 
disagreements about how safe the Republic was and how “pure” were the sentiments of 
the republicans running it. Explaining this volatile and contested political landscape will 
explain why the covering of a statue mattered to so many people. 
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The Perceived State of the Republic 
 
 How supporters of the Republic perceived their newly founded state had 
everything to do with the level of threat they perceived as facing it. There were those who 
did not see the Republic as under perpetual assault and facing mortal danger from without 
or within at every turn. There were those who did believe in a conservative/monarchical 
“permanent conspiracy” against the government and its agenda. And there was a wide 
range of people somewhere in between. These differences, which were often perceived as 
diametrical opposition, played a tremendous role in how Brazilians responded to the 
bandstand incident because those differences determined their level of ideological or 
political fear and outrage. The public conflict over the covering of Pedro’s statue, 
therefore, triggered a reaction based on those resultant world views. If they perceived the 
threat level to the Republic to be low or at least manageable, then the statue brouhaha 
was an irrational overreaction to a small occurrence blown way out of proportion. For 
those on the other end of the spectrum, the incident was evidence of that ongoing 
conspiracy and the need to purge the government and the Republican Party of anyone 
who was suspect. Such a view left no room for any middle ground. The public debate that 
resulted reflected the contestation over the very nature and composition of the Republic, 
between moderates and radicals. The statue incident certainly did not lead to any 
definitive resolution of this conflict, but it did provide a fascinating glimpse into it. 
From the very beginning of the Republic’s existence, there was a palpable sense 
of both optimism and uncertainty regarding the new government’s future. A writer’s 
comments in 1890 illustrated this duality: “the discontented with the Republic will never 
seriously threaten the order and the peace that reigns in Brazil.” They might stir up 
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“apprehensions and intrigues,” but they would “never be able to undo the work of the 
patriots that made the United States of Brazil.” Comments in the same newspaper, O 
Paiz, just one year later indicated the toll that a lack of political consolidation had taken. 
They show a stark contrast between the optimism associated with the Republic’s first 
celebration of Tiradentes Day with the circumstances of 1891. Where there was 
“enthusiasm” before, one editor finds only “disillusionment.” A contributing factor to 
that disillusionment was the growing perception of Deodoro da Fonseca’s presidency as 
authoritarian and even imperial. In terms that will sound distinctly familiar to those used 
to describe Pedro I by past critics, one editor for the Diário de Notícias equated Deodoro 
with his right-hand minister, the Baron of Lucena, and indicted their rule’s “crown” as 
well as their “corruption…disobedience to the law…violation of the Constitution…and 
all the public powers [being] in the hand of only one.”  This portrayal of the Republic’s 
first president as the usurper of singular, authoritarian power and violator of the 
constitution sounds more like the Pedro I that Otoni criticized than the venerated 
proclaimer of the Republic. The same editor even used the term “official lie” to describe 
Deodoro’s “imperialist” rule, a label quite reminiscent of Otoni’s “bronze lie.” Overall, 
the writer defined Brazil’s current period as one of “political comedy” for which he 
feared a “tragic end” and placed ultimate responsibility with the president. In April of 
1891, Deodoro had officially been president for only two months, but his control of the 
provisional government before the government apparatuses had been created by the 1891 
constitution had already soured many to his style of rule. It did not help his image, notes 
José Murilo de Carvalho, that the old general even looked to Brazilians like their exiled 
emperor Pedro II. The presence of Lucena was especially problematic for the president 
146 
 
and the public. The public view of him as a monarchist due to his position in the imperial 
government made him suspect and the figure the republicans directed the majority of 
their ire towards. They perceived the “Baron” as being opposed to the showing of respect 
to Tiradentes for the commemoration in 1892. One writer charged that the “present 
government” was “making the people forget the liberal traditions of this country.” The 
writer J. R. for O Paiz previewed this sentiment back in 1891 and lamented the larger 
implications of the diminished commemoration of Tiradentes Day amidst the political 
instability of the day. He described the day as evidence of an  
unhappy people [who] do not have the cult of devotion to their heroes, nor have 
the exaltation of their ancestors: without a past in time, without a point of human 
support in history, a human island…without inheritance…or connection to 
another generation. You say that the monarchy had no traditions here: and I ask 
what is the republican tradition that we should foment and develop from now on? 
 
In place of that cult or civic awareness, J. R. found only “indifference…vulgar 
contentment… and monotone happiness.”197 This finding of public indifference was 
typically an indictment of the level of civic engagement during the empire but it 
increasingly became a republican self-criticism as well. It was also an indication of the 
“disillusionment” noted above. While the writer referenced previously did in fact make 
clear that President Deodoro da Fonseca was responsible for the current political 
situation, that same writer nevertheless addressed all of his charges to the “Baron” rather 
than the President. In an interesting twist, Deodoro would use the pretext of a monarchist 
plot to justify his dissolution of Brazil’s National Congress in November of 1891, a move 
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that would force his resignation and his replacement by Floriano Peixoto, who would be 
the president at the time of the bandstand incident.198 
In the end, all of these fears of monarchists and authoritarians subverting the 
society and government of the Republic from within created a perpetual perception of 
threat. On top of that, an economic contraction added to that year’s public perception of a 
republic in crisis. The result was that earlier grandiose notions of Brazil’s “innate 
predisposition for democracy” based on the idea that “the Latin race is Republican” were 
coming up against the reality of the difficulty in organizing the new state and its 
society.199 In the Diário de Notícias on the day after Tiradentes Day in 1891, an account 
of the public discourses held at that commemoration pointed to “the uncertainties of the 
present and to the period of struggle that Brazilian liberty faces.” Included in the 
speeches was the belief that there was a “conspiracy against the Republic” that had not 
been uncovered yet but that existed “latent.” This reporter also noted the participation of 
one Sampaio Ferraz in this discourse. Such a deep-seated sense of undisclosed threats and 
uncertainty provides a context to the club president’s point of view and sheds 
considerable light on the seriousness with which he and the Club Tiradentes personally 
responded to the repercussions of the bandstand incident.200 
The Fear of the Silent Plotting of Monarchists 
The theme of lurking enemies was a common one, even before 1891. An earlier 
account of the 1890 Tiradentes Day celebrations juxtaposed what the article called the 
“most sincere patriotism” of those who participated and showed their civic engagement 
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with what it labeled a “profanation” and even a crime in the absence of any 
commemorations at the royal palace. The writer attempted to minimize its significance by 
saying that “happily those who are spiteful are few and the intrigues they are behind will 
unmask them, so that all will know them as enemies of the Republic.” This perceived 
monarchical slight added to a sense of conflict and standoff in the new political 
landscape. It is not clear what exactly occurred at the palace or its extent, but it clearly 
was important enough to earn its participants the title of “enemies of the Republic.”201 
Such a fear of the republic’s enemies and the threats they posed to the fledgling state 
existed immediately after the proclamation and would shape the view of commentators in 
1893. 
That fear centered most notably on the originally Portuguese concept of 
Sebastianismo. Robert M. Levine succinctly defines that idea as “the belief that 
Portugal’s King Sebastian had not died in battle at Alcácer Quibir against the Moors in 
1578, but had gone into hiding, awaiting a triumphal return.” While the idea had a 
religious and Messianic element to it from the start, Levine also notes how it ultimately 
took on an element of political liberation from the unwanted rule of a new power, giving 
the Portuguese nation a vehicle through which it could maintain its “will to survive as a 
nation” under Spanish control.202 Sebastianism repeatedly popped up in the Portuguese 
political imagination following political ruptures, and it did so across the Atlantic in 
Brazilian minds as well. In the context of the first few years of the Republic, Francisco 
das Neves Alves describes Sebastianismo as having a “restorative character” that 
reflected a desire for the return to the way things were under the empire. While the 
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people often labeled as Sebastianists did not self-identify as such, their opposition or 
criticism of the policies of the new state earned them that designation. As Alves points 
out, that opposition to the regime came not out of any real desire for the monarchy to be 
restored but rather the desire for the reinstatement of practices like the freedoms of 
expression and the press that existed during the imperial era. According to Alves, there 
were mere “traces” of any monarchist identification instead of the ever-present 
“bogeyman” feared by the more radical republicans.203    
Nevertheless, conspiracy theorists in Rio de Janeiro dating back to early 1890 
warned of “Sebastianist conspiracy” efforts and described a climate of subversive 
aspirations and political intrigue that had the potential for real threat. Some discourse 
surrounding the nation’s observance of September 7 in 1890 also debated the 
monarchical presence and threat to the Republic. A letter by the Visconde de Taunay, the 
very same Taunay who as a young man contributed inaugural odes in 1862, in the Gazeta 
de Notícias asserted that “the monarchical party exists and will always 
exist…numerous…and throughout Brazil” but that as a party they did and would not 
“conspire” against the Republic. Rather, they were watching events unfold. A writer for 
the newspaper Novidades refuted that idea in his own article. He responded that no 
legitimate monarchical party existed and that instead monarchists cloaked themselves 
under the false flags of other groups like the Catholic Party and the moderate faction of 
the Republican Party. This writer wanted those hiding monarchists “unmasked” and 
exposed.204 The radical fear of Sebastianist plots skyrocketed after the news of Pedro II’s 
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death in France reached Rio in December of 1891 and generated a significant public 
response. Such an outpouring of affection and grief was interpreted by radicals like the 
Jacobins within the Club Tiradentes as a climate ripe for restorationist opportunism. In 
response, the club organized a “great civic march” to glorify all Republican figures, and 
even more strikingly decided to create the “Batalhão (Battalion) Tiradentes” to serve as a 
funded and armed civic militia. The club named those they considered “political figures 
of the extinct monarchy” as Sebastianist plotters since those suspect figures were using 
the “pretext of funeral rights for the ex-emperor” to set the scene for a restorationist 
scheme. To combat that and any other threat to the Republic, the Battalion would be 
made up of around four hundred “republican citizens” armed through a public 
subscription. While there was some push back in the press the next day questioning why 
the club did not instead fund and join the National Guard rather than create their own 
militia, the Battalion Tiradentes became a visible and powerful arm of the core group that 
made up the club.205 As will be discussed shortly, the battalion would serve republican 
interests in a wide range of services from taking up arms and fighting against a naval 
insurrection to monitoring what was said in the press on an everyday basis. The 
battalion’s watchful eyes were not the only ones trained on the press. For example, in 
1892 O Apostolo reported in a section that can best be translated as “Say What?,” “that in 
S. Paulo books and pamphlets having the imperial crown as their emblem had just been 
published.”206 A small little blurb like that would be noticed by all readers in Rio and 
serve to validate the notion of some that monarchists were still a threat to be reckoned 
with. Groups like the Club Tiradentes and its Battalion paid particular attention to the 
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presence of royal symbolism like the anecdote above, so not surprisingly they reacted 
with great suspicion when their covering of the ultimate symbol of the monarchy in Rio 
led to public criticism. 
An O Tempo writer led the charge against those lurking monarchists in an article 
devoted to Tiradentes on his commemorative day just days after the incident in 1893. The 
writer asked the “high powers” of the government to “not allow these monarchists to 
occupy the higher and lower jobs.” This writer was particularly concerned with jobs in 
the capital city, saying that such infiltration was against “the highly sacred” constitution. 
In terms of detecting those monarchists, he affirmed that they “would be incapable of 
portraying themselves as republicans” and therefore would be noticeable as “our political 
enemies” by “their silence.” Writers of this vein had to deal with a vexing problem. There 
was no uprising at all carried out by monarchists after the incident, not one single peep 
about bringing back the empire. In fact, writers tripped all over themselves to affirm their 
republican sentiments. Fitting with their world view, though, the absence of any 
Sebastianist plot actually served to reinforce the idea that the enemies of the Republic 
were acting strategically silent and were still a threat, albeit a secret one.207  
Speaking of republican sentiment, the same newspaper found the incident guilty 
of producing harm. It said that in terms of “political relations, the brutality that injured 
the republican sentiment” could not be compared to the perceived injuries to the “adorers 
of the work of art that attests to a historical fact that never provoked any sense of national 
enthusiasm.” This writer clearly dismissed the call to respect the statue as a piece of art, 
instead taking the opportunity to claim republican victimhood and present the argument 
as a lie upon a lie…that the statue was art and that it represented history that mattered to 
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anyone.208 Sampaio Ferraz displayed a similar sense of incredulity about the public’s 
response to the statue’s covering. In his published letter, he said that he “did not attach 
any great importance” to the plan or the construction and certainly did not foresee any 
backlash. To him, it was simply a “temporary edifice” approved by the municipality in 
the form of the license for what he sarcastically referred to as the “abominable offense.” 
Ferraz was also incredulous due to his own sense of the world in which he lived, the 
world ushered in by the proclamation of the Republic. He stated that he “had lamentably 
deceived his soul into believing” that “after the 15th of November, the bitter traitor of D. 
João VI might not have in this land so many and so fervid worshippers.” He likened the 
criticism to an “anger suppressed that conspires in the darkness, finds its way, and its 
explosion feeds off of everything.” Those involved wanted the “perturbation” of the 
Republic. By translating the criticism directed to the club as an attempt to throw the 
entire state into disorder, Ferraz confirmed that he saw himself and his club as indistinct 
from the Republic and vice versa. Such a grandiose sense of self-importance would 
indeed rub many commentators of the day the wrong way, and they would take the 
opportunity to challenge that Jacobin vision of the Republic and their role in it. 
Criticism towards Municipal Authorities 
The reason that radical republicans were so fixated on the ideological 
predisposition of their government’s officials was because of the role that municipal 
officials played in the conflict and the subsequent (self-perceived) humiliation of Club 
Tiradentes in the public sphere. Those figures involved in the demolition of the bandstand 
demonstrated a wide range in terms of their level of complicity or blame—indirect to 
direct—and in terms of their political prominence—license-approving functionary to the 
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mayor of Rio de Janeiro. The most immediate and obvious officials who drew the ire of 
Club Tiradentes were Captain Martinho de Moraes of the National Guard and Captain 
Hyppolito Coutinho of the Police Brigade. Reports of the taking down of the bandstand 
on the evening of the 19th of April placed those two men at the head of the “grupo de 
populares” responsible for the demolition. In their account of the incident, the Diário de 
Notícias made note that the group was led by the two leaders “known as republicans” and 
“who occupied honored positions in our society.”209 In addition, when the Police Brigade 
cavalry unit arrived, multiple papers reported that Captain Moraes “thanked the police for 
having given time to the people in order to complete their work” of demolishing the 
coreto. This perception of the consent, acquiescence, or even participation of municipal 
authorities became a major point of contention with Club Tiradentes and fueled the idea 
that there was a municipal conspiracy against them.210  Their indignation grew over the 
comments of the head of the municipal government, Mayor Barata Ribeiro. The mayor’s 
decision to stop the construction, his order to demolish the bandstand, his public criticism 
of the club for its disrespect to Brazilian traditions, and his portrayal of the club as having 
in essence pulled a fast one on the city in obtaining that license all came together to earn 
him both praise and condemnation in the press. And while Sampaio Ferraz would 
attribute all actions critical of his club as coming from Pedro I “worshippers,” the fact of 
the matter was that that betrayal more accurately reflected republican on republican—
even Jacobin on Jacobin—crime rather than any Sebastianist opportunism. After all, José 
Murilo defines Ribeiro as a republican and even a “prominent leader of Jacobin 
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tendencies.” The reported vivas shouted during the incident provide more evidence to the 
incident and its aftermath being more of an internal republican dispute. The vigilante 
demolishers of the coreto were credited with giving “acclamations and vivas to the 
Republic, to the army, to the armada [navy], to the police, and to Marshal [President] 
Floriano.” No one shouted vivas to the monarchy or to Pedro I.211 Barata Ribeiro himself 
never even referred to Pedro I by name in his publicized letter to Ferraz (or Tiradentes for 
that matter…even calling the site the Largo do Rocio).  
The way that Mayor Ribeiro communicated his decisions and ideas to Sampaio 
Ferraz made the relationship between the two clearly public and decidedly antagonistic. 
The mayor did indeed include in his letter a face-saving gesture towards Club Tiradentes 
and its leader, giving them the courtesy of allowing them to call off their own works 
before the prefecture did. Technically, Ribeiro was “soliciting the intervention” of Ferraz 
to carry out the “politeness of acting” in order to remedy the “inconvenient” situation. 
This façade was recognizable to most observers since the letter was published after the 
public had already torn down a large part of the bandstand and made its reconstruction 
untenable. Had the offer to have the club resolve the issue themselves been done in 
private and subsequently heralded as being of their own initiative and sensitivity, then it 
would have saved face. However, the escalating tension between the two negated any 
possibility of that scenario, and instead antagonism ruled the day. Multiple times in his 
very short letter, Ribeiro made reference to the club’s intent to “cover” and “conceal” the 
statue as indicative of their over-the-top carrying out of their licensed construction. His 
argument centered on the prevailing notion that the club went way too far in blatantly 
covering the statue. He even cited a rumor of the construction that he dismissed as being 
                                                 
211 Carvalho, ”Unfinished,” 149; Jornal do Commercio, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua de D. Pedro I.” 
155 
 
preposterous. In terms of his and his officials’ lack of scrutiny of the details of the plan, 
Ribeiro excused them both based on the assertion that he never anticipated that Sampaio 
Ferraz would fail to put on a tasteful commemoration worthy of Tiradentes. He couched 
this blame in the terms of honoring Tiradentes, but in reality the issue was the creation of 
the public controversy. In what could be the most cutting and humiliating aspect of the 
letter in terms of republican on republican criticism, Mayor Ribeiro chided Ferraz and the 
club for creating a scenario and incident on the commemorative date that was beneath 
that which their namesake and the date should inspire. That the mayor of Rio would 
criticize the president of the Club Tiradentes and the commander of the Battalion 
Tiradentes in this way underscores the tensions and conflicts within the republican 
regime.212 
The public discourse praising or at least defending the actions of the mayor was 
minimal. O Paiz congratulated him for making the right decision while the Diário de 
Notícias called the actions of the authorities “perfectly justifiable.” Both the latter paper 
and the Gazeta de Notícias were relatively charitable in saying that the city granted the 
license without understanding the club’s intent for the “complete eclipsing of the statue 
with the superimposition of the base structure of the bandstand.”213 The vast majority of 
the discussion of the mayor’s conduct, however, found various degrees of fault and 
served more as an indictment of his overall municipal legacy rather than for just that one 
statue incident. Some of the criticism came after Club Tiradentes showed all of the 
newspapers the bandstand construction license granted by the city. The terms of the 
license were clear: the covering of the statue was approved. Given this, the municipality 
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should not have been surprised by the construction. Rather, it was shocked by the public 
reaction, and according to the editor of O Paiz, the mayor “recognized the 
inconvenience” brought by the scandal and decided to effectively void the club’s 
license.214 Other writers seized the opportunity to conflate the statue scandal with a 
polemic involving Barata Ribeiro just months prior. In January, his administration had 
demolished the slum named the Cabeza de Porco, displacing more than 2,000 people in 
the name of sanitation and city planning and leaving them with no resources or recourse. 
This type of urban reform demolition earned the nickname of the “bota-abaixo,” or 
“tear-down.” While Sophia Beal notes that the nickname held “both positive and negative 
connotations,” in April of 1893 it was purely negative for Barata Ribeiro. While 
previously some journalists had praised the demolition of a place that “sheltered 
murderers,” the displacement of so many desperate people, the disorder that followed, 
and the growing sense of the state’s intrusion into the private and personal space of the 
inhabitants of the slum all came together to add another dimension to the “demolition” of 
the bandstand at the mayor’s hands.215  
As a result, one prominent writer commenting on the bandstand incident came to 
refer to Mayor Barata Ribeiro as “D. Bota-Abaixo I.” This naming of Ribeiro is 
significant on several levels. First, the taking of the nickname for the city’s urban reform 
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project and the demolition of slums in its public health and redevelopment plan and its 
application to the mayor shows that the public backlash against Ribeiro was as much 
about his previous decisions as it was about his decision to have the coreto demolished. 
Secondly, the writer consciously manipulated that nickname to approximate the subject 
of the statue, “D. Pedro I.” The “Chico Reporter” who coined the phrase changed it thus 
to make it an even greater badge of dishonor. In his initial commentary on the incident in 
O Tempo on April 20, the writer charged that “D. Bota-Abaixo I remains very satisfied 
with the explosion of anger [in Portuguese cólera, a possible play on the public health 
metaphor] in the group in the largo do Rocio that tried yesterday to demolish the 
bandstand around the statue of Pedro I.” While he did not refer to Pedro as “D. Pedro I” 
as many writers did to accentuate Ribeiro’s new title, he did repeat the title more than 
once in order to associate the two figures and malign and mock the mayor. That mocking 
continued in his column after the Club Tiradentes made their rounds to show their 
construction license. In reference to that, he hypothesized that “His Omnipotence D. Bota 
Abaixo yelled out at seeing the license published for the bandstand that botaram abaixo 
[they tore down] in the Rocio.” The showing of the license headed off any further attempt 
on the mayor’s part that his office approved the construction because it was not made 
aware of the scale of the bandstand. The ensuing criticism of “His Omnipotence” 
revealed the public awareness of the mayor’s attempt to deflect all of the criticism onto 
the club. After using the nickname to refer to the demolition of the slum and the 
bandstand, the author also used the related nickname in conjunction with whom he 
thought the mayor’s next victim would be. According to the author, “D. Bota Abaixo I 
will demolish the Battalion Tiradentes.” On this prognostication the writer was partially 
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right. Nothing happened to the battalion itself, but its leader, Sampaio Ferraz, did shortly 
resign his command (while keeping his position as president of the club). One final rant 
against Ribiero took place two days later, with the writer accusing the mayor of 
“usurpation” in his demolitions. He charged that “He and only he and no one else is the 
general in chief of the army of crowbars and pickaxes…He came to the world for two 
ends: to exasperate it and to tear it down.”  
On top of the nickname slur, “Chico Reporter” also referred to Ribeiro as the 
“provisional mayor,” a qualification of his position that made him that much weaker in 
the public eye. A writer for the Diário de Notícias explained that the government had just 
named Ribeiro as mayor and that he faced Congressional confirmation or rejection soon. 
This writer stated directly that he found the mayor to be “incapable of discharging the 
duties of his position” and his appointment without the people’s vote to be a violation of 
the constitution. Whether or not all writers held this same view, most would concur with 
one writer’s column on the subject: “municipal disorganization.” Later in that month of 
May, the Brazilian Senate would in fact invalidate Ribeiro’s nomination, a move that 
would ironically be criticized by the same newspaper as being a result of Ribeiro’s 
“numerous enemies and adversaries” who stemmed from his “scrupulously honest” time 
as an “honorable civil servant” who refused to take bribes and play ball in Rio’s corrupt 
political system. That writer blamed the vested interests of the corrupt for the Senate’s 
rebuke of Ribeiro rather than any popular protest against the mayor.216 
The writer of the column “Coisas” in the Diário de Notícias had a very interesting 
metaphor for public opinion of Barata Ribeiro at the time of the incident. He likened the 
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mayor’s political trajectory to a fireworks show. At that fireworks show, there are plenty 
of “oohs and ahs” when they go off, but what is left afterwards is smoke and smell…what 
he calls “devil air.” The writer equated Ribeiro’s rise in politics to the beautiful show. At 
that time in the public’s eyes, “he was the man for the task, he had talent and was honest, 
active, and an excellent creature.” But after public campaigns against carne verde, the 
demolition of the slum, and now the events of Praça Tiradentes, the mayor went from 
being considered by the Club Tiradentes commission for Tiradentes Day 
commemorations as “one of them” to “being called a Sebastianista.”217 
The Bandstand Incident as “True Republican” Litmus Test 
 The perception of betrayal by republicans against fellow republicans resulted in a 
general questioning of fidelity to the republican spirit and ideology. As stated before, 
Sampaio Ferraz defined those republican values in his own image and therefore defined 
anyone who disagreed with him as unfaithful to those beliefs and the Republic itself. The 
public reaction to the bandstand incident provided a sort of laboratory for radicals such as 
Ferraz to test their fellow republicans based on whether their subjects supported or 
criticized the club and/or the covering of the statue. 
 Ferraz drew the figurative line in the sand saying that the removal should stab at 
the soul of any republican. For him, no real republican could ever privilege the memory 
of Pedro I over that of Tiradentes, so he condemned the “committed and loyal 
republicans who preferred the falsified legend of the first emperor to the festive and lofty 
remembering of the stoicism” of Tiradentes. The sarcasm clearly dripped from his words 
in calling his critics “committed and loyal” in their republican sentiments, and soon after 
he dropped such games and called those he held responsible “the Pharisees of the 
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Republic.” He attacked those figures, those he equated to the powerful, hypocritical, and 
hostile to Christian truth Biblical Pharisees, for their “incomprehensible timidity” and 
their “feigned sensibility” in allowing public perception to force the coreto’s demolition. 
Such a charge was common in the radical criticism of the “acts of cowardice and 
humiliating brutality” and “hysterical sentimentalism” shown by city authorities in being 
cowed by a handful of troublemakers. This specific attack also revealed the radical 
tendency to criticize using religious analogies. Previously, the monarchy had been 
damned as the executors of the Christ-like Tiradentes. Likewise, his betrayer was equated 
with Judas. All in all, the tactic reflected and fueled their sense of righteousness and 
unassailability. In addition, Ferraz refuted the portrayal of those involved in the 
bandstand’s demolition as “populares” and instead labeled them as “half a dozen 
hotheads” who were rounded up by “enemies of the Republic.” This delineation of the 
bandstand’s destroyers as enemies and brigands only accentuated that righteousness.218 
 Using terms to qualify and judge someone’s republican-ness went back as far as 
the very beginning of the Republic. In an article in the Jornal do Commercio in 1890, 
there is the use of the terms “true republicans” and “republiquistas” (part republican, part 
monarchist) to distinguish between those representing the new era and those “slavocrats” 
who wielded power during the empire and sought influence in the new government.219 
The bandstand backlash in 1893 unleashed a similar need to distinguish political friend 
from foe, and no group was more active in doing so than the Club Tiradentes. They 
immediately came out swinging in their protest statement after the coreto’s destruction. 
Their statement to the press read:  
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The dedicated and pure republicans, residents in this capital, …protest against the 
illegal, violent, and arbitrary attitude of the Chief of Police and the Mayor of this 
district, pseudo-republicans; and manifesting to the public powers their immense 
sorrow, make a sincere appeal to all of their co-religionarios of the territory of the 
Republic in defense of the republican cause, so unjustly attacked by two well 
remunerated public authorities of this capital.220 
 
The us versus them or “pure” versus impure republicans delineation made in this 
statement demonstrated how the identities of republicans were being further cleaved in 
the aftermath of the incident within that group’s own political landscape. A detailed 
account of that Club Tiradentes meeting that approved the statement above sheds further 
light onto the club’s immediate priorities. The account mentioned that more than 400 
people attended the meeting and that they unanimously agreed to five things. The first 
was that they would abstain from the other Tiradentes Day festivities to protest “the 
conduct of the authorities.” The second was to expel Lt. Col. Luiz de Oliveira e Souza for 
being “disloyal” and not fulfilling his obligations during the “attack on the bandstand.” 
Thirdly, they voted to consider Capt. Martinho de Moraes as a “traitor.” The fourth was 
to notify the National Guard of the disloyalty of the two officials named in the decisions 
referenced above. The last vote approved was that casting suspicion on Mayor Barata 
Ribeiro. The publication of what basically was the club’s enemies list along with their 
abstention notification is what drove several commentators to criticize their privileging 
political retaliation over civic commemoration.221 
 Capt. Martinho de Moraes took to the papers as well to make his rebuttal. His 
tactic was to take on the label of traitor in order to refute it, and he did so by establishing 
his own republican and Tiradentes-honoring credentials. For him, his self-awareness of 
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the greatness of Tiradentes was a large part of his republican credentials. He even went so 
far as to assert that he was recognizing and paying homage to Tiradentes before the Club 
Tiradentes was, thus placing him above the club in terms of the proof of his patriotism. 
His letter read  
There is nothing to see—I am lost!! I am a traitor to the Republic, the Republic 
that I always, always defend! I who before, much before, of the Senhores of a 
Club had thought on the Great Martyr of Liberty…I had in S. Fidelis a newspaper 
titled “For the Proto Martyr, Sacrosanct for My Homeland!!”  
 
Moraes ended his letter similarly by saying that he desired only “Progress and Order for 
the Republic and nothing…nothing…for the Monarchy!” In the papers at this time, the 
writers remained more concerned with the larger issues of the political tensions and did 
not comment on this individual response or question. When O Paiz responded to the Club 
Tiradentes, it did so with more sweeping statements such as this when they took on the 
notion of the litmus test and its significance on the republican landscape. The editor 
wrote that “the best republicans are not and will never be such that they would display 
such intolerance and exaltation; the patria and the Brazilian people will deserve much 
more, they will achieve a bond of much greater relevance than those who would 
inspire…aggression and disharmony.” Where O Paiz valued “common sense, 
moderation, and order,” radical proponents such as the letter-writer “a patriot” defined 
“the tranquility of the country and the well-being of its institutions” as being directly 
related to the “adhesion and loyalty to the Republic” shown in the newspapers in the 
discourse on such hot-button issues like the bandstand and the conflict in Rio Grande do 
Sul.222 That conflict, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, dominated 
the headlines because the Carioca reading public realized the larger implications of the 
                                                 
222 Jornal do Commercio, April 23, 1893, “O Traidor” in “Publicações a Pedido”; O Paiz, April 19, 1893, 
“A Estatua de Pedro I”; Jornal do Commercio, April 26, 1893, “A Estatua de D. Pedro I.” 
163 
 
contest for power taking place in that state. It pitted positivists backed by the president 
himself, Floriano Peixoto, against a liberal opposition fighting over the state constitution, 
namely whether the political system should be a parliamentary one more akin to the 
previous imperial model as backed by the liberals or a positivist system that allowed 
more control by the federal state and President Peixoto.223 With successive coup attempts 
and ongoing armed conflict, the politics of Rio Grande do Sul captured headlines and 
everyone’s attention in Rio.  
 The writers in the public sphere were well aware from the very beginning of the 
conflict over the bandstand that being labeled a fake republican or traitor was a potential 
consequence for criticizing the club and its actions. The fear was so palpable that almost 
every single writer felt compelled to preface any criticism of the statue’s covering by 
asserting their republican-ness. Many described themselves as “insuspeito” or “above 
suspicion” because of the “sincerity of their republican convictions” that were “firm and 
most sincere.” They had to affirm their “pure, sincere and fervent republican spirit” in 
order to inoculate their statements against the Club, so in some ways they were validating 
the Club Tiradentes belief that criticizing them was akin to questioning the Republic. As 
a curiosity, though, it is interesting to note that while criticizing Club Tiradentes was an 
act of impure republicanism, apparently not using the new name of the praça to honor 
Tiradentes was acceptable. Even some of the most fervid defenders of the club and its 
actions in their letters and editorials repeatedly referred to the largo do Rocio instead of 
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Praça Tiradentes. It would appear that the use of the site’s new name was not one of those 
republican litmus tests.224 
 While for many of the writers quoted above the statue incident was a matter of 
republican life or death, many observers considered it an insignificant occurrence blown 
incredibly out of proportion. In an example of one newspaper, the Diário de Notícias, 
mocking the hyperbolic treatment of the incident in another paper, in this case O Tempo, 
a writer commented on the ways that O Tempo had made Pedro I seem alive and a threat 
again. He did so by joking that in response to that paper’s reporting, the government of 
the Republic had decided to decree that they needed to besiege the statue and oversee 
Pedro I’s embarkation back to Lisbon. According to the joke, the government had even 
decided to keep the praça in Rio under a perpetual state of siege to deal with any chance 
of the first emperor’s return. To end his column, this writer even called for public prayers 
to the “Lady of the Afflicted” since many republicans were so traumatized by the 
occurrences.225 A writer for the Revista Illustrada used humor in a “nocturnal dialogue” 
imagined between Pedro I and one of the Indians from his statue’s pedestal to comment 
on the events. In that conversation, Pedro I wondered aloud if he was being sent to 
Chicago. The writer’s response was to have the Indian laugh and reply: “don’t kid 
yourself…the festivities of the Republic are drawing near…so we can’t have Your 
Majesty offending the republican opinions of your former subjects.” The defining of the 
parties involved in the incident as the emperor’s “former subjects” is striking as is the 
Indian’s perspective that the Republic’s festivities required Pedro’s obfuscation to avoid 
insult. The writer further commented on that idea by ultimately having Pedro I come to 
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the conclusion that the republicans must be teasing him by the building of the bandstand. 
The writer reveals the ex-emperor’s reasoning by having him continue his conversation 
with the Indian, but this time about their witnessing previous republican infighting…a 
reason that seems far more significant than him.226 A writer for the Gazeta de Notícias 
similarly used mocking humor to comment on the rumor and fear-mongering that blew 
the incident so out of proportion. He cited “grave consequences” for “anyone opening 
their mouth about anything about that bandstand” in the form of “conspiracies, 
dissentions, and explosions” as gossip about the statue spread throughout the city. 
Mocking the alarmists, he described feeling compelled to arm himself after hearing of the 
“serious events” in the praça and then waking up the next day and being shocked to find 
that no one had died and nothing had really happened overnight. When he went to the 
scene of the drama, he found only the statue and some curious onlookers on Tiradentes 
Day. His point was that only one day after two days of hubbub, the praça had returned to 
normal. In an homage to Shakespeare, this writer began his column translating the 
“words, words, words” line from Hamlet into “boatos, boatos, boatos” (rumor-
mongering) and ended it with the line “All is well that ends well.”227  
The apocalyptic portrait drawn and then debunked served as a tempered 
commentary on the actual human experience in this turbulent time in the city. And it was 
in stark contrast with statements such as the one made by a letter writer who called 
himself “a patriot,” who warned Brazilians to hope and pray that those “humble planks 
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not transform themselves into the instrument with which the head of Christianity [God] 
purifies the sands of time.” There were some notices of injury and violence at the praça 
and afterwards. The police had to disarm a young man who kept threatening all who 
came by him, one young man broke his leg after falling from a position up on the 
bandstand, and finally “an individual of Portuguese nationality” was injured after being 
clubbed.228 All in all, the lack of widespread mayhem and destruction noted above 
certainly gave a different perspective to the impact of the incident on the city, and another 
writer took up this issue of perspective but did so placing the statue covering in a national 
political context. The O Tempo writer put it succinctly by asking if one situation was 
equal to the other: “the question of lumber and rags, raised to the height of manifestation 
of monarchical sentiment and of the weakening of the enthusiasm for republican 
traditions, is equal to the other more important, heavy work of the government reaching 
an accord with those revolting in Rio Grande do Sul?”229 By boiling the issues down and 
placing them side by side, this writer did a great deal in putting the bandstand incident 
into perspective. He did validate it as a symbolic slighting, but he also compared it to the 
open repudiation by a province of the Republic’s authority and territorial control. The 
question of what to do to reunite all of Brazil under federal control and democratic 
participation also was highly visible in the newspapers of the time. The writer’s desire 
was the same as many others: for the government and the political elite to focus on truly 
pressing issues. 
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The Post-Incident Sense of Ideological Disunity and Antagonism 
For many commentators in Rio, the aftermath of the statue incident created a 
moment of reflection on the nation’s internal republican disunity and the impact it had on 
the functioning of the state. In that same letter from “a patriot,” the writer warns that as a 
result of the incident, “the institutions will suffer a profound shock” and that there will be 
“more than deplorable consequences.” The “patriot” kept referring back to Floriano 
Peixoto, saying that the president must be “impressed” with the “diatribes” found 
throughout the Rio press and that he “must recognize or at least could hear the profundity 
and the sincerity of republican convictions of the majority” of the public discourse of the 
capital. As a Jacobin writer, he touched on all of the most prevalent radical issues: the 
existential threat to the Republic, the identification of the “majority” sentiment with his 
own, and the preoccupation with the leanings of the city’s and the nation’s leadership. 
For writers such as “a patriot,” their rhetoric was only heating up in the days after the 
bandstand’s demolition.230 
Borja Reis, in an article titled “Republican Disunity” in O Tempo, also addressed 
the idea of republican division through the prism of Tiradentes Day commemorations 
over the last two years. Noting the lack of organized tribute to the martyr as due to “this 
or that reason,” Reis asserted that the absence “proved itself, however, one more time of 
the disunion of the republican camps, where all are leaders and none are soldiers.” With 
so many of strong convictions and the desire to lead, the cacophony of voices resulted in 
rudderless division, which he called “our disgrace.” He pointed to the events of the 19th 
(of April) as the product of advantage taken of the “different opinions, ideas, passions, 
and recriminations” that perpetuated a lack of “homogeneity in the party” as well as a 
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“lack of political direction.” For him, though, the answer would not be found in the 
purging of the party—as called for by the Jacobins. That group he called “parasites” and 
“speculators that have robbed” the nation. Reis advocated for a party strengthened by 
unity instead of ravaged and weakened by radicalism. Ultimately, he found the 
Republican Party’s “intrigues, treasons, or lack of tact” responsible for the absence of the 
sort of commemoration they “owed” the martyr of the Inconfidência Mineira. On the 
larger question of Brazil’s political trajectory, Borja Reis also made disunity his primary 
concern. He took the typical republican historical talking point about the “revolution” of 
the 15th of November ushering a time of Brazil for Brazilians and used it to further his 
point. Reis said that “if it is true that Brazil had not been on the side of the Brazilians 
until today, it is much more certain that the Republic has not been on the side of 
republicans.” His vision of the Republic was one of a political system hijacked by the 
Jacobins, leading to a party fractured and perpetually fighting itself. He criticized his 
party for not being about the greatness of the Republic and the nation but rather their own 
ideological squabbles.231 
Other writers similarly placed much of the blame for the party’s tensions at the 
feet of the Jacobins. In O Apostolo, a column about patriotism attributed the statue 
covering incident to the Jacobin desire to hide it from “the view of the people” on 
Tiradentes Day because it “offended the prudishness of the demagogues of the era.” 
Another linked the statue covering to the “political intransigence” of the time. A writer 
for the Cidade do Rio noted how the Republic itself adopted the 7th of September as a 
national holiday, thus establishing the Grito as an important commemorative date. Why 
then, would republicans feel so much repugnance for a statue that symbolized a moment 
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they consciously chose to embrace? The answer for this writer was fear. The republicans’ 
fear had given rise to Sebastianism, which in turn had given rise to the idea that the statue 
was the “incarnation of the restorationist ambitions of the time.” He found all of that 
political psychology to itself be the result of the “political intransigence” of the time. 
Because the statue had no way to act or respond to the events, he completely discounted 
the statue as a threat—symbolic or otherwise. And he cautioned all against finding 
monarchism in their observance of the past.232 
Nevertheless, fear and reactionary politics still marked the Brazilian exchange of 
ideas. By 1893 journalists knew very well that there were indeed consequences for 
offending the radical values of groups like Club Tiradentes and the Battalion Tiradentes. 
Just the year before, controversy in the press also marred the Tiradentes Day 
commemorative discourse. The conflict began over an article written that discussed the 
level of freedom of expression enjoyed in Rio. According to the author, his purpose was 
to point out that he had been able to criticize the monarchy without being retaliated 
against by the Guarda Negra, a political militia that was formed of black capoeira 
fighters after abolition in 1888 who held a cult devotion to Princess Isabel and were 
known for their punitive responses to criticisms of the monarchy. The author publicly 
hoped that the same would be true under the Republic. He set the Battalion Tiradentes 
off, however, by also hoping that he would not have to worry about that group 
responding to his criticism of the republican government. The Battalion took that 
comparison to mean they were being equated with the Guarda Negra, whom they 
considered thugs, so they protested and called for a boycott of the newspaper that 
published the article, O Paiz. In an editorial response, that newspaper characterized the 
                                                 
232 O Apostolo, April 28, 1893, “O Patriotismo”; Cidade do Rio, April 19, 1893, “Chronica.” 
170 
 
Battalion’s protest as based upon a mischaracterization of the original article and an 
intrusion into the inner workings of the newspaper. It cited the rights of the press to 
publish opinions from a wide range of views. Interestingly, though, the editor called the 
Battalion “patriots” and a civic organization in an effort to assuage their indignation and 
avoid a polemic. The result was pure irony nevertheless. The Battalion’s response 
essentially made the writer’s original point. He hypothesized such a potential role for the 
group as, in essence, the republican thought police, and they responded by entering the 
discussion and demanding punitive measures against the author and the paper. This 
exchange showed the existence already of that perceived role of the Battalion Tiradentes 
in the new republican society as well as the awareness of possible censorship through 
potential targeting and repercussions. While the Battalion clearly had a right to their 
indignant response, they succeeded in affirming that perception of them as the Jacobin 
ideological police.233 The example of this interventionist role in the press towards those 
who criticized the government and were thusly deemed unsupportive goes a long way to 
explaining all of those “true republican sentiments” affirmations proffered before any 
bandstand criticism just one year later.  
Republican Infighting amidst Popular Indifference 
 While all of these intra-elite contestations over the nature of the nation’s history 
and system of government were taking place, a theme which emerged immediately in 
1889 with the proclamation of the Republic (and which I referenced in this chapter’s very 
first paragraph) also became a point of concern in the elaborated context of the bandstand 
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rhetoric in 1893. At the same time that this heated debate over the actions of Club 
Tiradentes was taking place, some writers delved once again into the larger implications 
of a populace that was bestializado and indifferent. They passionately asserted their ideas 
and refuted those of other elites while simultaneously lamenting the “dull and apathetic 
indifference of the population” that manifested itself in the public reaction—or non-
reaction—to the incident. Like the many other writers before him, a writer for the Gazeta 
de Notícias used the occasion of the incident’s interference with commemorating 
Tiradentes Day to comment on the roots of Brazil’s problems. He defined the overarching 
problem as the result of “a conviction on the part of the people that the change to the 
Republic was a detriment rather than a benefit to the country.” In turn, the root causes of 
that indifference and conviction were many: “inexperience, atrophy of character, and lack 
of political education for the Brazilian people.” Despite that list, he felt that all could be 
remedied with time. Yet he still linked what he called the “criminal inertia” of the empire 
with the “morbid indifference” shown in the passing of Tiradentes Day without any 
“resurrection of the spirit.” The writer Paschoal in O Tempo also commented on that 
“disinterest” shown on Tiradentes Day that year and what he considered to be its greater 
political implications. After finding the canceling of those 1893 commemorations to have 
been based on a motive “so frivolous,” he ruminated on the nature of the Republic’s 
beginnings and its effect on people’s behavior. Commenting on the ease with which the 
Republic was proclaimed, he asserted that an “individual easily abandons that which cost 
him nothing to acquire.” This not having a stake in the game was what worried him in his 
observations of the bandstand incident fallout, not things like political enemies and 
reprisals. Paschoal’s points touched on an issue previously discussed: the tendency of the 
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political disunity to create a distraction from dealing with the issues that truly mattered. 
Was the frivolity or pettiness of the club’s recusing itself from seeing that Tiradentes was 
honored a function of their relative ease in achieving regime change and assuming 
prominence? Paschoal did not specifically answer that question, but the fact that he felt 





Clearly, the political backdrop to the bandstand incident in 1893 was a 
complicated one. It was hard enough to navigate the republican scene, much less deal 
with the remnants of an imperial past that loomed so large over Brazil’s national 
existence. The ideological cleavages present in the new ruling class combined with the 
uncertainty and organizational pains of any new regime combined to create a period of 
high expectations but also fear and at times disillusionment. In a way, it was rather 
reminiscent of the backdrop to the statue’s inauguration in 1862. At that time, some in the 
country sensed that their society had not lived up to the grandeur that the nation’s origins 
promised and that the statue sought to symbolize. Consequently, the statue of Pedro I 
became a touchstone for how to view the nation’s imperial present as much as it was for 
the past deeds and legacy of Brazil’s first emperor. Thirty years later, the statue again 
served as a touchstone, only this time it provided a glimpse into how the new political 
actors on the scene saw themselves, their Republic, and the nation’s generalized past. I 
have analyzed how the republicans in power perceived the statue in the context of its 
covering. The next chapter, Chapter Four, will explore how they defined the statue’s 
                                                 




subject. There I will explore how the writers in 1893 viewed their monarchical past and 
struggled over the redefinition of the identity and legacy of Pedro I. That process 
remained inextricably linked to the statue present in Praça Tiradentes. While this chapter 
dealt with one group’s attempt to deal with Pedro I’s statue and legacy by covering it, 
Chapter Five will examine the multiple proposals to either destroy or relocate the statue. 
Those efforts to remove Pedro I from the public square and their ultimate rejection by the 
authorities and the public reveal Brazil’s continued struggle to honor its history amidst 



















A Republic Debates How to View Its Imperial 
Past 
As the previous chapter showed, there were many levels of contestation taking 
place in the Rio de Janeiro of the Republic in 1893. My previous discussion of the 
bandstand incident with the statue of Pedro I focused on the specific reactions to the 
incident regarding the statue’s place in the public eye and the discussions on the very 
nature of the government and the past that as a result took place amongst the disparate 
groups politically cobbled together in the new regime. The purpose of this chapter is to 
look within that same new political landscape and rhetoric of the early 1890s and delve 
more deeply into the intellectual negotiations taking place over how the Republic’s 
citizens should view their past monarchy as an institution and past monarchs as historical 
figures. 
The writers in 1893 were demonstrably concerned with the bigger question of the 
monarchy’s legacy and place in Brazilian history as a whole. But the covering of the 
statue and its aftermath also caused many to reflect on—and argue over—the specific 
historical standing of Pedro I in the nation’s new era. In the end, the competing views of 
the present, as detailed in the previous chapter, spilled over into similarly varied views of 
the past just as they did in 1862. Only this time, the situations were reversed. Republican 
adherents and monarchical critics held political sway and dominated the discourse while 
defenders of that imperial past existed as a small minority, limited in voice and public 
presence. Yet the fundamental arguments over Pedro I remained the same. Was he the 
protagonist or antagonist of Brazilian independence? That depended upon how writers 
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viewed the relationship between that independence and the new Republic. Did he deserve 
to be remembered as the hero of Ipiranga, the proclaimer of Brazil’s break with the 
colonial past? That depended upon whether or not the imperial period was perceived as 
any such break with foreign rule. Should his statue remain in the public square despite the 
fall of the monarchy? That question remained a point of contention for years after the 
incident. But as we saw in the previous discussions about respecting the nation’s past and 
traditions, the myth of the nation’s imperial origins had taken on a power and an 
acceptance that was independent of its principal actor. Regardless of how much Jacobins 
detested Pedro I and rejected him in their historical narrative of the nation’s inherent 
republicanism, that statue still stood. And it stands there still today. Its physical 
perseverance in the public square, despite multiple calls to either destroy or remove it in 
the 1890s, succeeded during a time of perpetual redefining and qualifying of Pedro I’s 
historical legacy. This discussion of the public and historical implications of the 
bandstand incident on the statue and Pedro’s ultimate legacy will be concluded in the 
next chapter with a detailed analysis of those calls—and their rejections—to move the 
statue. 
This chapter will focus on the public rhetoric regarding the observation and 
commemoration of significant historical dates in Brazil’s past in order to explore how 
writers in the early Republic navigated the necessary transfer of sovereignty from the 
monarchy to the people and their nation following the rupture with the imperial past. The 
complexity of that orchestrated transfer will be front and center in the discussions over 
what from the past was to be incorporated into the Republican pantheon and what was to 
be cast off into anachronistic oblivion. Located within these discussions were debates 
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over how to view the nation’s imperial past in general and Pedro I’s legacy in particular. 
This analysis will show that republican writers, not surprisingly, held an overall negative 
view of the imperial past and lamented the monarchy’s role in interrupting and delaying 
what would have been a much earlier implementation of republican rule in Brazil. The 
over-arching awareness of historical and political transition—from a national identity 
marked by loyalty to the Emperor to a Republic legitimized by popular identification 
with the nation and the state—taking place colored discussions of what had previously 
been imperial holidays such as Independence Day and Abolition Day. The republican 
reinterpretation of the past comes into focus in this rhetoric, showing how royal figures 
were excised from the public imagination and replaced by republican or military themes 
and images. In terms of redefining Pedro I, these writers also used the issues of his role in 
independence and his abdication in order to chip away at his legacy by qualifying the 
substance of his historical contribution to Brazil and by judging him—and finding him 
wanting—against the historical experiences of both his father and son. All in all, this 
chapter will show a political and ideological climate that was ripe for the removal of an 
imperial statue in the public square. The following chapter will explain why that did not 
come to pass. 
 
Perspectives on How to View the Imperial Past 
 
Given the popular idea circulating in the public sphere that “the Latin race is 
Republican,” the new regime’s literary elite correspondingly portrayed the totality of the 
nation’s past, including its imperial era, through the simple theme of the Republic, 
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interrupted.235 At the core of that interpretation was the national story of a republic, not 
an empire. As Emilia Viotti da Costa describes in her seminal study Da Monarquia à 
República: momentos decisivos, the republican view of Brazilian history began with the 
assertion that the nation was always destined to be a republic. That fundamental aspect 
was always contextualized with the adversarial presence of monarchical rule. The deeply-
held belief that the republic “was always a national aspiration” drove the sister narrative 
that the monarchical era was “an anomaly in America, where there existed only 
republics” (notwithstanding the short-lived rule of Emperor Augustin I in Mexico in the 
early 1820s).  Da Costa succinctly sums up that republican view that Pedro II—as well as 
his father before him—dominated and divided Brazil’s government through an arbitrary 
and relentless use of the Poder Moderador, or Moderating Power, granted to them in the 
1824 constitution. In addition to the inclusion of the prevailing concept of the three 
branches of government, the executive, legislative, and judiciary, the constitution written 
by Pedro I also articulated a fourth moderating power which gave the emperor the final 
say in resolving disputes involving those three branches and/or political factions. In 
essence, Pedro I had dealt himself and his monarchy a permanent trump card. Not 
surprisingly, the Poder Moderador became a tremendous point of contention with the 
monarchy’s critics and a facet of the imperial system most despised by the republican 
elites before and after the emergence of the Republic. Da Costa notes that “to their eyes 
the Monarchy was the regime of corruption, of arbitrariness, of violence and of injustices 
and all about the government of Personal Power, discretionary and foreign to the interests 
                                                 
235 Diário de Notícias, February 22, 1890, “A Raça Latino é Republicano.” 
178 
 
of the People.”236 At every turn, according to such an interpretation, the monarchy 
stepped into the decisive moments in Brazilian history to interrupt, thwart, and postpone 
the people’s ushering in of its predisposed state of republic. Not only did the Crown 
thwart popular will in suppressing the Inconfidência Mineira and executing the martyr 
Tiradentes, but it also robbed Brazil of republican opportunities in 1808, 1822, and 1831 
(in addition to numerous other insurrections along the way).  
While the narrative advanced during the imperial era celebrated those moments 
listed above as important steps in the political evolution of Brazil, the republican 
narrative denounced them as the Crown opportunistically snuffing out what would have 
otherwise been the nation’s earlier transformation into republican rule. The transfer of the 
royal court to Rio in 1808 prevented what should have been a republic born out of 
Napoleon’s conquest of Portugal and deposition of the Bragantine royal line. Instead the 
monarchy’s escape to Brazil perpetuated their rule and transformed Brazil into a coequal 
kingdom. Pedro I’s cooptation of the independence movement in 1822 prevented what 
should have been a nationalist, republican push for political separation from the 
metropole. Even again in 1831 when the nation rid itself of one perceived despot, the 
monarchists secured the perpetuation of imperial rule through the continued reign of 
Pedro II, thus preventing yet another moment that should have ushered in the destined 
Republic. With these perspectives, imperial accomplishments became repeated betrayals 
of popular and republican will, and much like the view of Otoni in 1862, those realities 
completely poisoned any and all of the empire’s legacy. They also made the monarchy 
foreign and even “parasitic.” Even Pedro II was stripped of his brasilidade and 
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considered by radicals to represent a European rather than Brazilian monarch. In order to 
try to renounce and dismiss imperial traditions deepened by the sheer length of his rule, 
this re-characterization of Pedro II was necessary. It was much more simplistic for those 
republicans like Rodrigo Octavio, whose work articulating the historical significance of 
the new Republic’s national holidays was labeled “the true Bible of good citizenship” by 
a Battalion Tiradentes soldier in 1893, to separate Pedro II from Brazil and thus attach 
him to the Portuguese Crown. With that disqualification accomplished, they could 
dismiss and attempt to expunge all imperial historical traditions as “traditions of the 
colonial prepotencia” and “Portuguese dominion.” A clean slate was much easier to deal 
with than the complicated interplay of a republican and imperial past inextricably woven 
together. In this interpretation centered on newness, Brazil in 1889 constituted a “new 
country…without traditions” since none could come from the discredited monarchy. 
Historian Pedro Calmon describes the republican perspective on that change and political 
rupture as one of “a spiritual insurrection against the past and its consecrated values.”237  
 A good lens through which to see this “spiritual insurrection against the past” and 
its shaping of the republican historical narrative is the way in which the new Republic 
was forced to grapple with the civic standing and legacy of September 7 as Brazilian 
Independence Day. While the nature of commemorations of this date will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this chapter, an analysis of one major literary work’s reimagining of 
the civic meaning of September 7 provides an illustrative example of just how radically 
different some elites in 1893 viewed that iconic founding moment from its definitions in 
                                                 
237 Ibid.; Octavio, Festas Nacionaes, xviii, 107, 126, 171; Pedro Calmon, História Social do Brasil, Volume 
3: a época republicana (São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002), 3. For more on the biography of Rodrigo 





1862. The new regime’s decision to include the date in the civic pantheon of the Republic 
met significant resistance from those intellectual and historical “insurrectionists.” One 
such writer was Rodrigo Octavio, who was a prominent lawyer and magistrate who 
would rise to the ultimate position of minister of the Supremo Tribunal Federal of the 
Republic. Octavio took on the literary memorialist task of creating a new narrative for 
each of the commemorative dates chosen as national holidays. Labeled “the true Bible of 
good citizenship” by a Battalion Tiradentes member and a “handbook on the new 
national holidays for the civic education of the people,” Festas Nacionaes was required 
reading for primary schools after the Conselho Superior de Instrucção ordered its 
adoption.238 
Whether it was in the foreword by Raul Pompeia or the actual text of Octavio, the 
official republican spin on Independence Day was aggressively anti-monarchical and 
anti-Pedro I. For example, Pompeia referred to the date as the “sophism of our liberation 
through the simple and low cunning of a brutish autocrat.” Independence was qualified 
because of the tyranny and absolutism of Pedro I as well as the recognition treaty clause 
that indemnified Portugal for the loss of Brazil “secretly” snuck in by Pedro to show his 
allegedly lurking allegiance with Portugal. Pompeia agreed with many writers of his time 
that it was actually José Bonifácio who gave to the Brazilian people “a new patria,” but 
this holding up of the imperial “Patriarch” did put Pompeia at some odds with Octavio 
who made it a point to indict José Bonifácio as complicit in the burdening of Brazil with 
the continuation of the monarchy in 1822. Pompeia instead blamed José Clemente 
Pereira, not Pedro I’s chief advisor (who was José Bonifácio) but one of his most 
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versatile ministers, for “the implantation of absolutism that governed us and the 
predominance of the Portuguese party that still harasses us.” Pompeia thus took blame 
away from the Brazilian-born José Bonifácio and instead placed responsibility for Pedro 
I’s continuation of Brazil’s “colonial servitude” on another Portuguese figure. Octavio’s 
indictment of José Bonifácio, who would nevertheless increasingly take on the moniker 
of “Patriarch” of independence, was indeed more of an outlier with the vast majority of 
writers of the time choosing to applaud his actions and importance in the larger effort to 
have him supplant the role of Pedro I as the true leader of independence.239   
In his own text, Octavio went much further to vilify Pedro I, his father D. João VI, 
and the entire Portuguese royal family and court than did Pompeia or most writers of the 
day, especially when it came to portraying D. João. The Rio News even noted this 
discrepancy, saying in its review of Festas Nacionaes that “on some historical parts the 
author is not wholly in accord with the accepted authorities of the day.” Yet the 
publication nevertheless judged Octavio’s exposition of the national dates to be “timely 
and well-written.” In Octavio’s narrative revision, Pedro’s grandmother, Maria I (who 
ordered Tiradentes’ execution), was stark-raving mad and fanatical. D. João was a lazy 
glutton.240  
Even among this family of degenerates, though, Octavio singled out Pedro I for 
being “weak…ignorant…self-indulgent…and ambitious.” Such an indictment of Pedro’s 
person was then placed in the context of a Brazil that was “already like a nation…with an 
ever-present desire to rid itself of the Portuguese throne.” Amidst this preexisting 
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nationalism and separatism, Octavio assigned the role of the “biblical serpent” to José 
Bonifácio whom he blamed for the nation “subordinating itself” to Pedro I. Given this 
perspective, the 7th of September signified only “the separation of the Kingdom of Brazil 
from the Kingdom of Portugal” rather than the nation’s origins while at the same time the 
date “celebrated the pact of its enslavement to an autocratic offshoot of the House of 
Bragança.” He found the reasons for that Brazilian “self-subordination” to be the result of 
the “ambitious and violent prince” as well as “the generous complacency of the 
temperament” of the Brazilian people themselves in accepting his “authoritarian” rule 
until their “deposition” of him on April 7, 1831. He ultimately described this 
superimposition of Portuguese royal rule as thwarting “the republic that would have come 
naturally” to Brazil as “the deplorable error of 1822” in the allowing of continued 
Bragantine rule despite having rid itself of direct Portuguese rule. Precisely because of 
that continuation, Brazil did not have historical traditions. It only had ongoing foreign 
dominion. And that dominion he saw as illegal and illegitimate, as it “usurped the rights 
of the people” and “constituted treason” on the part of Pedro I “against his father and his 
nation.”241 The nation that he ascribes to Pedro is, of course, Portugal. 
This definition of Pedro I, the historical significance of September 7, and the 
monarchy served as some of the building blocks of the radical republican vision of the 
past in the new intellectual contest over the present. The fact that the fervent republican, 
Pompeia, asked to write the foreword offered alternate interpretations of that past lends 
evidence to the apparent difficulty in reconstructing a universally accepted republican 
narrative. It also shows that there was no one monolithic elite republican narrative. The 
discussions in the press in the first decade of the Republic would reveal that 
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reconstruction effort as an ongoing process with a variety of ideas and perspectives. They 
would also show the inherent tensions between the ramped up criticism of Pedro I and the 
continued recognition of Independence Day. The commemorations for the 7th of 
September allow for a fascinating glimpse into this process and will be discussed shortly. 
This previous discussion matters here, though, because it perfectly illustrates one end of 
the rhetorical spectrum. What will become apparent throughout the rest of this study, 
however, is that many writers in the Republic would challenge this overly simplistic 
dismissal of the past and its traditions. As the previous chapter teaches, the reality of 
public discourse in Rio was much more complicated and nuanced than one extreme view. 
As for the other end of that spectrum occupied not by radical republicans but by 
monarchists and their sympathizers, da Costa informs us that “the voice of the 
monarchists was stifled by the euphoria of the republicans,” and that singularity of the 
republican voice in the public space was “reinforced by the chorus of the adherents, those 
pressured to demonstrate fidelity to the new regime.” This phenomenon we witnessed in 
the previous chapter with the protestations of fidelity to the Republic that preceded those 
bandstand criticisms and the resultant labeling of those critics as “impure” republicans. 
The actual monarchists were therefore squeezed into the muted public space of those 
“disillusioned” with the Republic or even worse of those considered Sebastianists. That 
monarchist view of the imperial past was one that also pointed to the singularity of Brazil 
in the nineteenth century, but it looked upon that distinction as a mark of the 
accomplishments of the region’s only monarchy and not its faults. That the nation 
maintained its territorial integrity from the colonial period and achieved a level of 
internal stability made it a power in the hemisphere that had both long-term security and 
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liberty. From this perspective, the proclamation of the Republic was the product of raw 
opportunism on the part of the military class, upstarts chafing at the structured order of 
the regime that made their security and ambitions possible in the first place.242 Very few 
writers made any full-throated attempt to advance this narrative, however. Instead, most 
navigated the republican public mood, strategically challenged the afore-mentioned 
dismissive republican narrative, stimulated conversations that delved into the nuances of 
national memory, and negotiated for compromise and a middle ground on remembering 
the past. 
 Preceding the bandstand incident, an awareness existed on the part of the Rio 
press that the nation was in a transitional phase between those two narratives of the 
conflicting ends of the spectrum, and that idea was interestingly often conveyed through 
the use of the metaphor of Lazarus. Early on the theme of equating the monarchy to the 
biblical figure of the dead man brought back to life emerged. In 1890, one writer warned 
those republicans working to reorganize the government and society that they must keep 
the “lazaros” of the empire from “coming back to life” and “contaminating” a Brazilian 
society in the state of “regenerating” itself. This writer defined those “lazaros” in the 
context of the initial years of that reorganization as “men of ill repute” who had been the 
courtesans of the empire but who were also “collaborating” in the work of the Republic. 
That collaboration, however, was suspect because of what he called the “impure hands” 
of those former courtesans.243 This passage reveals the anxiety surrounding the idea of 
the possible contamination of the nation’s new political body by its old, and that idea was 
inextricably linked to the question of whether or not previous imperial administrators and 
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officials should be allowed to similarly take part in the Republic. The writer continued, 
warning of the consequences of the “contaminated evils from the monarchical virus” that 
was already present in the Republic itself because of the “incapacity of its leaders.” Such 
disillusionment with the new era’s political leadership was certainly nothing new. Nor 
was the assertion that “continuing the imperialist customs in the republic is a vice worse 
than the monarchy itself.” What was different was the same writer’s almost contradictory 
stance on the best means to prevent that nefarious monarchical influence. Rather than just 
making a total break with the past and feigning that the empire did not belong to 
Brazilian history, to protect the health of the Republic’s future all involved in its 
organization needed to instead study the imperial past as a cautionary tale for the present. 
Another writer would later echo this approach to dealing with the imperial past by 
advocating that republicans not “turn off the memory of those historical periods that were 
the catalysts for the present and for the realization of our ideas.”244 While on its surface 
this call seems like the even rarer example of a writer calling for a fully integrated 
Brazilian historical narrative, it is more likely that it is more of a moderate variation on 
the idea above that a republican could find value in what came before because of a sense 
of linear connection to their own time and life. The monarchical past could be related to 
the present and worth understanding, but virtually no one would assert that it should be 
embraced or celebrated.  
 In a play on the idea of classical imperial “Caesars” historically governing the 
“living dead,” the lazaros author also likened Brazilians under the imperial regime—with 
the emperor’s will as law—as “the deadened living” since the political customs of the day 
“persecuted virtues as crimes” and had a deleterious impact on the Empire’s citizens. 
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That “obedience” to their sovereign set the scene for the empire “to die from its own 
vices” but also record the “painful pages of our history.” This article was another 
example of a writer viewing the imperial past not as an aberration to be discredited and 
subsequently wiped into oblivion but as a vital cautionary tale and didactic source for the 
Republic of what not to do. He cited the “social work of the empire as a lesson and as 
advice to the republic.” He called on the new generation to “take advantage” of the 
empire’s historical record since from its “decomposition…the tree of liberty feeds.” It is 
striking that this one writer could advance multiple aspects of the republican view of the 
past. At the same time that he was warning of the threat of monarchical contamination, he 
was also calling upon the new elite to better familiarize themselves with the source of 
that threat in order to learn from its historical example. That it could be repudiated and 
valued simultaneously echoed the previous chapter’s arguments about Pedro I’s statue. 245  
Two years later in 1892, a writer for O Paiz described the present by noting that 
Brazil was still “between history and the future,” and he took the opportunity to discuss 
his view of the empire on the anniversary of Pedro I’s forced abdication on April 7. He 
did so by again using the monarchy as the dead metaphor.246 While the actions taken 
against the first emperor on that day in 1831 were described as a “popular revolt against 
an untimely change in ministry,” the current actions being undertaken by the new 
republican elite in 1892 were described as the “snuffing out of the last vestiges” of the 
empire. The writer called it a “cadaver of the past” that Brazil looked to cast the last stone 
upon and move on from. This sense of being stuck in limbo, with the monarchy dead but 
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still present, could explain why the writer would start the effort to commemorate that date 
in an effort to denigrate the nation’s first monarch and retroactively connect the 
republican narrative to the royal moments in Brazilian history. It also shows the desire to 
rid the Republic of any lingering presence or reminder of the imperial past. This 
sentiment also fed into the previously discussed psyche of figures like Sampaio Ferraz 
and into their interpretation of a perceived reemergence of imperial proclivities. 
Despite these negative portrayals of the imperial “walking dead,” the rhetorical 
climate did allow for some calls for republican magnanimity towards their former 
emperor and his family. After all, in the various portrayals of the origins of the Republic 
there existed a wariness towards referring to that moment as an act of deposition against 
Pedro II. The nature of those origins allowed for this since the end of Bragantine rule was 
euphemistically characterized as the fading away and ultimate fall of the empire. The 
actual final image was of the royal family sailing away, never to return. There was once 
again no fight or any attempt to return. Given this benign characteristic of the regime 
change plus the shared experience of generations of Brazilians living their lives with 
woven in commemorations to their royal family, there could still be a public soft spot for 
the nation’s most recent monarch, albeit those who demonstrated it would probably be 
labeled a Sebastianist. For example, in 1890 at the same time that the Republic notified 
the newspapers of the name changes for public spaces, writers were also penning articles 
to honor the memory of the former Empress of Brazil, D. Teresa Cristina. They, as was 
typical, felt compelled to assert their absolute and complete respect for the Republic first, 
but they simultaneously also felt the need to note the nation’s loss. In an article devoted 
to remembering their Empress, one writer made it a point to link both her and Pedro II to 
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the current and newly acclaimed Portuguese King D. Carlos. The writer referred 
specifically to the familial ties between the exiled royal family and the Portuguese 
monarchy, noting that Pedro II was the brother of the King’s grandmother. That same 
writer even went so far as to define Pedro II as Pedro I’s son in order to emphasize the 
Portuguese identity of the latter and therefore the bonds of family with the Portuguese 
monarchy. In this context, Pedro II was “the only surviving son of the glorious D. Pedro 
IV, whose memory is so respected in Portugal.”247 The use of Pedro I’s Portuguese royal 
designation (as the fourth rather than the first) reinforced yet again his portugalidade, but 
it did so as a means to bring the constituencies together rather than to divide them. The 
writer defined Pedro I in this way in order to discuss the exiled royal family in general 
and in a way that did not touch onto any of the contested notions of Brazil’s own imperial 
past. The occasion of Dona Teresa Cristina’s death also made some writers comment on 
the republican government’s treatment of Pedro II. Based on what it called a confidence 
in the inevitable success of the republic, another article suggested that the new 
government could show its own strength not in punishing Pedro II further in exile but in 
acting “generously” and “magnanimously” to help the failing former leader. He urged the 
“Brazilian nation” to show that “magnanimity” to “the citizen who was for more than half 
a century your leader” by making sure that he had sufficient money to avoid suffering 
“privations” in his exile in Europe. 
This writer for O Paiz was the first to really distinguish between the Republic he 
saw as being born out of “love for the patria” instead of out of “the rancor to persons.” 
For him, “the Republic is strong and should be generous.” Such an extension of mercy 
and consideration to the situation of the former emperor revealed a rare ability to see the 
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people of the imperial government not as just some evil abstraction, as present in the 
Lazarus metaphor, but as people worthy of generosity. Yet it also revealed that 
consideration’s limitations since the writer could not actually bring himself to use the title 
of emperor in conjunction with Pedro II and instead had to couch his respect in the use of 
labels and terms such as “citizen” and “leader.” Ultimately, though, the writer’s call 
advanced the perception of strength as being shown through not demonizing the empire, 
its monarchy, and the past.248 
For some commentators like the one above, that unfair demonization of and 
hostility towards the empire and its symbols stemmed from a lack of public education and 
the subsequent ignorance of history on the part of the general public and the new political 
classes in particular. It is not surprising that public assertions of the need for “civic 
education” to create a reasonable citizenry that understood proper “comportment in 
public life” and how to participate in the Republic followed shortly after its proclamation. 
What was notable was a public push back against the specific ignorance of history and its 
resultant spread of misinformation given the context of the push for a republican 
mythology and narrative. The writer “G. B.” of the Diário de Notícias recounted two 
incidents in 1890 that caused him to advocate loudly for greater emphasis on the 
population’s accurate understanding of the past. The first incident had to do with his 
carriage driver discussing history with him, prompted by the sight of the bandstand in the 
largo de S. Francisco being built as part of the preparations for the Republic’s first 
commemoration of Tiradentes Day. The driver sought confirmation that “they killed 
Tiradentes because he was republican, right?” to which the writer responded in the 
                                                 




affirmative. The driver’s next comment was what set the writer off: the driver said “it was 
in the time of Pedro I, wasn’t it?” Already you could see the conflating of the two 
historical events and figures in the public imagination because of the renaming of the 
square and its resultant juxtaposition of Tiradentes and Pedro I. As the only royal figure 
located there by means of the statue, the historical experiences of both figures had 
symbolically been fused. Because of his singular visibility and that confusing linking of 
Tiradentes and him, Pedro I had quietly become a sort of surrogate for the actual 
historical monarch who did condemn Tiradentes to death and dismemberment: his 
grandmother Maria I. The imperial project had ironically achieved its goal of creating a 
monument that came to symbolize much more than its subject. But rather than 
representing the nation as those in 1862 intended, it had come to symbolize in this 
instance only the monarchy. Therefore in that particular historical space, it meant that he 
took on the responsibility for the Crown’s actions against Tiradentes which took place 
before he was even born. This writer found the historical falsehood at the center of this 
anecdote to be troubling in and of itself, but he also questioned the viability of a 
republican vision of the past buoyed by misdirection and misunderstanding. 
G. B. went on to say that his indignation was only exacerbated further with 
another discussion, this one overheard by him on the street between two men he did not 
know. The topic was again regarding the circumstances of Tiradentes’ execution. And 
again, the story served to highlight the overall misconceptions held by the average 
Brazilian with level upon level of inaccuracy regarding the fate of the Republic’s number 
one icon who was captured, tried, and executed in Rio and whose dismembered body 
parts were displayed in the areas of the insurgency (most notably his decapitated head in 
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Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais). According to G. B.’s account, one speaker was informing the 
other that it was D. João VI who had had Tiradentes killed and that the martyr had been 
held in Rio and then sent off to be executed in Ouro Preto. The other man argued that he 
was executed in Vila Rica (the earlier name for Ouro Preto, the old capital of Minas 
Gerais). The writer says that he was himself “condemned” to listen to the conversation 
but unable to reach the men to set the historical record straight. They went on to argue 
whether or not it was in fact D. João on the throne or not, with one arguing that it must 
have been D. Manuel (a 16th century king). The writer ultimately ended his recounting of 
the two anecdotes with one sentence: “the government must open many schools and 
require the teaching of much of the patria’s history.”249 
What these accounts reveal is the difficulty for the brand new republic in 
constructing new symbols and historical narratives. Republican elites attempted to 
discredit previously held historical interpretations of facts, but as the writer noted, those 
efforts were coming up against a lack of specific and internalized historical knowledge on 
the part of the populace, what Graeme Morton refers to as “History You’ll Remember,” 
which is a heading meant to connote what becomes common knowledge of a people’s 
history. Morton stresses the importance of myth-making to the creation of a national 
identity that the masses can indeed “remember.” At the same time, he also concedes the 
reality of a people collectively getting history wrong as also being important to identity 
formation.250 This characterization of this process as messy and often stumbling provides 
added insight into precisely what G. B. felt compelled to comment on. The anecdotes 
demonstrate that the new republican stories of the past—namely that of Tiradentes—were 
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being propagated to a public that was latching onto just the big idea of Tiradentes’ 
execution for his republican principles while missing the factual historical context. In 
some ways, that rebranding of history could have been facilitated because of that 
ignorance of specifics. The statue misdirection of responsibility, the inaccurate 
understandings of the details of the execution all show that the basic, most fundamental 
message the republic wanted to get out there was succeeding: Tiradentes was executed by 
the monarchy because he was a republican. Did it really matter at the end of the day 
which monarch and where? And wouldn’t it be all the better to alienate the people from 
the figure of the statue by allowing them to advance the idea that it was in fact Pedro I 
who killed Tiradentes? The commemorations were achieving the inculcation, at least, of 
that very basic idea of Tiradentes even if the people were in the end still getting it wrong. 
The public response to the Tiradentes narrative also shows, though, that there 
wasn’t a clear notion of the republican importance of that square beyond the fact that it 
now carried his name. The lack of knowledge about that square having sacredness 
because of the fact that the martyrdom took place there shows that that particular message 
had not been successfully communicated. The anecdotes described before led the authors 
to one conclusion: the new republican government had to make public education a 
priority. This idea fits in with the other discussions of the civic need for public education 
in order to create knowledgeable citizens in the new republic. The fact that the writer 
found that the country needed “a lot of schools and a lot of history” reveals an elite 
wariness of the implications of the new political and social reality.251 After all, according 
to the French model, a monarchy did not need an educated and active citizenry. An 
idealized republic did. 




The Changed Commemorative Landscape of Royal Moments during the 
Republic 
 As much as a new republic needed a new type of citizen, the 1890s elite also 
needed a new civic calendar to advance their legitimizing narrative. As the previous 
analysis of Rodrigo Octavio’s Festas Nacionaes shows, they were also aware of their 
own lack of consensus. Given the documented wide range of the ideological affiliations 
of the elite, this is not surprising. In addition, the process of determining how to deal with 
the royal-driven moments that had traditionally been perceived as fundamental to the 
nation’s history and identity was complex by nature. It demanded that those seminal dates 
not be just reexamined but reimagined, reconstructed, and rearticulated into the new 
republican civic understanding as well. Pedro I’s role in the Grito moment made that 
effort difficult for the new regime and resulted in debate, disagreement, and an attempted 
official redefinition of the first emperor’s legacy. The role of Princess Isabel in ushering 
through the Golden Law of abolition in 1888 posed a similar problem. In both cases, 
republicans made a conscious effort to discredit, diminish, or simply ignore those royal 
figures in the new republic’s commemorations while they simultaneously transformed the 
moments in order to align them with an interpretation of the past which validated their 
republican claims to legitimacy and standing in the nation’s political and social 
development.  
 Before the Republic was even proclaimed, the ways in which the Rio elite 
observed Independence Day had already changed as had the social and institutional 
landscape of the nation. The popular fascination with the recent passage of the abolition 
law influenced the discourse of the last celebration of the 7th of September under the 
monarchy of Pedro II, and it correspondingly diminished the commemorative presence of 
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Pedro I and his statue before the republicans ever took over. Even in a commemorative 
publication for Brazilian Independence Day from 1889, just two months before the 
proclamation of the Republic, and titled Equestrian Statue of D. Pedro I, Founder of the 
Empire of Brazil, (see Figure 10), the vast majority of the discourses included were 
 
Figure 10: Cover of the commemorative issue of Estatua                                                                                  
Equestre de D. Pedro I, fundador do Imperio do Brazil. 
singularly focused on the topic of abolition. Aside from the first page of the publication 
being a photo of the statue and the statue’s plaza being one of the important locales for 
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festivities (along with the statue of José Bonifacio, the Campo da Aclamação, and the 
Camara Municipal), there was no effort to privilege the statue, the Grito, or Pedro I in the 
various included discourses. The festivities for the day did include the performance of 
Pedro’s Hymn of Independence by school children and the playing of music by three 
military bands seated on bandstands next to Pedro’s statue.  And there were portraits of 
both Emperors Pedro I and Pedro II displayed in Constitution Plaza. Yet in terms of the 
rhetoric found in the commemorative publication, some speeches contained not a single 
reference to Pedro I. While the statue served as the surrogate historical place for the 
commemoration in Rio, the 7th of September in 1889 was not really a moment for 
significant comments on the statue or to rehash independence. The date was instead used 
for the contemporary celebration of abolition. In terms of the statue, it was clearly 
central—in theory—to the festivities as the name of the publication shows. There are, 
after all, intermittent references to the Grito and Ipiranga that echo the rhetoric of 1862. 
For example, Candido Alves Pereira de Carvalho recounts the grito thusly:  
On September 7, 1822, a Magnanimous Prince, sincere and loyally devoted to the 
cause of the liberty of the people, proclaiming on the margins of Ipiranga, …the 
independence and liberty of our precious patria, constituted with the unanimous 
agreement of the Brazilians of this historical era a vast and flourishing empire, in 
America Meridional.252 
 
While this representation of the past and the other speakers’ reliance on the imagery of 
the Grito were typical, the 1889 introduction of a link between the moment of 
independence and the passage of the Golden Law added a new element and evidenced the 
desire on the part of the imperial elite to connect accomplishments and generations once 
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again. That new element involved a greater sense of a direct line linking Pedro I to his 
son and his granddaughter and thereby linked royal lineage with the fundamental 
historical moments of the nation. Carlos Eustaquio da Costa, in the Equestrian Statue 
publication, defined abolition as the truest testimony to Brazil’s progress, and he 
connected May 13 to September 7 by saying that the latter was “like a greeting and a 
brado [grito] of alert to the progress of Brazil.” Independence Day could be the 
“primogênito,” or first born, “whose finishing touch on the glorious work of liberty 
Providence saved for almost 66 years later, being carried out by the August 
Granddaughter of the Indelible Prince.” Similar to the sense of generational debt found in 
1862, these speakers in 1889 also wanted to recognize the actions of 1822 as “the 
planting of the tree of liberty” by Brazil’s figurative grandparents to which her children in 
1888 had brought liberty to fruition through abolition.253 
 A survey of the conceptualizations of “Sete de Setembro” in the various 
newspapers in Rio adds some additional context to the ideas prevalent in the special 
publication referenced above. The various writers for the Diário de Notícias, the Gazeta 
de Notícias, the Gazeta da Tarde, O Fluminense, O Paiz, and Novidades did not show the 
same level of preoccupation with abolition that the contributors to Estatua Equestre did. 
Instead, what they show is a multiplicity of approaches to commemorating the day. For 
those journalists who advanced the traditional narrative celebrating the monarchy, some 
latched onto May 13 like those discussed above while others made absolutely no mention 
of the date. Similarly, some of the writers who attacked that imperial narrative in their 
articles used the nature of Brazilian abolition as a means to further repudiate the 
monarchy, and others remained focused solely on the meaning of September 7.  




 For example, the “Sete de Setembro” write-up in the Gazeta da Tarde towed the 
imperial line all the way through but never brought up that empire’s most recent political 
accomplishment. It could have easily been an article written any year before abolition. A 
journalist for O Fluminense and a discourse by the president of the Sociedade 
Commemorative da Independencia published in the Gazeta de Notícias, however, did 
link the two dates together in their larger celebrations of Independence Day and the 
Empire. Pedro Augusto, the president of that commemorative society, referenced 
abolition both directly and indirectly in his speech. He emphasized the peaceful nature of 
the Brazilian nation’s achievement of both independence and abolition, noting that the 
accomplishment of May 13 was characterized by the “same tranquility” as that associated 
with September 7. The latter date he called the “liberation of a nationality” and the 
“starting point of our luminous trajectory.” Aside from the direct reference to that shared 
“tranquility,” Augusto also connected abolition to the notion of national trajectory by 
commenting on Brazil’s “ascendant path to perfectibility.” With the 7th of September as 
the starting point and the 13th of May as the most recent coordinate added to that line of 
progress, the president’s message was one of accomplishment and optimism.254 The 
journalist for O Fluminense also commented on abolition, but he did so more in passing 
in his patriotic and nationalistic/imperialistic accounting of the many accomplishments of 
Brazil’s empire. He customarily called the 7th of September the “greatest day for the 
Patria” and cheered on everything Brazilian from the land’s rich mineral resources to the 
military’s victory in the Paraguayan War. In terms of his comments on abolition, this 
writer similarly made note of the peaceful nature of the two moments in Brazilian history 
                                                 




by referring to September 7th as having “made our national emancipation in the middle of 
flowers,” which was an idiomatic expression used to convey the complete absence of 
conflict. He then immediately connected his version of tranquility to the abolition of 
slavery and went further to label it an act “decreed by the same system” as that which 
initially liberated the nation.255 
 On the other end of the ideological spectrum, writers for O Paiz and the Diário de 
Notícias aggressively repudiated the 7th of September as a civic date which perpetuated a 
“polluted history” full of imperial “falsities.” The O Paiz article labeled Pedro I an 
“ingrate and traitor” who got what he deserved on April 7 when a popular insurrection 
forced him to abdicate. Therefore this writer held up that latter date as the one more 
representative of the “American spirit, democratic spirit, frankly republican sentiment” 
which infused all of the actions that had “affected Brazil’s social and political 
constitution.” He made no mention of May 13 in his indictment of the date which 
glorified only the “independence of the Empire” rather than the nation, a 
(dis)qualification used by other writers for the Gazeta de Notícias and Novidades as well. 
The writer for the Diário de Notícias, however, did in his devastating take down of the 7th 
of September and Pedro I. Like the monarchy’s journalistic supporter who linked 
independence and abolition together, this writer did place the two dates on the same 
continuum of history, but he did so in order to articulate a long-term condemnation of the 
monarchy across time and generations. He affirmed that “every great national revolution, 
in this country, has its imperial counterfeit, fixed in place with the intent of grasping for 
the crown the victories of the people.” That phenomenon he called the “palace lie,” and 
he labels the imperial interpretations of various dates as components of that larger lie. 
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The 13th of May reflected what he calls “the redemptorismo isabelista”: a lie. The 7th of 
April as the “voluntary abdication of the Emperor” and the 7th of September as “the 
generous spontaneity of Pedro I”: all lies. The truth, instead, was that the 7th of April was 
“the act of international emancipation of the patria.” And as for the statue of Pedro I? It 
was no more than the “glorification of the despot.”256 
Thus Rio de Janeiro witnessed the last imperial celebration of September 7. As 
can be seen, Pedro I’s standing and the intellectual elites’ understanding of civic dates 
had already begun their plunge into disarray and disagreement. The new regime after the 
proclamation of the Republic nevertheless felt compelled to include the date of 
September 7 as a national holiday and historical moment, but it struggled to 
commemorate the day without honoring Pedro I and the empire or betraying its own 
emerging sense of republican identity and history. 
Perceptions of the celebrations and the significance of the statue of Pedro I on the 
day celebrating independence varied in those first few years of the Republic just as they 
did in 1889. In most cases, though, the literary public was not particularly preoccupied 
with either Pedro or his statue. For example, one writer in 1890 writing about “the first 
7th of September after the Republic!” found incongruity not with the imperial/royal aspect 
of the date but with the fact that while the authorities illuminated Pedro’s statue, they did 
not do similarly for José Bonifacio’s statue. Rather than criticize the honoring of Pedro I, 
he lamented the contrast with the patriarch’s statue which he described as “obscure,” 
“sad,” and a “black ghost.”257  
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A year later, writers for the Gazeta de Notícias noted the effects of the new 
regime’s revamping of the nature of the date’s public commemoration. One journalist 
cited the government’s decision—in formal decree—to continue the observation of the 
date as a national holiday, but he also described how the new regime had turned the 
commemoration of Independence Day into just an “exclusively military” event. The 
day’s festivities centered almost exclusively on a parade of troops, and the writer 
repeatedly referred to the “martial” nature of the exhibition and commemoration. The 
writer lamented that the day was not the “patriotic holiday” Brazil was accustomed to and 
asserted that the people witnessing it probably thought it to be a parade for Deodoro 
rather than the civic celebration of independence. As we saw in the previous chapter, this 
writer used republican France as a point of comparison with the new somber and 
militaristic approach to public commemoration. He compared the celebration of 
September 7 in 1891 to that of Bastille Day and came to the conclusion that if a holiday is 
“truly popular” in nature (rather than separate and militaristic), then there would be 
visible public pride, enthusiasm, and participation like that of the French observation of 
Bastille Day. The writer did not delve into the complicating issue of imperial-centric 
versus republican-centric historical moments. Instead he remained focused on the 
Brazilian date and its traditional observance in the past. Echoing the warnings of those 
other writers discussed in the previous chapter who feared the loss of tradition in the 
Republic, this journalist almost wistfully looked to the past, and he emphasized how the 
statue’s plaza had been a focal point where the people met to commemorate the date and 
where the authorities had orchestrated decorations, poetry, music, salvos, and general 
festivities. He described these efforts as not a great deal but something. In contrast, the 
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military parade conducted away from the newly renamed plaza had turned it into an 
“abandoned spot.”258  
In another article on the same day and in the same newspaper, that notion of the 
people as bestializado was used to comment on the commemorations of Independence 
Day that year. This author took on the issue of the incongruity of the statue head-on, 
referring to it as representing he “who cried Independence or Death on the 7th of 
September” but who now has been judged to merit scorn “because naturally in a 
republican regime it would be bad to allude to he who personally originated the holiday 
with festivities, for his actions for an oppressed people, since that someone was 
emperor.” He went on to cite the people’s “total and absolute indifference” to the military 
parade and the holiday as evidence of their continued “bestializado” condition. These 
critiques of the observance of the 7th of September in 1891 provide more evidence to the 
palpable unhappiness that some felt towards the republican change in approach in 
commemorating Brazil’s past, most notably the emerging tendency to completely break 
with tradition and deny the past because of its imperial aspect. They also emphasize the 
absence of the people in the public sphere of the Republic and a corresponding wariness 
towards the recasting of civic commemoration with a military slant.259  
All of these observations stem from the characteristics and very nature of the 
government at this time, and they call into question the degree of legitimacy the 
militaristic regime possessed. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Republic existed 
not because of any ideological or revolutionary groundswell but because the military 
leaders of the coup controlled the army as an institution. They could then translate the 
                                                 




army’s national organization and strength into control of the apparatuses of authority. At 
that time, the idealized Republic envisioned by many was restricted purely to the realm of 
the intellect and imagination. Deodoro’s rule was a military one. The early 
commemorations of the civic calendar had little choice but to reflect that. 
Years later, a journalist’s discussion of the 7th of September’s fade into 
commemorative obscurity sheds light onto the success of the government’s efforts to 
replace imperial national dates with republican ones. In this case, the supplanting of the 
7th of September by the 15th of November in the national imagination caused some to 
reflect on the long-term relationship between the two dates. One writer in particular, of 
the newspaper A Notícia, declared that “this date [November 15] killed the old, and, like 
the younger, more beautiful, more refined, monopolized all the flowers, all the 
illuminations, all the fireworks, and all of the salvos of artillery.” He went on to refer to 
past commemorations for the 7th of September as the “festive music that greeted the 
glorious date of our emancipation” and described the Brazil of 1822 as “young, ardent, 
impassioned, and drinking in its first hours of liberty, throwing itself into political life 
with the fanatical ardor of a hero.” Alongside this fervor, he also described the 
simultaneous political preoccupation of the government, in words reminiscent of the 
characteristics of the early Republic, in “organizing the state, fending off Portugal, 
dealing with the envy of neighboring countries, and snuffing out internal uprisings.” 
Despite these distractions, those commemorations of Independence Day during that first 
generation are fondly remembered as being “enthusiastic, raucous, [and] magnificent.” 
Similarly, the author recounted his fond memories of the commemorations of his own 
generation in the 1870s in which “all of the people spent the night there dancing and 
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singing” near the statue until the nearby battery fired volleys to culminate the “great 
day.” The journalist then compared these experiences to the “dampening” of the date’s 
celebrations and their eventual replacement by the civic prominence of November 15. To 
add to this point, just the advertisements themselves for the September 7 
commemorations published in the papers showed the complexity and even schizophrenic 
nature of the republican efforts to simultaneously celebrate both 1822 and 1889 on the 
date of independence. For example, in 1893, the Diário de Notícias published an 
invitation to celebrate the “anniversary of the separation of Brazil from the Metropole at 
the exhibition of the Municipal Republican Hymn, and its composition, in the theater of 
S. Pedro de Alcântara.”  
These articles also shed light onto the ongoing debate in the Rio press over 
whether or not the 7th of September was a “suspect” day in the pantheon of republican 
national holidays. Responding to an article that was published on Independence Day 
itself and that made just this assertion, the writer for A Notícia refuted that notion and 
articulated his hope that the commemorative date could be “rehabilitated.” He couched 
his reasoning and his analogy for comparing the 7th of September with the 15th of 
November in generational and family terms as well. He equated the latter date with the 
role of the “young grandchild” that should be “celebrated with enthusiasm” while the 
“sacred, old grandparent” must not be forgotten either. His discussion then turned to the 
role of radicalism in that relationship:  
The red and feverish Jacobism judged, during some time, that it was an easy thing 
to wipe away traditions, amputating History, spewing out hatred and disdain 
towards the memory of what came before. But this fever passed. Rio is not a city 
that was reborn new and ready for the bosom of the 15th of November: it is an 
ancient city that cannot tear from its soul the religion of the past.260 
                                                 




This quotation is valuable for its insight into the long-term conflict over the radical and 
conciliatory approaches to the past already documented in the previous chapter. The 
radicalism criticized by many in 1893 in the context of the bandstand incident still 
lingered in 1897, yet so did the criticism of that radicalism. The idea of the Jacobins 
“amputating history” is a striking metaphor for the repudiation of the imperial era and the 
disdain that that group felt for the past. Also striking is the writer’s evocation of the idea 
of Rio having a right to its own history as a city rich in historical tradition. This is the 
first writer to make this point that trying to eradicate the imperial parts of the nation’s and 
the city’s pasts would be to deny Rio’s singular past. Inextricably part of this argument is 
the fact that the city’s history did not begin with the Republic’s proclamation. The statue 
of Pedro I in Praça Tiradentes testified to this fact. And it continued to be a nuisance for 
the very same reasons that existed in 1893. 
While the 7th of September had been stripped down to a commemorative military 
parade and systematically eclipsed by November 15 in the civic imagination, the 
Republican approach to observing May 13 and abolition was an act of cooptation rather 
than supplantation. Much like the writers in the last year of the Empire, republican 
writers were particularly interested in exploring the implications of abolition for their 
emergent national narrative. Chronologically, the celebration of the end of slavery on 
May 13th shortly followed the April 21st celebration of Tiradentes. By the time that some 
journalists finished their accounts of Tiradentes Day, it was time for the commemoration 
of Floriano Peixoto’s birthday (by 1893 the President of the Republic) on April 30. Then, 
beginning with the early days of May, writers prepared for, discussed, and reflected on 
May 13 throughout the first half of that month. Beyond this chronological 
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commemorative continuum, the conceptual linking of republicanism and liberation on 
multiple levels became evident as early as April of 1890. Writers observing Tiradentes 
Day in that year labeled those celebrations the “first republican festivity” and May 13 as 
the second such national holiday. One year later, Sampaio Ferraz himself would comment 
further. In a discourse published to commemorate Tiradentes Day in 1891, he referred to 
Brazilians having been the “slaves of irrationality,” and he singled out “the two golden 
dates” of abolition: May 13, 1888 and November 15, 1889.261 This discourse 
demonstrated the new regime’s ability to coopt what had been perceived as Princess 
Isabel’s Golden Law for its ending of chattel slavery and link it to the proclamation of the 
Republic for its ending of Brazil’s perceived political slavery to the empire. Through the 
omission of September 7 as an important date, Ferraz could connect Tiradentes to 
abolition and abolition to the Republic, thus cutting Pedro I and the monarchy out of that 
historical line by denying royal attribution for the achievements of 1822 and 1888. 
Other writers similarly cut the monarchy out of the historical narrative but did 
allow for the continuation of September 7 as a legitimate fundamental date. It was what 
one writer called “the most glorious date for our patria” because it commemorated the 
moment in which Brazil “broke free from the prison in which the metropole had held us.” 
For another, September 7 was the first “step” in the trajectory of Brazilian nationality 
with May 13 being the second step and November 15 being the “culminating point and 
the third.” For him, “in 1822 the foundations of a free patria were launched; in 1888 the 
odious dominion of one human over another was put to rest in our land; [and] in 1889 it 
all ended with the ultimate privilege, self-government.” The same author emphasized the 
popular notion of abolition as a “struggle of those lower to rise above” and the “first 
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victory of the people of Brazil.” The commemoration, described as the “party of the 
people,” saw Praça Tiradentes decorated as part of the festivities and with no reference to 
the statue in the square.262  
It was one thing to omit references to the monarchical roles in those notable dates. 
It was quite another to dispute and refute those roles head-on, and that is what several 
authors did regarding Pedro I (which will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section) and perhaps surprisingly Princess Isabel. For these writers, abolition was the 
culmination and achievement of a longer process that could be traced back to prominent 
republican historical figures. That process was “outside of the Third Reign” (the name 
given to Isabel’s regency) and outside of the “guileful dominion” of the Princess’s court. 
Rather than seeing her as the “Redemptora” or Redeemer that Brazilian history and 
culture would eventually define her as, republican writers in the 1890s emphasized her 
use of warships to put down a slave revolt prior to the Golden Law in order to discredit 
her abolitionary standing. The Brazilian “Day of Redemption” with abolition was the 
triumph of republican-led liberation and achieved with the martyrdom of those slaves at 
the hands of the Princess Regent.263 In line with this thinking, abolition was a “great 
revolution” and their “grandiose social rehabilitation” that stemmed from neither the 
“benevolence nor favor of the reigning dynasty,” but was instead “the popular will that 
overcame absolutism.” The military and the nation’s young minds were the “vanguard” 
of the abolition movement, and it was precisely their work, not Isabel’s, that made 
abolition the “pedestal” for the Republic by creating racial equality, which some viewed 
as the necessary precursor to political and democratic equality. For many writers, 
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abolition was inextricably linked to the proclamation of the Republic because of the 
prevailing sense of how incongruent a republic with slavery would be. After all, a 
republic needed “free people, liberty, equality, [and] fraternity,” thus abolition was a 
necessary prerequisite to the existence of the Republic.264 And the discrediting and 
removal of Princess Isabel as a figure in that achievement was a necessary part in the 
advancement of the republican narrative. 
 
Commemorations and the Redefining of Pedro I 
 
In many ways, the wide range of public responses in the 1890s to Pedro’s 
historical role and his statue reflected the complex limitations placed on the Republican 
re-imaginings of the nation’s history by the nature of that history and the presence of the 
statue itself. The different approaches to dealing with the statue and its subject articulated 
in the press—before, during, and after the bandstand incident—reveal a wide range of 
emotions and nuanced intellectualism. For most of the radical ideologues of the Republic, 
much of the 1890s would be spent in anger and attack, manifested in diatribes against the 
first emperor and different proposals to either destroy or move the statue from the public 
square. In the end, though, the nation’s first statue would persevere. It would remain and 
endure in Praça Tiradentes through equal parts choice and inertia. Pedro I’s legacy, 
however, continued to be a work in progress, newly qualified by the nation’s republican 
landscape.  
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Comparative Definitions of Pedro I through the Lenses of Independence 
and Abdication 
 Clearly evident in the 1890s Republican criticisms of Pedro I was the tendency to 
judge him harshly in comparison with the other two (male) monarchs in Brazil’s past. 
Those writers showed much more interest in reevaluating and reinterpreting Pedro’s 
standing based on his perceived relationships with his father, the Portuguese King João 
VI, and his son, Pedro II, the second Emperor of Brazil. This Republican reinterpretation 
hinged on recasting both the independence moment and Pedro I’s abdication in new, 
devastatingly unflattering lights in an attempt to replace the identity of the hero of 
Ipiranga with that of the haughty traitor of the Braganças. The fact that the most virulent 
critics of Pedro I went so far as to make him appear foreign even to his father and his 
son—fellow monarchs— reveals the singular ire that he aroused in the contest of 
memory. 
 Immediately following the proclamation of the Republic, the 7th of April, the date 
of Pedro I’s abdication in 1831, emerged as a counter-date and narrative that refuted the 
first emperor’s definition as historical hero. While those imperial writers of the inaugural 
odes of 1862 intentionally and necessarily glossed over that moment, republican writers 
could directly use it as a memorial weapon. The Gazeta da Tarde in 1890 commemorated 
the day as “the day of the people!” and extolled the “honor and glory to the revolution of 
the 7th of April” as the date on which Brazilians reclaimed their “liberty and 
constitutional rights.” This 1890 column went further to tackle the question of the statue, 
asserting that “in the Brazilian heart there is a moment greater than that of the statue of 
Sr. d. Pedro I.” Simultaneously calling for Brazilians to respect “the memorable traditions 
of the past,” the author called for the “sun of the 7th of April of 1831” to shine down on 
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the artifice and “symbol of a lie” that was the statue.265 These were strong words spoken 
against Pedro I and his statue, namely that the emperor should be more defined by his last 
national act than by his first, but they reveal an interesting aspect of republican criticisms. 
This column in 1890 was merely a reprint of the words of Republican Party President 
Bocayuva spoken against the statue’s inauguration in 1862. Rather than a new discussion 
of the viability of the statue in the plaza of the new Republic of Brazil and a fresh critique 
of the first emperor, this republican writer—and many others like him—chose to rely on 
the 1862 historical narrative and the actual words of the 1862 critics. Despite these strong 
recycled words, the commemorative visibility of April 7 never took off to really capture 
the public’s or the newspapers’ attention. 
 The observance in 1893 of April 7 and Pedro’s abdication just shortly before the 
bandstand incident was consistent with the limited interest shown in the years prior when 
journalists were understandably more focused on the more pressing political issues of the 
day to the point that they made no reference to the date at all the year before. In O Tempo 
in 1893, the date rated only a small blurb, but that in and of itself indicates an 
intentional—albeit small—attack on the standing of Pedro I. The comment stated only 
that “the seventh of April is a notable date in the history of Brazil because it was on that 
day in 1831 that the 1st emperor abdicated, seeing himself forced to flee from our 
territory.”266 In just one sentence, the author did manage to employ three of the most 
common Republican slights to Pedro I: the omission of his name as an intentional slap 
(which Sampaio Ferraz did repeatedly in referring to Pedro’s statue as “the statue of 
Praça Tiradentes”), the elevation of the date of his abdication as a celebratory moment for 
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Brazil, and the portrayal of his abdication as “fleeing.” While the writer emphasized 
Pedro’s abdication, he also minimalized the date simultaneously, seemingly for effect, by 
placing the event of 1831 with other “notable” historical events on the 7th of April such as 
the death of Carlos VIII of France in 1498 and the departure of St. Francis for India in 
1541. This effort to deny Pedro’s standing by affirming the importance of his abdication 
speaks to the larger tension such writers felt in wanting him to slip into historical oblivion 
but feeling compelled to publically discuss him in order to attack his standing and 
achieve that goal. It was what made them memorial deniers and bargainers at the same 
time in how they dealt with him. 
 The dust-up over the bandstand just days later triggered a renewed interest in 
reevaluating the historical narrative associated with Pedro I’s abdication. A letter-writer 
calling himself “A Patriot” fused the Republican perspective on that abdication with the 
political purity litmus test generated by the bandstand incident. He wrote that “we 
guarantee…that no self-respecting puritan republican would have considered the raising 
of a bandstand around the feet of the statue of the largo do Rocio as an affront made by 
the Club Tiradentes against the memory of this libertine and wimp of the 7th of April.”267 
Like the previous quotation, this portrayal advances the typical republican view 
expressed in the indignant responses to the public criticisms in 1893. Club Tiradentes 
could never dishonor the nation’s history through dishonoring the statue in any way 
simply because Pedro I merited no respect. The first emperor was dismissed as a 
“libertine,” which was a tactic used previously by Teófilo Otoni in 1862 as a means to 
show the contrast between the virtue that characterized republicans and the vice that 
characterized Pedro I. Ferraz himself labeled Pedro as “haughty…perverse…[and] lax.” 
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But the “Patriot” writer went further, insulting Pedro for not fighting his exile. While 
Pedro himself and the writers who celebrated his statue at its inauguration cloaked his 
leaving Brazil in the language of sacrifice and constitutional observance to avoid conflict, 
this republican writer in 1893 portrayed it only as weakness and a function of the 
emperor’s lack of moral and ethical principles. This personal repudiation of Pedro I 
translated into the complete dismissal of his historical significance and therefore that of 
the statue as well, and it was part of the attack frequently used by Sampaio Ferraz in his 
responses to the public criticism of the bandstand. He vehemently mocked those he called 
the “adorers of Pedro I” for their adoration for a figure expelled from the nation, saying 
that the “perverse and weak” emperor was “dispatched to the old continent” out of an act 
of “national dignity” in throwing him out. He added that the ship spiriting Pedro away 
left “to the sound of popular fanfare” and a collective sense of good riddance.268 
 This reinterpretation of the 1831 abdication flew in the face of that 
aforementioned previous imperial narrative, advanced during the imperial historical 
project and codified long after by Octavio Tarquinio de Sousa in his seminal biography of 
Pedro I. Drawing on those previous imperial narratives, including Pedro I’s own accounts 
of his abdication, Tarquinio de Sousa did label the events of April 7 a “revolution,” but 
he resoundingly portrayed Pedro’s leaving as the benevolent and liberal self-sacrifice 
referenced in the odes of 1862.  Where Ferraz found jeering celebration, he found solemn 
respect and a “melancholic withdrawal” of a dignified ruler rather than the fearful flight 
described above. Similarly, the traditional characterization of the impetus for Pedro’s 
decision to abdicate focused on the emperor’s royal honor rather than any ignominy. 
                                                 




Tarquinio de Sousa presented abdication as Pedro’s placing his honor, the observance of 
the constitution, and the avoidance of a possible civil war between Brazilians and 
Portuguese ahead of his retention of the throne. This narrative accentuated the support 
that existed in place in Rio had Pedro I wanted to fight for his throne as a means to 
deepen his perceived sacrifice and morality.269 
 In an ironic twist, this debate over abdication as a mark of shame or sacrifice 
would itself play out in the aftermath of the bandstand scandal when Sampaio Ferraz felt 
compelled to step down as commander of the Battalion Tiradentes. That same “Patriot” 
who called Pedro a “wimp” for the way in which he abdicated lauded Ferraz’s resignation 
as an act of “selflessness and self-denial of this true Spartan of the Brazilian republic.” 
For this not to be dismissed as radical cognitive dissonance, the republican distinction 
had to be made that abdication was a virtuous act only when one was unjustly targeted. 
Since the official republican view of April 7 was that of a righteous revolution and Pedro 
I as anything but a victim, there could be no credit or esteem granted him for that act of 
withdrawal.270 
 Ferraz went further in using abdication to condemn Pedro I by interestingly 
drawing a comparison between what he perceived as the exit of the contemptible father in 
1831 and that of the sympathetic son in 1889. Rather than the haughty Pedro I justly and 
jubilantly sent packing, Pedro II, Pedro’s “son, good and compassionate, because of the 
strength of our aspirations and owing to the inexorable fate of events, had to depart, 
breaking his loving heart in front of his homeland, to die in bitter exile, and to which only 
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cowards would rise to celebrate in the face of his agony!”271 This portrayal of Pedro II as 
merely a victim of circumstances—namely the inevitable Brazilian evolution to 
republican government—and a sympathetic and melodramatic figure reaffirmed Ferraz’s 
singular hatred for Pedro I rather than any Jacobin ire directed at the Bragantine 
monarchy in general. In the Club Tiradentes’ identification with Pedro II, he even went 
so far as to liken that afore-described sad scene of abdication in 1889 to the public 
affronts made against the Club in 1893, referencing the “inexplicable assent of the 
powers that be” in the maltreatment of the two. In a rather surprising linking of dates, 
Ferraz portrayed them as such: 
two dates that confront and repulse: the 17th of November of 1889—the last 
goodbye of D. Pedro II to the land that had cradled him since birth—when the 
Riachuelo—the awesome battleship parted the waters of Guanabara [Bay], having 
an entire family of outcasts to the side of its walls of iron; and the 19th of April of 
1893, when the enemies of the Republic found half a dozen hotheads to violate 
the veneration of the glorious martyr of the Inconfidência, creating a pretext for 
the irreverence to the dead, who old Portugal itself hated and condemned!272 
 
Within this defense of the Club Tiradentes against the resultant public scorn in 1893 was 
that sad image of Pedro II leaving his homeland, which ironically should have been a 
cathartic and triumphant date for a radical republican such as Ferraz. Yet he used it to 
lament what he saw as the re-victimization of Tiradentes (and his club and himself) by 
modern enemies of the Republic. 
 Not only did Ferraz use a comparison to his son to denounce Pedro I, he also used 
the latter’s historical relationship to his own father, King João VI, in the context of 
Brazilian independence to condemn him for his role in that political separation from 
Portugal. Calling Pedro I a traitor for leading Brazilian independence against the 





Portuguese rule of his father was no new condemnatory tactic. Otoni made that charge in 
his 1862 pamphlet. Ferraz simply reiterated the line of attack in 1893, saying that Pedro’s 
actions leading up to September 7 of 1822 were “the usurpation originating from the vile 
perjury against his own father—old and stooped—friend of this unhappy country—
reduced, since then, to a land of slaves.”273 This one characterization of Pedro I held 
every possible republican slur against Pedro I. He had enslaved Brazil under his rule, 
betrayed his old and weakened father, and lied to that same father when he made a 
declaration of continued fidelity to Portuguese rule. This line of attack required a positive 
historical legacy for Dom João in order to make Pedro’s perfidy that much more 
malignant. Therefore the Portuguese king became Brazil’s “friend” who fled “the 
European tyranny of Bonaparte” and found “safe shelter” in a magnanimous and 
welcoming Brazil. Another writer for O Tempo similarly used his column discussion of 
Tiradentes to slam Pedro I for “betraying his father in the hour most critical to his 
dynasty.”274 Again, critics of Pedro I drew a distinction within the house of Bragança by 
victimizing D. João, the Portuguese king, and villainizing the son, the figurehead of 
Brazilian independence. In a case of making decidedly strange bedfellows of the 1893 
Jacobin and two of the three monarchs most intimately associated with Brazilian history, 
Ferraz was attempting to reintroduce a perspective on independence and Pedro I that had 
roundly been rejected or at least ignored before on the grounds that it distorted the events 
and manner of Pedro’s treatment of his father. For most, the historical reality was that 
Pedro never stopped showing his father deference, explaining his protestations of fidelity 
to his father’s authority, and the Brazilian press and later historians had drawn the clear 
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distinction between whom Pedro and Brazil were declaring independence from: the 
Cortes. But here, Ferraz and his supporters advanced the narrative of familial betrayal to 
fuse the traditionally sympathetic interpretation of D. João VI with that of the conniving 
Pedro I. 
Definition through Qualification 
 In addition to redefining him by comparing him unfavorably to his family and 
fellow monarchs, Pedro I’s critics in the 1890s also attempted to minimize his legacy by 
qualifying his role as Fundador, albeit grudgingly since many would have preferred his 
complete exorcism from the history books rather than this minimization. Even those 
journalists who did not typically advance that more aggressively anti-imperial narrative 
began to qualify Pedro’s historical role because of the new political reality. And in some 
cases, it becomes apparent that they themselves were learning to navigate in this way day 
by day during the public debate over the covering of the statue. For example, on April 19, 
the editorial in O Paiz referred to Pedro I as the “founder of the empire” in that paper’s 
ongoing criticism of Club Tiradentes’ actions. Just one day later, though, Pedro’s title 
became “the founder of the extinct empire” [emphasis my own]. This immediate 
qualification and titular course-correction speaks volumes towards the political and 
rhetorical climate that generated this new self-censorship and historical reinterpretation. 
The editor of the Revista Illustrada showed the learning of this same lesson on the need 
to distinguish between historical eras when labeling Pedro I. That journal delineated the 
past from the present by calling Pedro “the founder of the ex-empire of Brazil.” 275 
  While these writers, who stood out for their criticism of the statue’s covering, 
qualified Pedro’s standing by articulating a rupture in the Brazilian historical narrative, 
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others directly attacked that standing by either qualifying or contesting his historical 
achievements. Rather than the hero of Ipiranga or the founder of the nation, Pedro 
became the “pseudo founder of the empire,” and a “falsified legend.” Echoing the 
“bronze lie” assertion of Otoni decades before, another writer described the statue as “the 
vile bronze that the [imperial] court raised” and later used the exact label of Otoni 
himself as did multiple others. A writer who called himself the “Positivist Apostle of 
Brazil” stated that the statue of Pedro I “does not represent true history” because it “is 
excessively exaggerating” what was in reality the first emperor’s “secondary role despite 
his official primacy…in the effort of our national independence.”  That false narrative, 
according to him, was advanced and immortalized in the statue through the 
“cortezanismo” of the past. This qualifying of the statue’s founding meant to de-
popularize it for the Brazilian public. With this interpretation, the nation didn’t raise that 
statue…nor did the people or even Rio for that matter. It was the work of the court, and 
for this reason it was the representation of a lie and what amounted to an inside memorial 
job. For many of these writers, the true “preeminent role” belonged to either José 
Bonifácio or Tiradentes before him, and not to Pedro I. Revealing the true symbolic 
meaning of Pedro’s statue—“the usurpation of the liberty and rights of the Brazilian 
people” by its subject—became the mechanism for the “just reclamation of republican 
sentiment.” By similarly labeling him as merely the “founder of the monarchy and 
supposed author of the independence of Brazil,” critics could simultaneously question his 
credited role in independence and limit his founding to that strictly of the monarchy and 
not the nation and not Brazil. These writers conceded that Pedro created an “independent 
empire” because September 7 achieved the “separation of Brazil from the metropole” or 
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“the end of [Brazil’s] colonial life,” but they expressly limited it as such in order to give 
credit for the founding of Brazil’s nationhood to the “revolution” of November 15 and the 
Republic. Even the credit for establishing the empire came to be qualified by some 
writers. For example, the Masonic Grand Master Antonio Joaquim de Maceda Soares 
earlier affirmed that Pedro I would have been just a “vulgar adventurer” without the 
efforts of Tiradentes and José Bonifácio rather than any sort of fundador.276  
 These sorts of discussions of the Brazilian independence movement in the specific 
context of commemorating September 7 typically advanced two themes previously 
discussed: royal usurpation of a decidedly popular Brazilian movement and the 
replacement of Pedro I by José Bonifácio as the real patriarch and icon of independence. 
At the core of these historical redefinitions was the fundamental idea that Brazil would 
have been just fine without any royal participation in those decisive moments. There was 
an effort published in 1893 to redirect the celebration of independence day by going to 
the statue of “the eminentíssimo figure of the patriarch of independence, the great José 
Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva” to witness “the laying down of a crown at the feet” of the 
statue “as a single symbol of national recognition.” While it was not surprising that Pedro 
I was commemoratively replaced by his esteemed Brazilian advisor on this date, it was 
certainly striking that an organization like the Centro Artístico would create a “patriotic 
work of remembering” for the date that privileged royal imagery as a means to honor and 
recognize the authority and contribution of José Bonifácio.277  
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Such an effort showed that there were many different levels and nuance to 
attempting to replace an emperor with an imperial advisor and stalwart in historical 
memory during the Republic. The use of a crown to pay homage in a time that, as I have 
already noted, was preoccupied with extirpating royal iconography indicates a lack of 
consensus on how exactly to pay tribute. However, there existed strong consensus on the 
primacy of José Bonifácio over Pedro I as well as on the understanding that Pedro’s role 
in independence was inconsequential and merely opportunistic. This example also sheds 
light onto what appears to be a habitual need on the part of the elites for a multi-layered 
Brazilian reclamation of sovereignty. When it came to attempts to strip Pedro I of power, 
the mechanism that allowed for the greatest degree of separation between Brazilians and 
his royal person and what he as a national figure stood for was always his portugalidade. 
It can be seen in the forced transfer of the throne to the Brazilian-born Pedro II in 1831. I 
would argue that the nation avoided that “inevitable” republican rupture in that year 
precisely because of the way that the abdication effectively transferred sovereignty in 
both royal and administrative terms to Brazil and Brazilians. It was enough of a shift to 
mitigate any call for more extreme change. In the anecdote involving the patriarch, we 
see the desired transfer of the mantle of leadership of independence from Pedro I to José 
Bonifácio, from the Portuguese royal to the Brazilian-born Paulista (albeit imperial) elite. 
The handing over of status to José Bonifácio regarding September 7 commemorations 
represented one more degree of separation and reclamation for the date. These steps 
represented a sort of middle ground and transitional phase. For the idealized Republic, 
the ultimate transfer of power—symbolic and real—would be represented in the new 
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system of government as the popular sovereignty claimed by the citizenry on November 
15. 
In addition to shedding light on the themes of sovereignty and legitimacy, this 
anecdote involving the issue of paying tribute to a statue (in this case José Bonifácio’s) 
and the State’s public representations of power is also akin to that of the World’s Fair 
controversy present in the perceptions of the statue’s covering by the bandstand. The 
belief of some at the time of the incident that Pedro I’s statue was being prepared for 
exhibition at the Chicago World’s Fair, noted in the previous chapter, made the reality of 
the covering that much more disturbing since it transformed what they believed to be an 
act of ultimate respect into one of incivility. After all, in the late nineteenth century, being 
chosen to represent Brazil in the high stakes world of international exhibitions was the 
highest honor because it reflected the valuation of an object as meriting a place in the 
carefully crafted national identity projected to the world and the Western arbiters of 
civilization. The 1889 world’s fair in Paris had attracted more widespread participation 
from Latin American countries precisely because of those elites’ desire to prove 
themselves on the soil of the French nation and people who served as the era’s and the 
region’s “cultural point of reference.”278 
  Given this context, the exhibits in the world’s fairs ultimately reflected how 
elites formulated the concept of the ideal modern and progressive nation. The new 
republican elite did indeed send some of the nation’s greatest artwork to Chicago in 1893, 
but it would be paintings made by famous Brazilian artists rather than a statue of a 
Portuguese prince made by a French sculptor. In their construction of a unique national 
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self, the elites of the late empire and early republic had to walk a fine line of conformity 
and individualism. The “transformation, re-creation, and invention of tradition” that went 
into that construction had to fit in with Western ideals of beauty and merit while at the 
same time purposefully being outside of that model in order to accommodate the 
simultaneous Western fascination with the exotic. In deciding just how “other” they 
could be as Latin Americans, Brazilian elites—like their counterparts throughout the 
region—used that opening to latch onto the intellectual and artistic cooptation of the 
native as part of their distinctly American identity. As the nation’s fair commissions 
“stressed the vastness and exotic nature of Brazil,” its artists responded with indianista 
novels and depictions. This trend would continue to influence Brazilian notions of 
national identity and those objects selected for exhibition.279 
However, in the late nineteenth century the selection of artwork was secondary to 
the real purpose of those cosmopolitan gatherings. That purpose was as much a product 
of the preoccupation with modernization and progress present in the intellectual climate 
in Brazil as the 15th of November was. In his study Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting 
a Modern Nation, Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo notes how elites throughout Latin America 
sought the public display and validation of their modernization programs at those 
international sites in order to “present in impressive fashion both the economic and the 
human resources of the nation for the world to see” to in turn attract foreign capital and 
European immigration. Thus, their self-awareness of progress was what drove their desire 
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for international awareness of their nation’s modernity and economic attractiveness.280 
Brazil’s exhibition in Chicago in 1893 reflected that desire, and the key component to the 
first projection of the new Republic’s image was coffee. The “Brazilian building” that 
represented the nation (see Figure 11) in the foreign structures category served to 
promote Brazilian coffee with its first-floor exhibit of “every kind” of coffee (but was 














American commentary spoke to Brazil’s success on that cosmopolitan—though 
inherently American—stage in Chicago. A local writer considered Brazil’s architectural 
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Figure 11: The Brazil Building of the 1893 Chicago World's Fair. Source: Joseph M. Di Cola and David 





offering to be “one of the most beautiful” of the fair because of its domes, impressive 
French Renaissance style, sculptured artifice, medallions, spiral staircases, and summer 
garden. Even the fair’s Director-General referred to the nation as such: “Brazil, possessed 
of all the wealth of products incident to her perfect clime, has set aside $600,000 with 
which to display the exhibits and resources of that young and growing republic.” In terms 
of the resources displayed, Brazil contributed to exhibits on forestry/woods, leather, 
mining, and fisheries (displaying fishing boats). It sent a representative of the nation to 
the “Woman’s Building” and followed requested protocol of having Brazil’s female-
comprised committee develop statements on women’s “industrial interests” rather than 
“politics, suffrage, or other irrelevant issues.” It contributed in some way (not detailed) to 
ethnological and anthropological exhibition and collection, depicted as “the objects that 
show how the rude forefathers of a thousand tribes delved, dug, and builded” and 
included “many interesting tribes of living Indians…quartered near the building.”281 In 
the end, Brazilian participation in Chicago did indeed live up to the current Western 
models of modernism, sexism, and racism. 
 As seen in the previous chapter’s discussion of the intellectual and political 
climate that came to be associated with positivism, elite perceptions in 1893 of the very 
nature of nationality hinged on their society’s ability to publicize “its own possession of 
the universal truths of progress, science, and industry.” In the end, their objective at the 
world’s fairs was the same as on the streets of Rio de Janeiro and across Brazil: “to 
consolidate their national and international integrity.”282 In terms of elite understandings 
of political legitimacy, Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo asserts that those world’s fairs also 
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demonstrated the era’s conceptualization of freedom and democracy through that lens of 
the modern model nation. Accordingly, he cites the terms republic, nation, and 
democracy as “fundamental to the concept of modern freedom.” Whether it was an 
understanding of equality, popular representation, or what he calls the “modern 
republican freedom” as defined by the “political and social rights granted by the French 
Revolution,” Tenorio-Trillo ultimately concludes that in the international exposition 
context freedom was  
a fundamental philosophical principle, not an indispensable practice. Thus 
democracy, without a fixed meaning, was conceived by special, and often 
nondemocratic, adjectives—authoritarian, conservative, socialist, liberal, 
caesarean. The need for an economically or militarily strong state and the heavily 
nationalistic environment made democracy and its inherently ambivalent liberty 
dispensable though valuable components of the model modern nation. Economic 
and productive laissez-faire was at the core of the late-nineteenth-century’s pride 
in freedom.283 
 
The practical results of these beliefs included government-created commercial 
commissions in order to best take advantage of the opportunities for the “civilizing 
effects of commerce.” What a nation needed to attract that commerce was order. All of 
these interplaying factors lead Tenorio-Trillo to conclude that “freedom as a political 
virtue was understood as peace.” This distinction is important since it underscores the 
wariness of the republican writers for the state of their nation, evidenced in their 
commentary regarding the statue controversy and the conflict in Rio Grande do Sul, and 
what it was representing to the world.  The Latin American intellectual understanding by 
that time of democracy being equivalent to a republican form of government informed 
their views on the legitimacy of their government. Thus, Brazil had achieved the ultimate 
marker of republicanism while still struggling, as any new regime dealing with what 
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Tenorio-Trillo calls the “ungovernability of democracy” would, to achieve the peace and 
order viewed as markers of a nation’s progress.284 
 What these discussions of world’s fairs, national identities, and statues seemingly 
boxed up for display show is just how complex and messy it was for those elites in the 
early Republic to decide how to think and what to do. They also reveal why one writer 
would feel compelled to advocate for the recognition of José Bonifácio as the true icon of 
Independence Day and others to continue to more generally but vehemently seek the 
disqualification of Pedro I from that accomplishment and their version of nationality. We 
return, then, to the more specific topic of what the observations of September 7 during 
the 1890s reveal about those disqualification efforts and their impact on the historical 
legacy of Pedro I. 
A commemorative write-up for the 7th of September in 1894 emphasized the 
political recognition on Pedro I’s part for the movement—referred to as the “aspirations 
of the Brazilian people”—already afoot well before that moment on the banks of the 
Ipiranga River. For this author, that political calculus taken by Pedro to join the 
movement made his role reactionary rather than characterized by any sort of leadership. 
Seeing Pedro as never truly intent to “shake off the yoke of Portugal” like the Brazilians 
were, the author places him apart—and only perceiving—from the “desires of the entire 
nation” for independence. Ultimately, the main point of this qualification of Pedro is that 
without his political opportunism in injecting himself into an already swiftly moving 
current of independence, the result would have been in 1822 a “revolution” that would 
have been republican in nature and would have decisively won Brazilian independence 
without Pedro I. The author presents it as historical certitude that if Pedro had returned to 
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Portugal when ordered to do so by the Cortes or had resisted Brazilian independence in 
an effort to preserve his father’s and Portugal’s control, then the republic would assuredly 
have come into being in 1822. In the end, then, Pedro I’s cooptation of that preexisting 
effort subverted that very effort and denied and delayed the coming Brazilian republic. 
This same author continued to challenge the notion of Pedro as the leader of 
independence by emphasizing the popular nature of the Brazilian independence 
movement. For him, the people were the true force of the movement, and Pedro merely 
acceded and tapped into it. Correspondingly, Pedro had not been acclaimed by the people 
but had “acclaimed himself emperor of Brazil,” and his ability to do so stemmed from his 
success in capturing the moment with the “memorable phrase independence or death” and 
creating an image and a catchphrase. The Grito allowed him to fuse himself onto that 
preexisting movement and leach standing and authority to the point of effectively 
creating a brand for himself. In a final criticism and qualification of Pedro's independence 
legacy, the author also asserted that royal aspect of the way Brazil achieved its political 
independence cheapened that victory. He found that the roles of Pedro I and D. João VI 
in the process “stained” Brazilian independence because it was a “negotiation between 
father and son” as opposed to the ennobling popular movement that was the groundswell 
behind Pedro’s negotiating position. The bottom line for this author was how that royal 
participation masked the real force of the movement, the Brazilian people, who would 
have gained their freedom “with the prince or without him.”285 
 Another way that critics qualified Pedro’s legacy was to cast him as more foreign 
and thereby define him more by his otherness and incongruity. Using Pedro I’s 
portugalidade against him as a means of attack went back to the first emperor’s own 
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time. It was, after all, one of the driving factors in the uprising against him in 1831. Even 
those celebrating him back in 1862 defined him more by the land of his birth and death—
Portugal—than the land in which he lived and self-identified with the majority of his 
life—Brazil. This being a monarch of two worlds and of neither was a reality that Pedro 
himself found difficult. In his biography, Tarquinio de Sousa discusses Pedro I’s surprise 
at being labeled in his own time as a Portuguese and a foreigner by quoting the 
Emperor’s own words on the matter at the time of his abdication: “I would imagine that 
twenty-three years of existence in this land, of which ten were dedicated to the public 
cause, they could have extended me the right of being Brazilian.”286 Historically, that 
foreignness had most to do with whether or not there loomed a more foreign foil than 
Pedro I for Brazilians. In 1822, Portugal and its Cortes occupied that spot rather than 
Pedro I. Even writers in 1894 echoed this reality, describing the Brazilian people back in 
1822 as “neither tolerating anymore the authority of the foreigner nor the direct 
intervention of the metropole in the political business of the country.” In this instance, 
this writer did not choose to segue into Pedro’s own foreignness, but he did take the 
opportunity to stress the emperor’s monarchical identity and thereby still qualified him 
and made him that much “other.”287 Other writers did often use that label of foreign to 
challenge Pedro I’s legacy, and some went a step further to tie that foreignness to Pedro’s 
perceived vice, opportunism, and authoritarianism. It was simply part of the well-used 
critical playbook, such that a writer discussing the topic of “national gratitude” to Pedro I 
would make the argument that  
the foreigner glorified by the statue is not the author of our political 
independence. He sold it to Brazil for the certain and very high price of two 
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million pounds sterling and even more the onus of the terms as emperors from the 
descendants of the House of Bragança, when it is indubitable that the belief in 
civic duty held by our grandparents would have in little time achieved our 
emancipation from the metropole and founded on this soil in America the 
appropriate government that was implanted only sixty-seven years after the 
Revolution. Given this, what does the statue signify? An homage of gratitude to 
the founder of the monarchy.288 
 
This indictment of Pedro as the foreigner who used Brazilian independence, interrupted 
the inevitable republic, and condemned Brazil to monarchy ultimately ended with the 
common qualification on what it was that Pedro actually founded in 1822. Again, it was 
distinguished as the monarchy, and not Brazil. Sampaio Ferraz himself would drive home 
this interpretation of Pedro’s otherness, but he would do so by emphasizing how his royal 
and imperial tendencies served to separate him from the people of Brazil and qualify how 
his 1824 constitution should be remembered. Ferraz called Pedro the “first monarch” and 
denigrated the statue’s symbolic representation of that constitution, describing the act 
captured in bronze as Pedro I “bestowing upon his vassals his constitutional charter.”289 
By labeling the Brazilian people as mere “vassals” to Pedro I, Ferraz sought to clearly 
define Pedro by his authoritarian royalty and his relationship of separateness to the 
people. Neither the hero of independence and the nation nor the author of the Brazilian 
people’s constitution in these eyes, Pedro I faced the steady chipping away of his 
historical place. 
 There was, curiously, one chronicle of the bandstand confrontation that flew in 
the face of this tendency to back away from Pedro I’s traditional historical legacy. The 
write-up on April 20 in the Diário de Notícias regarding the events of the day before, 
when the bandstand was pulled down, included the first and only reference to something 
                                                 




different reported in the accounts of the words exchanged in the plaza. The account had 
the typical attribution that one of the captains thanked the police for their “having given 
time for the people to perform their patriotic duty.” But this one chronicler also added a 
new line to what the speaker said: “if Tiradentes was a great patriot, then so was d. Pedro 
I on the day of the 7th of September of 1822.”290 This account is the only one that 
reported that particular exchange of words, and it was certainly an outlier at its time for 
further affirming not only Pedro’s status as the icon of Ipiranga and independence and 
that imperial founding narrative but also a comparable historical standing with 
Tiradentes. Given the charged rhetorical atmosphere in the aftermath of the bandstand, 
you would expect that this particular account would have kicked up a firestorm and been 
highlighted in the Club Tiradentes denunciations of the captains singled out for their 
participation. Yet it remained confined to this one account and that one small line. The 
rest of the account lined up with those in the other papers. The vivas exclaimed on the site 
and reported in the Diário de Notícias still excluded any pro-monarchy elements; they 
were strictly limited to the Republic, the army, the navy, President Floriano Peixoto, the 
police, and the National Guard. In terms of the question of vivas, there existed a sort of 
flip side of this story of unique reporting on what was said in the streets. Only one 
account in O Tempo on the 21st of April mentioned bandstand supporters shouting calls of 
“down with the monarchy” as “some groups roamed the main streets of the city giving 
vivas to the Republic, to Tiradentes, etc., and death to (morras) the monarchists, the 
traitors, to Pedro I and others.” This account was commented on by a writer for the 
Diário de Notícias the next day who said that the other paper’s coverage brought “to his 
mind a ghost,” and this notion of a renewed public presence for Pedro I giving the dead 
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emperor new life as a ghost and/or a statue is one that has already been discussed. 
Nevertheless, this reporting of information in the context of outlier stories provides a 
different slant on the significance of that reporting. There was only that one account of 
explicitly anti-Pedro I rhetoric in the streets. Similarly, the only explicitly pro-Pedro I 
language registered at the demolition site remained confined to that other one paper with 
its one account.291 
On a humorous note, and from a much different time, the only other example of a 
verbal affirmation of Pedro I taking place at his statue came in 1916 with a newspaper 
description of an incident involving the statue and playfully titled “Symbolic Nudity.” 
The blurb described the actions of one Serafim Dias who got drunk, got nude, and 
climbed the statue in Praça Tiradentes. The report stated that he yelled from the statue “I 
was always a monarchist and admirer of Dom Pedro I who gave liberty to this land!” 
After that, the reporter noted that the crowd applauded, as they would do for “all patriotic 
discourses” and mocked Dias a bit more by calling him both a “citizen” and a “national 
symbol.” Ultimately, the incident was labeled an “excess of monarchism and wine” and 
left at that. There had been other shenanigans involving the statue that were reported in 
the papers as far back as 1895, but they did not involve any sort of understood 
affirmation of the statue or its subject. Instead, one was a simple police blurb about a man 
being arrested for climbing the statue. The blotter included no reference to any 
proclamations by the climber. The second incident that year was reported widely in 
multiple newspapers since it escalated to the point of potential mob violence. In his look 
back over the week past, a writer for the Gazeta de Noticias commented on how a 
disturbed Italian man had climbed onto the statue late at night and begun speaking loudly 
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though unintelligibly since the passers-by did not understood Italian. According to this 
account, the climber drew a crowd of people trying to get him to come down. Eventually 
the authorities succeeded in getting the “poor madman” to come down. The man’s mental 
health concerned the writer as did the fact that the situation escalated into the nearby 
crowd wanting to “lynchar” the man. The writer did not explain their justification for 
such an extreme response to the incident. He only responded to the events asserting that 
the man had not committed any serious crime except that of “owing respect to the 
monument.” In concluding the account, the writer made clear his relief that the man 
received help in the form of admittance into the mental hospital rather than mob 
punishment.292 While more details that could better explain the dark turn that this incident 
took are not available, the incident does show the continued keeping of law and order 
when it came to the public monument as well as the underlying sense that respect for the 
statue was part of that order. The public aspect of the man’s and the crowd’s 
confrontations seems to have made the statue a mere incidental backdrop to the drama. In 
the end, both the Italian and the imperial statue survived public threats against 
them…Pedro I quietly and the un-named Italian anonymously. 
The fact that a search for any other incidents involving the statue after the 
bandstand incident and those few moments mentioned above turned up nothing—until 
1916 and Mr. Dias—is telling. If the statue was in fact a symbolic affront to many 
hardline republicans, then one would expect some targeted acts of vandalism or protest 
after the bandstand turmoil. For example, it would not have been surprising to see the 
likes of what occurred in Porto, Portugal in 1911 when a group of republicans identified 
                                                 




as “vermelhos” ripped the crown off of the statue of Pedro V, the son of Maria II and 
thereby Pedro’s grandson, who ruled Portugal from 1853 to 1861. This symbolic attack 
on the statue took place just one year after Portugal’s First Republic came into existence 
and almost three years since the Carbonari act of regicide that killed then-king Carlos I 




In light of these occurrences in Portugal, Rio’s absence of violence surrounding 
the proclamation of the Republic and any symbolic attacks on Pedro’s statue outside of 
the construction of an over-sized temporary bandstand certainly stands out. Instead, the 
elites of the time, who represented the entire political and ideological spectrum, were 
basically content to contest the prior legitimacy and history of the empire on an 
intellectual level. Driving that contestation was their need to legitimize their own new 
control of the State and usher in popular civic participation in order to consolidate the 
transfer of sovereignty from the royal line of Bragança to the Brazilian people that was 
initiated on November 15. The legacy of Pedro I and his historical sovereignty were 
placed squarely in the crosshairs of this intellectual and memorial endeavor. 1890s elites 
grappled with how to remember him and the nation’s other imperial figures. While 
perspectives on Pedro II could soften with exile and time, for many the only way to 
remember Pedro I was to at least qualify his legacy and at most wholly repudiate it as 
foreign and opportunistic. 
Brazilian attempts to remove the bronze reminder of the monarchy in Praça 
Tiradentes did occur. But they would be contrastingly tame compared to that example in 
                                                 




Portugal and only within the political process of making appeals to the government for its 
destruction or removal. Those efforts—and their ultimate failures—will serve as the 
focus of the final part of this chapter in a discussion that will follow the ongoing debate 
























When “Incoherence” Meets “Inertia”:                      
A Statue Challenged but Left in Peace 
 
During the first decade of the Republic’s existence, critics of Pedro I and his 
statue made four separate proposals to remove the statue. To be more precise, there were 
actually only three requests articulated in the Rio press that the government rid Praça 
Tiradentes of its imperial statue, but the fact that one of them was proposed on two 
separate occasions brings our tally to four. The first call came in 1890 to remove Pedro 
I’s figure from atop the pedestal and replace it with a republican-themed monument. This 
exact same proposal was published again in 1893. A year after that came an entirely 
different call to relocate the statue to a museum and construct a new monument to the 
martyr Tiradentes. Finally in1898, there was a reference, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, to a 
federal senator’s plan to ask that the statue be demolished and replaced by a bust to an 
obscure Rio figure.294 None of these proposals ever gained much traction in the public or 
legislative spheres, where they ultimately played out. Yet their continuing presence 
throughout the years speaks to the recognition of the power of monuments as memory 
both in those advocacies for change and the decisions against them. 
Of these multiple suggestions to remove the statue from Praça Tiradentes, the 
very first occurred just six months after the Proclamation of the Republic. In May of 
1890, Miguel Lemos sought to remove the statue of Pedro from its massive pedestal and 
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place a new monument to the Republic atop the bronze base as its replacement. The 
public reaction to that idea revealed an overall wariness of symbolically expunging 
history and turning monuments into transitory markers of the nation. The criticisms found 
in the Rio press included strong anti-positivist rhetoric as well as repeated comparisons to 
the European approach towards regime change and public memory. This first proposal 
did not precipitate any concrete action being taken by the government to achieve its ends, 
but it did reemerge from public discourse oblivion in 1893 when a supporter of his ideas 
submitted Lemos’ original proposal—word for word—for publication in the context of 
the commemoration of Tiradentes Day of that year. That attempt to revive the call to 
remove Pedro’s statue fell on deaf ears as well and generated no public response or 
discussion. It would not be until one year later and after Rio had been scarred by the 
naval revolt that transpired in its harbor against the republican administration of President 
Floriano Peixoto that a new proposal would gain enough support to warrant being 
formally proposed in the nation’s legislative body.  
That flirtation with civil war and the fallout over Portugal’s perceived role in 
aiding the escape of the rebels reignited anti-Portuguese sentiments along with Brazilian 
fears of instability and threats to the sovereignty of the nation. In turn, these changes had 
an impact on how Pedro I and his statue were viewed yet again. The first emperor’s 
portugalidade came to the forefront again, and this time found its way into new 
justifications for his statue’s removal from Praça Tiradentes. Lúcio de Mendonça 
spearheaded the new proposal and succeeded in having the issue taken up by a 
congressional committee. Ultimately, the petition died quietly in the legislature, but 
together with the earlier Lemos effort, it did manage to cement the question of the 
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statue’s future as a running point of contention in the capital city’s public sphere. The 
idea of removing the nation’s first monument remained in the literary public’s 
imagination to the point that various occasions spurred commentators to invoke it in their 
discussions of other matters. Whether it was the subject of an aqueduct being literally 
whitewashed, the erection of a Republic-themed monument (not in Praça Tiradentes), or 
the removal of a public fountain, journalists repeatedly brought the statue’s proposed 
destruction into the discussion. In the end, the statue persevered and survived. Whether 
this was the result of the sort of political inertia identified by Mendonça as the culprit 
behind the statue’s continued incoherent presence or the result of what Mendonça’s 
critics considered radical republican overreach, the result remained the same. The 
imperial statue would continue to stand tall in the public square of the Republic of Brazil. 
Nevertheless the discussions on the role of the statue in the new Brazilian Republic 
reflected the growing political culture of the state. 
 
1890 and 1893: The Repeated Calls to “Destroy” the Statue 
 
The only example of a debate in the public sphere immediately following the 
proclamation of the Republic occurred in May of 1890. The writers of two newspapers, O 
Cruzeiro and O Brazil, responded directly to a proposal made by Miguel Lemos, known 
as “O Apostolado Positivista,” to remove the statue of Pedro I from its pedestal. 
Originally published on May 19 in the periodical Democracia, the proposal itself is 
unfortunately not available through the archive. Yet thanks to Carlos de Laet of O Brazil 
directly quoting Lemos in his paper’s response, the record still remains.  This 
commentator introduced the topic by complimenting Lemos and asserting his own habit 
of “reading all that o Apostolado Positivista publishes,” but he also stated clearly that his 
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paper must “explain to the readers the reasons for our divergence from such a venerable 
newsman.” As for Lemos’s proposal, it made the following points, all of which will 
sound strikingly familiar. The first centered on the premise that “the equestrian statue of 
D. Pedro I, erected in the Largo do Rocio, today Praça de Tiradentes, does not represent 
historical truth, excessively exaggerating the secondary role that truly fits, despite his 
official primacy, the first emperor in the work of our national independence.” In light of 
this diminishing of Pedro’s actual role, Lemos’s second point sought to establish that the 
“preeminent role” in “our evolution belongs to José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva.” 
According to this view, it was the Portuguese royal regent’s connection to the venerated 
patriarch and his subsequent adherence to the cause of independence that loaned to Pedro 
prestige and elevated his standing in Brazil, both of which the author insinuated were 
leached rather than earned by the first emperor. He asserted lastly the need for addressing 
the monument in order to correct the historical public record. For him, the need existed to 
“reestablish in our respective monuments the historical truth and justice falsified through 
cortezanismo, without exaggerating or diminishing the real services of each one of the 
aforementioned figures of the prince and of his immortal minster.”  
Given these perspectives on Pedro I and the expression of national memory, 
Lemos made two specific proposals and then followed those up with clarifications. First, 
he desired “that keeping the respective pedestal, the equestrian statue of D. Pedro I be 
removed and substituted with a monument symbolizing the Brazilian Republic.” He 
called secondly for the addition of a “sculpted medallion with the bust of D. Pedro I” to 
one of the sides of the pedestal of the statue of José Bonifácio, already raised in the largo 
de S. Francisco. Thus ended the proposal. It did not, in fact, call for the “destruction” of 
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the statue as would be characterized by two writers responding to it, but rather that it be 
removed, or retirada, and replaced with a republican statue. Perhaps the statue’s 
destruction was implied by the fact that Lemos consciously left off any mention of what 
to do with the removed statue. Other proposals would specify the intent to relocate the 
statue to another location, but not this one. Nevertheless, it is significant that Lemos was 
not calling for the complete obliteration of Pedro I from public memory. Instead, he was 
pursuing what he considered an homenagem that was proportional to his perception of 
Pedro’s role and standing: clearly subordinate to José Bonifácio.   
In addition, the Apostolado Positivista clarified that he was not proposing that the 
government substitute a statue for Tiradentes for that of Pedro I. He stated that “the 
monument destined to glorify the proto-martyr of our independence must be erected on 
the spot where, on another occasion, his gallows were raised.” This addendum reflected 
the emerging idea that Tiradentes was not actually executed in the praça named after him. 
Lemos himself had been asserting an alternate location, as discussed in Chapter Two.295 
In his proposal, he encouraged the government to acquire the land and set the new 
monument’s construction in motion. By questioning the veracity of the claim to Praça 
Tiradentes being sacred historical space for its namesake, Lemos certainly complicated 
any early republican plan to advocate for the obvious move of replacing Pedro’s statue 
with one of Tiradentes. Nevertheless, his overall objective of replacing an imperial statue 
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with a republican one still fit squarely within the goals of recasting history and reshaping 
the city’s cultural landscape.296 
In this first article engaging in the topic of Lemos’s proposal, the editor of O 
Brazil disagreed with his esteemed colleague on several different aspects related to 
memory and the public expression of it. He first addressed the idea that José Bonifácio, 
rather than Pedro I, was the true “protagonist of national independence.” The response 
was a sympathetic “Very well! It is a sustainable opinion.” He thereby did not take issue 
with that part of Lemos’s argument, but he did disagree with how that historical view 
should be reflected in dealing with Pedro’s statue. He found that “justice and logic 
demand that in the place of the cavalheiro of bronze be placed the old patriarch, and not 
another monument symbolizing the republic, since clearly, it was not the republic that 
shook off the yoke of the metropole in 1822.” His argument to keep the monument 
dedicated to independence yet void of any reference to the Grito or Pedro I reflected the 
growing tendency to diminish or even expunge Pedro’s role in that accomplishment. It 
also served to represent yet again that Brazilian reclamation of sovereignty discussed in 
the previous chapter. Yet it was not a wholesale adoption of the new regime’s efforts to 
recast the public sphere in republican terms. He made this clear by addressing the 
existence already of a statue to honor the “patriarch,” José Bonifácio, saying that “it 
would be worth more to glorify the same hero two times than to substitute one for the 
cold symbolism of a form of government.” To put an homage to the republican figures of 
the day atop what he called the “monarchical pedestal” was to attempt to show 
“prehistoric democracy,” an ahistorical overlay onto a monument meant to show the 
nation’s gratitude for the “timeless era” and “notable services” provided in 1822. De 
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Laet’s fundamental message to his readers was that the nation’s posterity would not be 
best served by “the metal of the republic being placed atop the pedestal of the monarchy.” 
Such an action, predicated on men such as Lemos “not wanting to accept” the statue, he 
found to be more out of animosity and anger, warning that the “decapitated monument” 
replaced by one denoting the 15th of November would not alter the people’s 
understanding of the development of the “Brazilian patria” nor their appreciation of a 
“commemoration [September 7] already imprinted on popular imagination.” 
Furthermore, the “young and lovely” republic would not be well suited for the pedestal of 
“the old monument.” The O Brazil writer concluded his argument with an analogy. He 
referred to a fountain located on the street of Matacavallos which had an inscription that 
said “the king for the good of his people commanded that the police do this work….” He 
then ended his article saying “if history, if truth, if the Apostalado requires that 
everything be changed” then the inscription must be changed to read that “it was Sr. 
Glycerio [a minister in the new Republic] who commanded its doing through Sr. Sampaio 
Ferraz [then chief of police for Rio]”. This simple extension of the logic in Lemos’s 
proposal powerfully captures the fundamental element of the attempt to rewrite the 
history of the nation and the city. Observers such as Carlos de Laet were simply 
unwilling and unable to deny such an imperial history for the purposes of the republican 
present. 297 
 By the next day, the reaction in an article in O Brazil to the proposal had grown 
decidedly confrontational and fixated on the positivist influence perceived in Lemos’s 
ideas. The writer, not signed as de Laet this time, specifically criticized the emergence of 
“the positivist fury” lurking behind the proposal as well as that group’s identity as 




“destroyers” (as well as “the enemies of true progress” and “traitors”).  He characterized 
the proposal for the “demolition and mutilation of the monumentos patrios” as being in 
line with positivism’s desire “to spoil the pride of Brazil, forcing it to deny its traditions 
to bow down reverently to the Phrygian cap [or liberty cap] of the neighboring 
republiquetas.” Such a diminution of those so-called republicans was a direct attack 
against their standing in the government, and his sensationalized use of the terms 
“demolition and mutilation” to describe the statue’s proposed fate intentionally sought to 
raise the stakes and implications of any carrying out of such a proposal. Rather than 
following the path of radicalism and intransigence he saw in the positivist ideology, his 
message centered on the need for republicans to carry themselves “with dignity” and a 
certain level of moderation. He found it to be hypocritical to deny history by “tearing 
down the statue of the first hero of our political emancipation” out of some misguided 
“mixture of salaam and servilism...and a supposed scientific truth.” Instead, it would be 
an act of “ingratitude, of ignorance, lacking in common sense…mental backwardness, 
and doctrinaire intolerance.” Like the writer for O Cruzeiro would also do, this writer 
asserted a Brazilian debt of gratitude towards Pedro I for the nation’s liberty.  While he 
conceded that it “might have been personal ambition, desire for glory, [or] the result of 
inevitable events” that underscored his participation, it was nevertheless “he [Pedro I] 
who authored national independence. The monument of the Rocio is a testimony of the 
gratitude of the Brazilian people.” Similar also to what was written in O Cruzeiro on the 
same day, this O Brazil writer accounted for the republican criticisms and attempted 
dismissals of the historical standing of Pedro I by emphasizing as well the bottom line of 
the historical reality: his role in independence via Ipiranga. Therefore, he defended the 
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statue as capturing an important Brazilian moment, but he also added national 
significance to the statue beyond that aspect by making it as much about the Brazilian 
people themselves as it was about Pedro’s historical legacy. While Ipiranga was the act of 
the prince and future emperor, the raising of the statue was a deliberate act of the 
Brazilian people. The writer was effectively introducing the existence of national 
gratitude in 1862 as an incontrovertible historical fact. The existence of that sense of 
gratitude is well documented in Chapter Two. Whether or not that gratitude was directed 
at the correct historical figure was debatable. By specifically distinguishing the statue as a 
“testimony” to that gratitude and not necessarily to Pedro I, this writer created an even 
more multi-layered analysis of memory. In the end, for him, destroying the statue would 
be akin to attacking the actions of the people in that regard. Therefore, he roundly 
rejected the notion that the statue was solely the product of that cortezanismo referred to 
in the proposal. He also later made the point that following the logic behind the radical 
push to destroy a monument of the former regime, any successor to the current regime 
could follow suit and erase those raised for the Republic, which was an argument notably 
premised on the idea that the Republic might not last. This potential act of making 
monuments meant to be permanent into transitory symbols raised and torn down brought 
him to the French historical example of the columna Vendôme. He used an allusion to the 
history of that monument as a cautionary tale against duplicating the French experience. 
After all, it was the perfect example of impermanent memory. When the short-lived Paris 
Commune in 1871 pulled down the Romanesque column topped by a statue of Emperor 
Napoleon I (see Figure 12), its radicals were destroying the symbolic representation of 
both the First and Second Empires since it had been Napoleon III who in 1863  
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inaugurated the new statue that sat atop the 
original column of 1810. They were also 
attacking a monument described as having 
“marked the very center of Paris since 
1810.”298 While Praça Tiradentes would 
certainly never be described in that manner in 
terms of its importance to Rio, the column 
Vendôme comparison did have relevance and 
value to the discussions taking place in 
republican Brazil. The O Brazil writer’s plea, 
as a result of that lesson, was to “leave the 
monuments in peace” and respect the 
sovereignty of the preceding groups that put 
them there. The author reiterated this ultimate message to those positivists whom he 
blamed for the statue “destruction” proposal: “tearing down today that which they 
venerated yesterday” would mark the positivists as “intolerant and ungrateful.”299 
 This same writer also, and not surprisingly, disagreed with Lemos on the latter’s 
dismissal of Pedro I’s legacy by addressing the typical attack—albeit not present in this 
                                                 
298 Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson, Paris as Revolution: Writing the Nineteenth-Century City 
(Berkeley:  Univ. of California Press, 1994), accessed on August 15, 2015, 
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299 O Brazil, May 21, 1890, “O Brazil,” “Monumentos patrios.” 
Figure 12: Destruction of the Column Vendôme in 
1871. Source: Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson, Paris as 
Revolution: Writing the Nineteenth-Century City 
(Berkeley:  Univ. of California Press, 1994), accessed 




specific proposal—on the prince and emperor’s foreignness. In this article, Pedro may 
have been “an illustrious foreigner,” but he was also a “figure who collaborated in the 
independence of this country which he adopted as his own.” Reflecting the common 
practice of contextualizing these Brazilian debates with comparisons to their Western 
equivalents, the writer then used another and very interesting allusion to France. He did 
so by looking at the memorial legacy of Lafayette in the United States. The writer likened 
Pedro’s role in Brazilian independence to that of Lafayette in the American Revolution 
and affirmed that in the U. S., no one would act against a statue to Lafayette because of 
his foreignness.300 He went so far as to also assert that in the U. S. “fanatics have neither 
voice nor vote in the national questions” of that country and instead are the inhabitants of 
“comfortable psychiatric hospitals.” Such a statement made clear this strain of Brazilian 
disdain for the radical tenor of the time and those perceived ideologue’s roles in the 
creation and organization of the state. Included in this article was also the atypical 
reference to the conservation of monuments in England rather than France. The author 
pointed to the existence of the “figure of the usurper Cromwell amongst the lines of 
statues of the kings of England” at Westminster. In addition, he held up the English 
practice of maintaining in the Tower of London “the most ignominious instruments of 
torture, of perversity, and of enslavement” as a reminder of that nation’s path towards 
“tolerance, charity, and liberty.” While this author did not use this example to argue that 
Pedro’s statue was itself a memento of Brazil’s sordid past, he did advance it as yet 
another European counter-example to the proposed destruction of the statue in Rio. On 
top of that, he drew yet one more historical parallel, this time to the Catholic Church. In 
                                                 
300 It must be noted, however, that the United States as any sort of cohesive political entity had never been 
held under French colonial rule or sovereignty as Brazil had been by Portugal. 
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making a general point about the practice of museums keeping objects “in complete 
antagonism with the ideas of the collectors,” he held up the Vatican practice in particular 
of safeguarding “pagan and idolatrous art” in its collections. On a comparative note and 
under these circumstances in 1890, this writer for O Brazil also made the same argument 
that others advanced three years later amidst the bandstand controversy (and that was 
discussed in Chapter 3): that the statue of Pedro I was the “only monument that we 
possess worthy of this name.”301   
The author ended his article as he began it: taking a shot against the positivist 
ideology he opposed. To conclude, he drew a portrait of acts previously made by 
Brazilians—and denounced by the current positivists—in deference to the Crown. Noting 
their contempt for such displays of deference and subjection, he then contrasted that 
avowed rejection of royalty with the same group’s “taking a knee before the dentista 
mineiro [italics of original writer], as the martyr of the past and the glorification of the 
future.” This attack on the new cult emerging around the memory of Tiradentes is the 
only example that I encountered in all of my research of such an insult. Certainly many 
criticized the Club Tiradentes for its actions and perceived intransigence, but in all of the 
rhetoric elicited by the incident in 1893, the growing public importance of the martyr was 
strictly respected and supported. The notion of replacing one type of subservience for 
another struck at the very core of the prevailing radical ideology, and the author used this 
moment to take his shot across their bow.302 
 On the front page and the first topic of the newspaper O Cruzeiro on the same day 
in 1890 as the article discussed above, another writer similarly and singularly blamed 
                                                 




positivism for the proposal to “destroy” the statue. The first line of the article read 
“positivism is on the scene,” and the author began his argument against that positivist 
interpretation of national memory inherent in the proposal by stating unequivocally that 
“d. Pedro, whether they like it or not, is considered a hero of our two worlds, and only the 
ingratitude of contemporaries will forget that to him we owe the foundation of the 
Patria.” He delved further into the question of denying the legacy of the empire and 
asserted that “it would be easy to melt all the bronze of the praça do Rocio, but we 
consider it difficult, if not impossible, to rip out the pages of history and erase from the 
memories of Brazilians the deeds of this great man who made amends for some faults 
through unsurpassed patriotism proven on the solemn occasion [of Ipiranga].” It is 
striking that this defense of the statue’s continuation in the square is made on the grounds 
of both historical standing and personal redemption. While the writers in 1862 and the 
defenders of the statue in 1893 (and discussed in Chapter Three) either ignored or 
conceded Pedro’s perceived faults, this author in 1890 attached a retroactively 
redemptive quality to Pedro’s role in the Grito, adding a new power and characteristic to 
the iconic moment in history. He also incorporated some of the qualifications on Pedro’s 
historical identity mentioned in the previous chapter with his concession of the emperor 
having “faults” that could arguably taint his legacy, but his assertion in totality allowed 
him to stake out some middle ground between the dueling historical interpretations that 
either celebrated Pedro I or repudiated him.   
Regarding Ipiranga, the O Cruzeiro author posited that “Ipiranga is there, in the 
brilliant state of S. Paulo, to record that grandiose scene in which the founder of the 
dynasty, banished today, was the protagonist. Will the majestic monument that was raised 
246 
 
on the banks of the Ipiranga also be razed? We cannot believe it. We do not want to 
believe it.” From these earliest of moments of the Republic, there existed an acute 
awareness of the long-term implications of taking down this first statue. Just as de Laet 
scornfully imagined a city with a completely rewritten public record, his colleague at O 
Cruzeiro called into question whether or not those who proposed the Rio statue’s removal 
would feel similarly compelled to remove the one located at Ipiranga itself. Because 
Lemos specifically refuted Pedro I’s role in independence as part of his justification, this 
writer’s question appears valid as the extension of that logic would indeed lead such 
critics to all public representations advancing the view of Pedro as the hero of Ipiranga 
and independence. In addition to posing this uniquely Brazilian question of statues, this 
author also turned to the familiar rhetorical tactic of using France as an historical guide. 
The article noted that “the government that succeeded” what he called the “monarchy of 
the Napoleons,” rather than erasing those monuments like the column of Vendôme, 
instead “conserved” them “as a historic relic.” He then went further by contextualizing 
the Brazilian proposal towards the statue, asking if “the Brazilian Republic will be more 
intransigent than the republic of Thiers, J. Ferry, and Gambetta?”303 He then pointed to 
Brazil’s own historical past, reminding his readers that the “Brazil-Imperio” did not erase 
the vestiges of the colonial past after that change in regime. Ultimately, the author’s 
rhetoric sought to warn the Brazilian Republic that such intransigence as evidenced in the 
                                                 
303 This reference is to Adolphe Thiers, the founder and first president in the 1870s of the French Third 
Republic (and the leader who violently put down the Commune), Jules Ferry, the anticlerical and 
imperialistic prime minister in the 1880s of the Third Republic, and Léon Gambetta, who was similarly a 
founder of the Third Republic and prime minister in the early 1880s. 
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removal of a national monument would only belittle them historically and in the eyes of 
other nations. 304 
In the end, this 1890 proposal by Miguel Lemos gained no traction either in the 
press or the new government. Other than the two responses discussed above, there exists 
no evidence of a larger debate taking place. Three years later and shortly after the 
commemoration of Tiradentes Day in April that witnessed the bandstand incident, 
Lemos’s proposal attempted—and failed—once again to turn public sentiment against the 
imperial statue in Praça Tiradentes. The Apostolado Positivista had taken the opportunity 
of the anniversary of the death of the martyr to publish his new theory on the exact 
location where Tiradentes was executed. In response, the Gazeta de Notícias ran a multi-
part analysis of Lemos’s argument beginning on Tiradentes Day itself, April 21, and 
running throughout the following week. It was within this moment of increased visibility 
for the positivist’s historical viewpoints that someone referred to as “a sincere adherent of 
the 15th of November” sent in Lemos’s 1890 proposal, word for word, to be published in 
the aforementioned Gazeta de Notícias in the “Publicações a Pedido” section. This time 
around there was no engagement on the part of the editorial board and no response to the 
re-publication of the proposal in that newspaper or others. Yet it did show that the topic 
continued to be considered and offered to the public.305 
In the interim between the first and second publication of Lemos’s proposal, the 
topic of removing the statue nevertheless appeared on the radar of some intellectuals for a 
different reason. The writer named “Somel” provided a sophisticated commentary on the 
                                                 
304 O Cruzeiro, May 31, 1890, “A Estatua Equestre.” 
305 Gazeta de Notícias, April 26, 1893, “Publicações a Pedido,” “As festas a Tiradentes,” “A Estatua de D. 
Pedro I.” For the begining of the analysis of Lemos’s execution site argument, see Gazeta de Notícias, 
April 21, 1893, “Tiradentes,” “O Local da Execução de Tiradentes.” 
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topic that was strikingly similar to those in O Cruzeiro and O Brazil two years prior. He 
advanced the exact same historical argument centering on the French (Commune’s) 
decision to destroy their column of Vendôme in a discussion generated not by another 
proposal to tear down Pedro I’s statue but to erect one for Deodoro in another completely 
separate location. The Diário de Notícias published that news item in 1892, and the 
occasion inspired Somel to reflect on memory, history, monuments, and specifically the 
statue of Pedro I in Praça Tiradentes. He pledged his full support for the proposal made to 
erect a bronze statue to the memory of General Deodoro da Fonseca and the proclamation 
of the Republic in the Praça da República (formerly the Campo do Santa Anna). Somel 
asserted the importance of gratitude as guiding a people’s raising of monuments “to the 
memory of their heroes,” and he addressed the complicating factor of regime change on 
that memorial necessity.  He noted that “the right of tearing down its impressive column 
of Vendôme did not fall to republican France,” thus criticizing the act, and immediately 
related the Brazilian republic’s similar situation. He stated that “to us, the revolutionaries 
of November 15, the right of destroying the statue of the first emperor” similarly “does 
not fall.” Rather than such an act of destruction, Somel “applauded with enthusiasm” that 
idea of the Republic raising its own monuments rather than destroying those of the past. 
He also warned that taking away the statue of Pedro I would not take September 7th and 
the nation’s history from the “povo brazileiro.”306 This reality of a people’s collective 
memory and internalization of what had been one of the defining moments thus far in 
Brazilian history was powerful, and it was based on the understanding that a people’s 
patriotic identity and sense of national memory were built upon more than just the 
existence of one statue. Yet the ongoing effort to construct a public sphere that 
                                                 
306 Diário de Notícias, August 27, 1892, “Sala D’Armas.” 
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legitimized the Republic at the expense of the imperial past was precisely why the effort 
to remove Pedro I’s statue from the public square would continue. 
 
 
1894: The Proposal to Remove and Replace the Statue 
 
 While the Lemos proposal offered first in 1890 and then reprinted in 1893 failed 
to generate a strong public reaction or outcry, the political climate in Rio in 1894 had 
changed so dramatically that a new proposal did in fact gain some traction, to the point 
that it was presented before and considered by the National Assembly. The event that 
made the proponents of removing Pedro I’s statue bolder and the public more receptive 
was the naval revolt in Rio’s own harbor that began on September 6, 1893, and lasted 
until March 11 of the next year. The fact that for six months the nation’s navy was in 
open rebellion against the administration of President Floriano Peixoto fundamentally 
altered the trajectory of the early Republic. Historians cite the president’s victory as the 
circumstance which allowed him to become the triumphant “consolidator of the 
Republic.”307 The conflict turned an administration increasingly opposed and perceived 
as operating outside of its constitutional parameters into a victim of outright—and more 
importantly monarchically sympathetic—rebellion. In the discussions presented in 
previous chapters, the threats of restoration and the fall of the Republic had remained 
entirely imagined, a lurking monarchical bogeyman that never took shape. And while the 
naval revolt began with the avowed intent to restore the constitution of the Republic 
rather than the monarchy, its locus in the navy, which was historically aristocratic and 
favored by the emperor, plus the eventual participation and leadership of Admiral Luís 
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Filipe de Saldanha da Gama who openly advocated for a plebiscite to return the nation to 
monarchical rule came together to paint the rebellion with an imperial brush. The 
resultant restorationist identity was one that the republican government relentlessly 
exploited and that cast a new, menacing light on the security of the nation.  
Historical Context: The Naval Revolt 
 The naval revolt in Rio came, in many ways, out of an earlier factional split that 
arose in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The contest for power there between the 
positivist Júlio de Castilhos, backed by the government in Rio, and the liberal Gaspar da 
Silveira Martins, who had previously been an imperial senator and provincial governor, 
became an example of a local power struggle that had far-reaching national implications. 
Silveira Martins’ attempt to have the state’s constitution thrown out because of its 
positivist elements and replaced by one based on a parliamentary system and viewed as a 
step towards restoration directly challenged the constitution’s author, Castilhos, and his 
backer, President Floriano Peixoto. In what José Maria Bello describes as the emergence 
of caudillism in post-imperial Brazil, the political chaos in Rio Grande do Sul evidenced 
in successive coups to either depose or reinstall Castilhos to power also served to add to 
tensions between the navy and army. The two branches of the military had already begun 
to stake out their roles in the new political reality. The army not surprisingly served as 
Floriano Peixoto’s power base, and from its young officer corps, the same group that 
instigated the Republic’s proclamation, he seeded the local and state governments 
throughout Brazil and oversaw the quashing of localized rebellions after the empire’s 
deposition. Contrastingly, naval officers had been active in forcing President Deodoro da 
Fonseca to resign (as discussed in Chapter Three) and were perceived by many—
including Floriano himself—to still have the potential to force the president into policy 
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change. Ultimately the conflict in Rio Grande do Sul over the rule of Castilhos became a 
proxy war for similar conflicts between the nation’s president and his opposition. Those 
opponents began to seek his impeachment over what they considered his move towards 
dictatorship as the “Iron Marshal” evidenced by his dismissals of functionaries, threats to 
jail Supreme Court justices, holding of Pernambuco in a state of siege, and intervention in 
Rio Grande do Sul to consolidate his power and central authority. Floriano Peixoto might 
have faced a fate very similar to that of his presidential predecessor if not for two things: 
the perception of the naval revolts in Rio Grande do Sul and later Rio as monarchic and 
restorationist and the absolute disunity and lack of coordination between the various 
insurgent groups. Despite the fact that the rebellion began strictly as an act against 
Castilhos and not for the monarchy or against President Peixoto, its savvy recasting as 
both of those things similarly recast the president as the defender of the Nation State of 
Brazil rather than its aggressor and violator. It spelled the revolts’ eventual defeat, and it 
accomplished for the first time a true fusing of the state and the nation in the new 
Republic. 
 When Admiral Custódio José de Melo, the navy’s highest ranking official, 
resigned his post over Floriano’s “personal policies” in provoking and maintaining the 
civil war in Rio Grande do Sul, he soon spearheaded the revolt that began in Rio’s harbor 
on September 6, 1893. His original plan to “restore the Constitution” hinged on the faulty 
assumption that Floriano Peixoto would buckle under as Deodoro da Fonseca had in 
terms of giving up political power and included the ambitious goals of taking over Santos 
in São Paulo and joining up with the insurgents in Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. 
None of these plans worked out, and Custódio de Melo remained awkwardly in Rio with 
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his rag-tag vessels. Admiral Saldanha da Gama’s joining the revolt later in December 
only served to confirm earlier suspicions of the revolt being an attempt at restoration. 
While the revolt failed in all of its original objectives, it did unintendedly succeed in 
alleviating the nation’s—and the capital’s—negative views of Floriano’s regime by 
making the insurgents the enemy to the point that the Congress granted the president state 
of siege powers wherever in Brazil he thought it necessary. The interference by the 
vessels of foreign countries in Rio’s harbor during the revolt in order to maintain Rio as 
an “open city” for trade only served to deepen the resentment and hostility that many 
Cariocas felt towards the revolt for creating such an embarrassment and violation of 
Brazilian sovereignty. With a failed attempt by the insurgents to take Niteroi in February 
and the imminent arrival of a fleet loyal to Floriano in March, the rebels accepted the 
negotiating help of Portuguese naval officers. When those efforts failed, they then 
accepted refuge and exile aboard Portuguese vessels. Bello cites “Jacobinic passions and 
cries for vengeance” as the driving force behind the Brazilian government’s refusal to 
agree to those terms of surrender, and the unapproved spiriting of the rebels away on the 
part of the Portuguese led Floriano to break off diplomatic relations with the European 
nation and inspired an even higher level of xenophobia at home.308  
 With Floriano triumphant in Rio and able to begin mopping up the remaining 
resistance in the southern states, the result of the naval revolt greatly altered Brazil’s 
political landscape. The president had succeeded in establishing the contours of 
presidential and central authority and creating a government which could transcend the 
                                                 
308 Ibid., 97-138. The diplomatic stand-off between Brazil and Portugal only worsened when those 
overloaded and inadequate vessels carrying the 500 Brazilians could only stagger into port in the Argentine 
la Plata region. The perception was that the Portuguese were consciously aiding and abetting the insurgents 
by allowing them to disembark and rejoin the rebellion in the south, which some did in fact do. 
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militaristic characteristics of the first few years, and he would hand over that control 
peacefully and constitutionally to his civilian successor, Prudente de Morais, in 1894. 
More important to this study, however, was the revolt’s impact on the political psyche of 
the political and intellectual elite in Rio. Bello articulates the nature of the political 
climate and the revival of Jacobinism after the revolt’s defeat, saying that “the memory of 
the danger the Republic had been in and concern over those who might still threaten it 
exacerbated the passions of the most ardent republicans, especially the young men in the 
military and civil academies.”309 It is not surprising that the revolt reignited the passions 
and fears already chronicled in previous chapters. It is also not surprising that within two 
months after the rebels’ defeat in the Rio harbor a small group of prominent lawyers, 
journalists, and government officials sought to have the statue of Pedro I removed from 
the Republic’s public square. 
The Petition 
 On May 16, 1894, Lúcio de Mendonça read a petition to the nation’s Congress on 
behalf of himself and four others: Manoel Timotheo da Costa, Raul Pompeia, Rodrigo 
Octavio, and João Ribeiro.310 Part of the new juridical and intellectual elite in Rio, they 
ranged from the older republican stalwart of Mendonça, who had great credibility as part 
of the initial cadre of organized republicans dating back to the 1870s and who had 
immediately been asked to serve in the Ministry of Justice after the proclamation of the 
Republic, to Pompeia, whose biography on the website of the Academia Brasileira de 
Letras describes him as a “florianista exaltado” whose positions of prominence came and 
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went with the administration of his presidential patron.311 Thus, they varied ideologically 
but nevertheless all signed their name to a petition to remove and replace Pedro’s statue 
with one of Tiradentes. Their specific call to erect that statue of Tiradentes in the square 
diverged from the earlier proposal made by Lemos, who was driven by his own 
preoccupation with the question of the execution’s location. However, they did continue 
forward his indictment of Pedro I with the familiar designation of him as the “founder of 
the monarchy and supposed [italics mine] author of the independence of Brazil.” The 
petition then went further than Lemos, arguing that  
the foreigner glorified by that statue is not the author of our political 
independence: he sold it to Brazil for the right and steep price—two million 
pounds sterling and more so the onus of the terms as emperors from the 
descendants of the House of Bragança, when it is indubitable that the belief in 
civic duty of our grandparents would have in little time achieved our 
emancipation from the metropole and founded in this soil in America the 
appropriate government that was implanted only sixty-seven years after the 
Revolution. Given this, what does the statue signify? An homage of gratitude to 
the founder of the monarchy.312 
 
This repudiation and attempted nullification of Pedro I’s role in independence echoed 
Ferraz Sampaio’s line of attack a year earlier in the aftermath of the bandstand incident. 
Mendonça also reiterated the incongruence of the statue to the current generation, stating 
that “the generation of the 15th of November of 1889 can neither affirm nor comprehend 
this monument” still existing in “a public plaza of a capital of a republican nation.” 
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Owing to this reality, they asked that the Congress “end this strange incoherence…kept 
only through the inertia of political sentiment.”313  
 This is the first appearance of the concept of “inertia” as being the culprit behind 
the statue’s persistence in the public square. While Sampaio a year earlier accused 
defenders of the statue as essentially Pedro/monarchy-lovers, this assertion of inertia 
harkened back more to the parallel idea of popular apathy or the bestializado populace. 
The statue’s continuation was not a choice being made. Rather, it was a choice not being 
made to turn the page out of what the petition called some misguided attempt to maintain 
Brazil’s “tradition of friendship with the Portuguese nation” evidenced in the keeping of 
the statue. According to the authors, that tradition continued only through the sacrifice of 
the current generation’s “sacred convictions.” The post-revolt context and this new take 
on generational memory shed light onto such a new interpretation of how Pedro’s statue 
came to be woven into the nation’s traditions and history. Pedro I’s portugalidade was 
front and center, making his foreign-ness that much more overwhelming to his identity 
and standing. A quick scan of just this one page of one newspaper on this one day (Page 
1 of O Paiz on May 17, 1894) makes the climate perfectly clear. “Conflicto Luso-
Brazileiro.” “Revolta Restauradora.” “A Desaffronta (The Affront Avenged).” These are 
the section headings for the day, and they reinforced the notions of conflict and threat on 
a regular basis. They also showed how Pedro’s perceived portugalidade served him even 
worse in that climate, since it added the current Brazilian hostilities towards Portugal to 
his separation from his adopted country. Rio’s relationship to the statue would serve as a 
microcosm for the larger, more looming question of Brazil’s relationship to Portugal. 
This new conflict and confrontation certainly did Pedro I’s legacy no favors.  
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 In addition to repudiating the statue based on their assertions of Pedro’s false 
historical standing regarding independence and the ongoing hostility towards Portugal, 
Mendonça and his colleagues also called into question the validity of the statue’s very 
erection. The argument in the paragraph above involved their making Pedro’s statue 
seemingly a Portuguese rather than a Brazilian one. The next argument similarly labeled 
the decision to erect the statue in 1862 as also foreign. The writers of the proposal 
asserted that “if the Republic is in reality our Patria, it is absurd to conserve in a public 
square of its capital the statue of the founder of the monarchy, whose inauguration was 
made with false delegates of the Nation, the courtesans of the empire, and the protests of 
the liberals of the time.” Just as in the instances of its assertion before, such an attribution 
of the statue’s creation attempted to delegitimize it by separating those who funded and 
celebrated it from what can only be described as the real povo Brasileiro.  What made 
Brazilians real in 1894 for writers such as Mendonça was the same thing that made 
Republicans real in 1893: “the purity of our republican sentiments and the absolute 
justice that it inspires.” The petitioners concluded by asking that the Congress decide to 
make into law “the cessation of the anomaly against that which we represent.”314 As seen 
multiple times before, the statue served as a proxy for the empire, and those in the 
Republic threatened by either or both felt compelled to attack them, invalidate them, and 
remove them from public view. The logic begged the question, though, of how the statue 
could truly be a threat if it was met and sustained only with inertia. That question’s 
answer, I would assert, had more to do with the image-making of the Republic than it did 
with the public message of the statue. Yes, the proposal refuted the historical foundations 
of the statue’s symbolism. But ultimately the most fervent lines revolved around the idea 




that there were things that a republic simply could not have because they cut at the very 
foundations of legitimacy. On that list appeared to be an imperial statue standing in a 
republican square. 
The vast majority of the ideas that undergirded this 1894 proposal centered on 
these questions of legitimacy and identity. Yet one small part of the proposal also 
connected to the different question of appropriate public space for the statue. While 
Lemos in 1890 had called only for the statue’s removal from the square, Mendonça’s 
proposal specified that the statue should be “removed from Praça Tiradentes and taken to 
the national museum.” He justified this aspect of the petition by arguing that “as a work 
of art it is not there” [the public square] that the statue should be located. Rather, works 
of art belonged in a museum of fine arts, and that was precisely where he proposed the 
statue be relocated. Embedded in this argument were two things that were deeply related. 
The first was the acceptance of the statue as in fact a work of art. That argument met with 
a certain level of pushback in the discourse the year before, and it would so again in 
1894. The second was that in reducing the statue down to a mere work of art, the 
proposal sought to effectively strip Pedro I of any historical or political agency. And it 
was saying that only those figures that deserved and retained such agency had the right to 
be enshrined in the public square.315 On a final note, the petition is surprisingly void of 
any direct connections to the anti-monarchism fueled by the revolt. The rabid Jacobinism 
and anti-monarchism alluded to by José Maria Bello in the wake of that conflict would be 
expected to infuse this proposal. Yet it did not. The revolt’s influence was more subtle in 
the prevalence of anti-Portuguese sentiments instead. There was no denunciation of the 
statue as a rallying point for monarchical threats to the Republic of the day. In fact, there 




was no mention in the petition of the revolt at all. The revolt certainly did factor into the 
new proposal being made, but it did not seem to add any new level of vitriol from the 
Lemos proposal of 1890. This 1894 petition did not even include the rancorous notes of 
the post-bandstand incident rhetoric the year before. In the end, there was a great deal of 
continuity to these calls for change. 
Responses to the Proposal 
 Not surprisingly, given the newspaper’s prior relationship to Mendonça, O Paiz 
served as the main organ of public support for the proposal. While others like the Gazeta 
de Notícias and the Correio da Tarde referenced the proposal in their covering of 
Congress, Mendonça’s old publication served as the rallying point for supporters from 
various parts of the Sudeste, or southeast region of Brazil. The response began, however, 
in Rio itself with the O Paiz editorial board’s take on the proposal published on page one. 
The preface to the publication of the text of the proposal briefly discussed the basic ideas 
put forth. The article considered the statue “a great piece of art cast in bronze, a product 
of a popular subscription, and made in an era very different from today.” That evaluation 
agreed on the fundamental premise of the statue having significance as a work of art, but 
it also found a way to somewhat agree at the same time that it somewhat disagreed with 
the proposal’s invalidation of the circumstances behind the statue’s raising. In that short 
line, the editorial’s take did in fact distance the Brazil of 1862 from that of 1894, but it 
also reminded the paper’s readers that the funding for the statue came from a popular 
subscription. Even after undercutting a certain level of the courtezanismo denounced in 
the proposal, the editorial nevertheless appeared sympathetic overall to the petitioners’ 
request. It reiterated how the “permanence of the equestrian figure” in the praça was an 
idea “repugnant to the present generation.” And while it concluded that the idea of the 
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petition was “not misplaced,” it did caution and state unequivocally that the statue should 
not and must not be destroyed. Thus, the petition’s lead-in certainly was no ringing 
endorsement, but it also did not condemn the argument’s ultimate aim.316 
 Ringing endorsements did find their way onto the pages of O Paiz, yet they were 
in the form of letters to the editor rather than editorial articles themselves. All also came 
from outside of Rio, most notably the state of Minas Gerais, which happened to be the 
home state of Tiradentes as well as the state where Mendonça spent his childhood. In 
fact, the “Constitutional Republican Party” of S. Gonçalo do Sapucahy, Mendonça’s 
hometown, was the first to write in to “sincerely applaud” their native son’s “beautiful 
idea of the substitution of the statue of Pedro I for one of Tiradentes.” The party’s letter 
cited other “illustrious republicans” who also subscribed to the petition. In addition to 
affirming the statue’s substitution as an act of good republicanism, Mendonça’s 
hometown party did take the opportunity to refute one aspect of the petition. It 
vehemently refuted the notion of Pedro I’s statue being a valid work of art. The letter 
challenged that “in fact, what does that monument represent, defective as a work of art, 
according to the opinion of those who understand, other than the usurpation of the liberty 
and rights of the Brazilian people?!” They went on to once again call the statue “that 
bronze lie that only makes us relive a past of utterly sad memory” and contrasted it with 
the proposed statue to Tiradentes that would represent not only the “just reclamation of 
republican sentiment” but also “good art.”317  
 Other than the mineiro preoccupation with a statue in Rio, two things stand out in 
this short letter of support in terms of the ongoing back and forth over Pedro’s standing 
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and the statue. First, the phrase “according to the opinion of those who understand” to 
attest to the credibility of the statue’s critics brings us back to that republican notion that 
they singularly refused to have the wool pulled over their eyes by false histories and lying 
statues. They saw through the false imperial historical narrative, and as a result they also 
had the sense of that “reclamation of republican sentiment” as being served by the public 
square’s reclamation from the imperial statue.  Where defenders of the statue in 1890 
found Pedro’s redemption in Ipiranga and the statue, these 1894 writers sought only that 
historical and public reclamation for the Republic, adding a republican-specific element 
to previous notions of Brazilian reclamation related to the statue. With the capital’s 
security only recently reclaimed from the insurgents’ presence in the harbor, such a 
preoccupation was understandable. 
 Letters of support for Mendonça’s proposal also came in from another Minas 
Gerais organization and an individual from São Paulo. O Paiz noted its reception of a 
letter from the municipal council of Campanha, Minas Gerais but explained that the paper 
would not publish that particular letter owing to limited space. Several days later, there 
was room for the publication of a letter from Sr. Dr. Antonio Luiz dos Santos Werneck, a 
lawyer, fazendeiro, and public official in the Republican government. Rather than coming 
directly to the newspaper from its author, the letter was sent in by Lucio de Mendonça 
himself to be published. This note of support he received affirmed the historical and 
political significance of the statue swap and congratulated Mendonça for a petition that 
Werneck described as all of the following words: beautiful, profound, elevated, energetic, 
and just in its understanding of that significance. A few days later, Mendonça also had 
published a letter he received from similar supporters in Ouro Preto. A group of twenty-
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six professors of law sent him a telegram stating that “as republicans, we enthusiastically 
applaud the substitution of the statue of D. Pedro I for that of the glorious proto-martyr of 
Brazilian liberty. Long live the Republic!”318 
 O Paiz continued to track the proposal’s progress in the Camara dos Deputados, 
updating its readers on June 19 that the “Project of the demolition of the statue of D. 
Pedro I in Praça Tiradentes” had been sent to the Commission of Justice in the Camara 
and was soon to be introduced again for the members’ deliberation.319 Thanks to its 
continued coverage in O Paiz, the petition to remove and replace the statue had a certain 
level of visibility and support as discussed above, but it never managed to gain any real 
momentum. No rhetorical groundswell of support rose up, even with the charged post-
revolt climate. Mendonça’s proposal was not even enough of a polemic to generate much 
of a response from those writers who had roundly criticized the statue’s covering just a 
year earlier. Instead, it met with the very political inertia condemned in its text. In the 
coverage of the Camara dos Deputados in the Correio da Tarde, that paper referenced the 
attempt in the legislative session by Rio’s congressional representative, Thomaz Delfino, 
to justify the proposal to “destroy” the statue and came to the conclusion that many did 
not consider the matter of any pressing importance. In terms of space afforded in the 
papers and vitriol, Brazil’s suspension of diplomatic relations with Portugal and the 
public’s reaction to the government’s actions dominated the discourse at this time, not the 
statue or the proposal. In fact, the Correio asserted that the Congress “gave indications of 
wanting to take up more serious matters” than the “destruction of the statue of the 
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founder of our independence.”320 In this case, such a dismissal of the petition and the 
political viewpoints underlying it went hand in hand with a defense of the traditional 
narrative of Pedro I’s contribution to Brazilian independence. Bucking the previous 
trends, this writer’s labeling of Pedro employed no qualifications or diminution. In fact, it 
was just the first example of several writings that unapologetically reaffirmed Pedro I’s 
historical standing relative to independence.  
 The most visible work that took on the republican reinterpretation of Brazilian 
history in general and the “proposal for the demolition of the statue in Praça Tiradentes” 
in particular (and part of the work’s title page) was André P. L. Werneck’s D. Pedro I e a 
Independencia. An eleven page royal-centered account of Brazil’s independence written 
in July of 1894 and published in pamphlet form the following year, Werneck presented 
his own “historical truth” that would have fit right in with the dominant rhetoric in 1862 
rather than his own time. The author made very clear his intention: to dispute the 
discrediting of Pedro’s role in independence and to reestablish the emperor’s historical 
identity as leader.321 In contrast to the republican portrayals of a pre-existing and free-
standing Brazilian movement for independence that predated and had no need for any 
royal cooptation, he defined Pedro as the “true political leader of the epoch” after the 
Prince Regent made his famous Fico. And he did so not just by asserting Pedro’s 
leadership but by also challenging the notion of a competing Brazilian counter-
leadership. He attacked the typical Brazilian figures constantly lauded by republicans as 
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the true driving forces of independence, asserting that they actually were fighting for the 
status quo of Brazil’s co-equal status within the Portuguese imperial system while Pedro I 
sought true separation and independence.  
Werneck also refuted the political opportunism charge often levied against Pedro 
I by describing his swearing of allegiance to the upcoming Portuguese constitution in 
1821 in a letter to his father. The author emphasized that this oath was born out of 
Pedro’s “conviction” rather out of the fear generated by the forcing of the oath by the 
Portuguese troops stationed in Rio and led by General Jorge de Avilez. To demonstrate 
that good faith, Werneck cited Pedro’s oath and subsequent reorganization of his ministry 
and creation of the elected provisional junta and presents them as proof of the Prince 
Regent’s active and competent leadership in the face of mounting Portuguese pressure. It 
was during that time of “such important crisis” that “beyond any doubt” Pedro showed 
himself to be “a young man full of resolution, of courage, and of will” and up to the 
challenges before Brazil and himself. Werneck went on to discuss the attacks of the 
Cortes on the legitimacy of Pedro’s regency and their efforts to bring him back to 
Portugal, bringing back the imperial narrative codified in the 1860s. He described the 
Brazilian people’s calls for Pedro to remain and his resultant decision to stay “for the 
good of all,” called the Fico.  He established Pedro’s strategic savvy at outmaneuvering 
the Portuguese troops in Rio and his steadfastness and courage in forcing their 
embarkation from the city. 
Rather than the royal opportunist, Werneck defined Pedro as the popularly 
acclaimed champion of Brazilian interests who worked hard to quell the “anarchy” in 
some provinces. This narrative, which concluded with the traditional account of the Grito 
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(down to the quotation, tearing of the hat band, and drawing of the sword), directly 
refuted the notion of a coalescing organic Brazilian independence movement often cited 
in the 1890s. Werneck made Pedro I once again the founder and the hero of Ipiranga. He 
again connected that moment to “the realization of the idea of liberty” and stated 
definitively that “Independence was made” and “a new Patria created” with those 
actions, thus reclaiming for Pedro I that historical credit and standing.322 Interestingly, 
Werneck’s singular focus on Pedro’s historical actions up to and including September 7 
also put his account in line with the celebratory rhetoric of 1862. The overwhelming 
identification of Pedro with Ipiranga served as the cornerstone of his identity and legacy. 
D. Pedro e a Independencia sought to return the focus and the glory back to Pedro I and 
that moment. 
While the proposal continued to go nowhere in Congress, the topic of it did 
resurface once again in the Rio newspapers. Only this time writers were discussing it in 
the context of the publication of André P. L. Werneck’s pamphlet. Being only a year and 
a half removed from the experience of the naval revolt, one might think that the 
advancement of an openly imperial and monarchy-centered interpretation of the past 
would kick up a firestorm of criticism and Jacobin vitriol. Yet it did not. Instead, it met 
with approval from multiple writers. The Gazeta de Notícias referred to the publication 
and called it “a succinct, impartial and clear exposition of the events that led up to the 
memorable day of the 7th of September in 1822.” The review board of that paper even 
thanked the author “for the exemplar.”323 A review in the periodical Don Quixote also 
acknowledged Werneck’s work on D. Pedro I, calling the author an “effective writer” and 
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his study “supported by historical documents.” According to this review, the work made 
patently clear the flagrant injustice that would be committed “if the idea of a hysterical 
group to demolish it” came about. In terms of the level of political sway that the 
“hysterical group” possessed in September of 1895, the reviewer concluded that 
“happily” the proponents of the statue’s demolition were “without real influence in the 
direction of public affairs.”324 
The Naval Revolt and New Perceptions of September 7 and Brazilian 
History 
While André Werneck and imperial critics such as Lucio de Mendonça were 
essentially having the same argument over the statue and legacy of Pedro I that had been 
going on for the majority of Brazil’s national existence, there is no denying that the 
recent revolt did color Brazilian perceptions of the past and the commemorations of it. As 
has been documented in previous chapters, commemorative dates such as that of 
September 7 often provided a window through which to see how Brazilians perceived 
themselves and their nation’s current state as much as it did to show how they defined the 
past. In this case of what the intellectual elite of Rio wrote about on the anniversary of the 
nation’s independence in light of the trauma that the revolt wrought onto the city, it is 
possible to gain a better understanding once again of their larger notions of history, 
identity, and memory. Their preoccupation with this big national picture meant that any 
real discussion of Pedro I and his role on that date was noticeably absent. Yet since these 
discussions spoke to the very core of Brazilian memory during the early Republic, they 
are valuable to this study partly because their lack of interest in discussing Pedro in 
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particular is informative and partly because their interest in those larger compelling topics 
inevitably shed indirect light onto their views of the Empire and Pedro I. 
 An analysis of the post-revolt discourse surrounding the observation of 
September 7 reveals an interesting tension between the two separate visions of Brazil’s 
past and overall historical experience. On the one hand, there was the long-standing 
republican criticism that the Empire was at fault for the current citizenry’s political 
incapacity. On the other was the aforementioned Brazilian self-awareness of the revolt’s 
introduction of caudillism into Brazilian politics and culture after a history marked by 
stability and the prior absence of such a destructive force. Accordingly, that previous 
singular status in Latin America offered Brazil unique claim to its place in the community 
of nations, so the revolt’s aftermath cast a shadow not just on Rio but the nation’s 
international standing as well. In this complicated context, it was easy to blame the 
Empire for current ills at the same time that it was also artful to discuss Brazil’s past 
stability without assigning any credit to that previous regime. 
Regardless of which theme a writer on September 7 felt compelled to explore, all 
could agree that the government’s defeat of the revolt would serve as a defining moment 
for the nation. They saw themselves “in a very serious and critical moment in our 
political life” which demanded that they “think not of our own interests” but of “raising 
up the image of a great nation, respected, full of strength to be placed among those most 
important in the world.” Multiple writers shared this concern with the respect Brazil had 
earned and that the revolt had damaged. In one writer’s description of the nation’s past, 
he proclaimed that Brazil had “made itself a nation deserving of the respect of all.” Thus, 
with the stakes having been the survival of the Republic and the conflict visible to all 
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visitors and of political concern to governmental emissaries, the revolt served as a symbol 
of disorder and a Brazilian inability to keep its own house in order. It was a blemish that 
stabbed at the ideals of order and peace being the markers of a modern nation. As a 
result, those in Rio felt that the world was watching intently, and that reality factored into 
how the regime acted during and after the conflict. For these writers, ultimately the 
government’s victory was indeed something to celebrate, but the loss of standing and 
embarrassment that resulted from that exhibition of vulnerability and disunity 
necessitated a governmental show of consolidation and strength that was for foreign 
consumption as much as it was for domestic. One journalist condemned the rebels and 
described their current situation as “utterly sad…that they slaughtered us in the interior 
and humiliated us in front of foreigners.” A second writer similarly found it “painful” to 
commemorate the date of September 7th on account of the nation not having fully realized 
its greatness. His article about Independence Day proposed that the nation needed to 
consolidate its institutions and federation to achieve its goals of “conquering our 
aggrandizement, placing us beside the United States, through progress and material 
development.” It is important to note that the term “aggrandizement” (engrandecimento) 
became the dominant refrain during this time. This preoccupation with achieving national 
greatness and maintaining a seat in the community of nations as an equal stemmed from 
the positivist and modernization leanings of the new regime discussed in detail in 
previous chapters. Another author referred to the day as “Sad September 7!” and used the 
moment to contrast what the day’s festivities should be with the reality of the tensions 
left over from the revolt. They should have been “hearing festive salvos for the 
commemoration of our independence and the formation of this vast State, that, after 
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passing through periods of agitation, little by little came to develop its vital strengths and 
prosperity” which accompanied and helped evolve its progress. They should have 
witnessed parties and the “hymns of joy.” Instead, there was only “our population, 
worried and terrified, spending the day gazing upon the brutish attitude of a part of their 
fellow citizens” who acted “against the constituted and legal government.” A day 
negatively notable for the questions of the nation’s “sovereignty and confidence” was 
how that author viewed September 7.325 
It was therefore the specter of Brazil not measuring up to those defined societal 
markers—order, progress and material development—that loomed after the revolt’s 
defeat. A year prior, and one day into the revolt, a different cloud hung over the date of 
September 7th. Understandably, the revolt dominated the news of that day rather than any 
observance of the holiday, and what was written was infused with apprehension, 
uncertainty towards the outcome of the revolt, and concerns over the future of the 
Republic. One year later with the rebels defeated, writers turned again to questions of 
progress rather than survival. Overall there was a general concern for Brazil being a 
nation worthy of respect, a nation with “greatness… opulence…character.” Some found 
hope in the aforementioned consolidation of the nation’s institutions and found a way to 
link all of these themes together with the commemorative date of independence. One 
reflected that “if today we cannot commemorate the 7th of September as we would like to, 
we have faith that soon we will make it so that our country, in just a few years, will be 
attracting to us the attention of the entire world.” This same writer who said that it was 
                                                 




painful to commemorate Independence Day given the situation in the country 
nevertheless had absolute confidence in the trajectory of Brazil.326 
Another writer was also optimistic given the restoration of public order. He 
affirmed that Brazilians “should not fear neither the future nor that perturbation would 
continue in our country,” but he also conceded that the “ashes were still hot from this 
formidable fire” lit by a band of “reckless exploiters…promoting revolutions and 
disturbing public order.” The peace he envisioned would be one that reestablished 
republican institutions despite efforts against it and that was based on the people’s 
growing “understanding of their duties and recognition of their rights, loving the 
law…and respecting the legally constituted authority.” Of note is the portrayal of the 
maturation or awakening of the citizenry. Brazilian notions of an uneducated populace 
hemmed into subservience by the imperial government have already been presented in 
prior discussions. That preexisting line of thought simply continued in the post-revolt 
context. One writer used his “7 de Setembro” article on that day in 1894 to indict once 
again the imperial governmental apparatus as being a hindrance to the creation of a 
citizenry capable of governing itself and responding to the unexpected, i. e. a revolt, in 
the new Republic. In his words, Brazil had to overcome its past as an “empire, unitary 
and subservient to the stratagems of the emperor, who intervened in everything and 
commanded everything.” Hearkening back to the idea of the Republic, delayed, this 
author laid the blame for the nation’s instability at the feet of the empire asserting that 
Brazil would be better off in 1894 had its political and material progress not been 
“stymied” by the system of the past.327 





While these writers thereby typically took a dim view of the empire and the 
people’s political preparedness for democratic participation and national ascendancy 
prior to the revolt, some also wistfully looked back at the nation’s past, albeit while 
denying any credit to the monarchy, for the level of political stability that it enjoyed. 
With the revolt, all of that had changed, and those same writers referenced above shared a 
sense of Brazil being on the precipice of caudillism. The same authors who condemned 
the empire for the monarch’s unrelenting dominance simultaneously characterized 
Brazil’s past as a “triumphant march” of stability. And they were well aware that their 
past was in stark contrast with the experience of the rest of Latin America. One journalist 
cautioned against “abandoning the calm life to always follow [the next] military uprising 
that has so profoundly wounded and stymied the progress of the nation located in the 
Plata and all of those who live also in South America.” Another writer similarly 
referenced Brazil’s history, but he did so conceding the nation’s periods of agitation but 
describing the past as overall marked by “a long period of peace allowing us to always be 
moving forward, placing us side-by-side with the most respected nations of the world.” 
For him, it was through “the stability of the government (note that he did not say imperial 
government), the public riches…, the punctuality of our fulfillment of our commitments” 
that Brazil achieved such status. That stability mentioned above also gave Brazil the 
ability to “resolve serious questions” and “maintain its honor” and unity, thus serving as 
the backbone of the nation’s standing and its attainment of those markers of society. Like 
many before him, this writer also credited the abolition of slavery for propelling Brazil 
along in the fields of “industry and work” and for creating the preconditions necessary for 
a “beautiful future” of “wealth and expansion.” He concluded this vision by hitting all of 
271 
 
the high notes of positivist theory, stating that it was “certain that the nation’s evolution 
demanded in its political order” the fostering of the development of industry as well as 
“conquests in the arts, letters, and all the greatness that civilization has.” The same writer 
also noted the singularity of Brazil in the region for possessing those characteristics of 
stability and greatness: “sadly for the others in Latin America, Brazil was the exception 
to its brothers, and by chance only Chile and later the Republics of the Plata could place 
themselves alongside it.” That avoidance of the caudillism prevalent in Spanish America 
had previously averted the attendant crises associated with that instability. Ultimately the 
author credited Brazil in general with achieving that unusual stability while at the same 
time laying blame for the instability generated by the revolt at the feet of the empire in 
particular. What is of particular interest with this portrayal of the past is that there is 
absolutely no blame assigned to monarchists or monarchism for the revolt itself. There is 
a complete absence of any polemic in that regard. In an article focused on the nation’s 
day of independence historically centered on the royal action taken at Ipiranga, these 
authors focused exclusively on caudillism and not restoration as the driving force behind 
the revolt. They found “neither political ideal nor lofty thoughts” but instead only 
“individual concern and desire to disturb the peace, in the hope of seizing power from the 
government and imposing his will on the nation.” Ultimately, they defined the revolt as 
the attempt by caudillos to establish themselves in Brazil. That was the message on 
September 7. 328 
One last important theme that emerged from some of the discourse surrounding 
the Independence Day after the naval revolt’s defeat was the new tendency to link that 
effort and success to those of 1822. We have already looked at evidence showing the 




earlier republican efforts to draw a direct line backwards into history from the 
proclamation of the Republic of 1889 to the achievement of political independence in 
1822 (and with May 13th in between). The purpose of these attempts was as much to 
legitimize the new regime as it was to try to circumvent the imperial historical period. 
Into this backdrop of contested historical lineage entered the government’s victory over 
the revolt. That struggle came to be perceived as the testing ground that forged in battle 
Brazilian understandings of citizenship and consolidated the Republic. The relative ease 
of achieving independence and the complete absence of any fight to implant the Republic 
in 1889 had meant that very few Brazilians had ever done battle to usher in a political 
regime, a reality some writers previously pointed out. In some ways, the naval revolt 
became a surrogate for that missing struggle, and it also became another means of 
connecting the Republic back to the origins of the nation and independence. 
For the authors analyzed, the popular struggle to consolidate the Republic in the 
face of insurrection and political destabilization was akin to the Brazilian independence 
movement that achieved political liberation from Portugal. The Republic succeeded in 
overcoming the rebels’ “political ambitions and the anarchists of all types who infest our 
country.” Again, it was not the monarchists who were to blame for the attack against the 
government, nor was it the monarchy they noted in their depictions of Brazil’s fight for 
independence. Both the Republic and the organic Brazilian independence movement that 
pre-dated Pedro I faced existential outside threats, and both overcame them to continue 
Brazil on its path. Only for them, that path followed a direct line from independence to 
the Republic with blips like the empire and the revolt along the way. It was a powerful 
rhetorical tool to be able to “give honor to the patriots of 1822” while holding up the 
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patriotism of everyday Brazilians standing against the rebel invasions of Niteroi. The 
revolt had afforded the Republic an opportunity to further the construction of both the 
state and the nation. Floriano Peixoto’s victory over the navy—and any antagonistic 
leader in the provinces—exalted the state over its constituent institutions. More 
importantly, it allowed the president of the federal government to assert his centralized 
authority in the name of the Brazilian people. This reality legitimized sovereignty in the 
people of Brazil and, in essence, made the new democratic republic governable. Thus, 
amidst a great deal of wariness and insecurity over Brazil’s loss of standing and internal 
stability stood also a palpable desire—and characteristic Brazilian optimism—for a return 
to greatness and confidence.329 
 
Later Media References and the Final Proposal for Removal 
 
Apparently, no one publically considered the removal of the statue of Pedro I to 
be part of that path to reclaimed greatness. The topic of the statue’s future disappeared 
from the pages of the Rio newspapers again until 1895 when a writer for the Gazeta de 
Notícias referenced it in a commentary on an impassioned point made in that paper’s 
ideological sparring partner, O Paiz. One writer for the latter, signed as “A. A.,” used the 
paper’s “Palestra” section to rail against the literal whitewashing of the Aqueducto da 
Carioca. Angered by the painting white of the “friendly old marble” of the city’s historic 
aqueduct for a lowly cognac advertisement, A. A. longed for a public outcry. He pointed 
to prior public outrage born out of an attempt by the authorities to demolish the historic 
fountain at the Largo da Carioca and lamented that there had been no such similar 
response to the aqueduct’s whitewashing. Such a call to protest struck the Gazeta writer 




as odd and hypocritical. He commented on A. A.’s indignation, saying that “this sacred 
love for archeology and for historical monuments” was “well placed in a culture of art.” 
This praise quickly turned to confrontation, however. Speaking to (or at least at) that 
writer, he asked whether his “colleague could not communicate” that “love” or 
appreciation “to some of his co-believers who carry the Iconoclast furor up to the 
demolition of the statue of Pedro I?”330 This writer’s commentary reiterated many others’ 
warnings about the slippery slope involved in one group imposing its vision of historical 
or political correctness on a historical monument as well as how messy and complex 
history, memory, and tradition could be. The pointing out that a member of a group who 
advocated for the erasing of Pedro’s statue from the public square could rant about how 
the aqueduct looked shorter and less picturesque after the whitewashing captured that 
very complexity. This commentary also revealed that the proposed threat to the statue’s 
continuation in the square remained on some journalists’ minds, and it remained a point 
of contention in the battle over sovereignty, history, and memory. 
The statue and its proposed destruction did not reemerge in Rio’s journalistic 
sphere again until 1898 when two separate individuals wrote in to smaller publications 
with very distinct agendas. The first was published by O Apostolo in May from a reader 
referred to as a “collaborador” commenting on the topic of instructional reforms in 
Brazil’s schools. The writer found the current social, political, and educational questions 
in 1898 to be similar to earlier ones dating back to 1890 and the “birth” of Brazil’s “new 
form of government.” He even quoted from some of his own writing at that earlier time, 
in which he indicted the changes instituted by the new regime as “the most absurd 
reforms, the clumsiest innovations, [and] the most insane resolutions.” He found the 
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efforts to construct “the new republican pavilion” and transform the nation decidedly 
malevolent, articulating that each of the targets of those reforms and innovations had 
become the “victim of the evil of destruction.” Within this early republican context, the 
author noted that “the idea of the destruction of the statue of D. Pedro I appeared” and 
specifically referred to the Mendonça proposal of that time. He engaged Mendonça’s and 
his cohorts’ historical view of the statue, characterizing it as the viewpoint that the 
monument “flaunted” being out of step with the “new republican form” and served as an 
affront to “national decorum.” The author described the statue as having “escaped” from 
being “washed down the drain” in what he perceived to be the casting off of Brazilian 
history and tradition in 1890. These early contests over national memory—both general 
and specific to the statue—are what came to this author’s mind in 1898 in the context of 
proposed educational reforms. The “collaborador” wrote in response to the journal’s 
published accounts of the government’s reform of curriculum, most notably and 
controversially the removal of religion from that curriculum. He found the idea of 
“instructing without religion” to be “repulsive” and warned of the impact on Brazil’s 
society that the “nullification of faith” and an undeveloped “conscience” would have.331 
That a writer would protest the secularization of education in Brazil in a letter published 
in a Catholic publication is not particularly notable. But the fact that that writer would 
employ the example of the statue’s proposed destruction eight years prior in an argument 
against continued government reform is. It shows that by later in the 1890s the statue and 
its survival in the public square had become…in some quarters… a symbol of republican 
overreach. 
                                                 
331 O Apostolo, May 29, 1898, “Religião e Nova Escola.” 
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Thus the Mendonça proposal continued to pop up here and there in Rio’s public 
discourse despite the fact that it had died a quiet death in the nation’s legislature. Perhaps 
that fact drove one more politician to give the idea another try. Or, perhaps it was just the 
means by which a journalist could sarcastically poke fun of a disliked politician. In July 
of 1898, the publication Cidade do Rio noted in its “Varias Notícias” section that a 
Senator Caiado would soon present a project to “demolish” the statue of Pedro I and raise 
money to replace it with a bust of Lombriga Canivete in appreciation “for the relevant 
services [he] rendered to those who frequent the Largo do Rocio.”332 This politician 
named in the article was Senator Antonio José Caiado who represented the state of Goias 
in the nation’s legislature after a prominent history of service in his home state. Several 
factors lead me to the conclusion that the “news” of this proposal was most likely an act 
of what is referred to today as “trolling.” First, the location of the notification of the 
proposal was in the “Cidade Nova” section known for its use of satire to comment on the 
politics and society of the day. Senator Caiado was a frequent subject of this section, 
appearing in various anecdotes seven different times in the span of a year. He appeared in 
a book review (For example, how do you know a book is good? Because it made Senator 
Caiado feel..), a lunch-time anecdote, various “overheard” conversations, and this 
proposal.333 The Cidade do Rio was not even the only newspaper to single him out in that 
way. The Gazeta de Notícias commented on the senator’s request for a two month leave 
of absence from the legislature in Rio on the grounds that he was “ill” by saying that 
                                                 
332 Cidade do Rio, July 25, 1898, “Ciadade Nova,” “Varias Noticias.” 
333 An obituary for Senator Caiado in O Paiz notes that he had helped found the liberal party in Goias, had 
been a vice president of the province during the Empire, had been elected president of the state after the 
Republic’s founding, and served Commandante Superior of the state’s National Guard. See O Paiz, August 
9, 1899. For the senator’s appearances in “Cidade Nova,” see Cidade do Rio, 1897,  August 30, September 
3 and 23, November 19, and December 4 and 22.  
277 
 
what had him infirmed was the upcoming elections in Goias. This newspaper provided 
updates on many of Caiado’s actions, from challenging and replacing the previous 
directory of the Federal Republican Party, to getting an official in Goias fired because of 
his party affiliation, to playing a role in linking Catholic and dissident republican groups 
together to oppose anticlerical policies.334 The last reason for skepticism towards this 
supposed news item is the statue’s proposed replacement. There is no known figure 
named “Lombriga Canivete.” And worse, by this time in the city’s history, the “sordid 
and shady side” of Praça Tiradentes was well-known for being a place “frequented” often 
by prostitutes.335 The “services rendered” included in the write-up could very well be an 
allusion to those very specific frequenters of the praça. All in all, this 1898 proposal 
reference appears to be a thinly veiled inside joke and insult to Senator Caiado. There is 
no indication that any similar proposal was mentioned in any other publication, and it 
certainly did not generate a public discussion. Instead, it faded into oblivion as well and 
the newspaper lost its frequent target when the senator passed away a year later. 
Nevertheless, this example does shed insight once again into the ways in which the 
statue’s removal had become a distinct rhetorical or even satirical tool used by Rio 
writers to comment, often critically, on the ideas of others. After this instance of the use 




Pedro I’s statue had won that war of attrition, but it nevertheless ended up being 
part of a discussion six years later triggered by the city authorities’ ongoing efforts to 
                                                 
334 Gazeta de Notícias, 1897, April 6, May 18, June 2, June 12. 
335 Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, O Rio de Janeiro e Suas Praças (Rio de Janeiro: RIOTUR—
Empresa de Turismo do Município do Rio de Janeiro S. A., 1988), 6-10. 
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reshape the capital’s physical and monumental landscape. In a protest that will again 
sound decidedly familiar, a writer signed “A. V.” again wove the issue of the statue of the 
emperor into the debate over another structure’s proposed removal in 1904. The statuary 
in question this time was the fountain designed by Grandjean de Montigny during the 
Empire and located in the Praça Onze de Junho of that time. In part of his protest against 
the removal of that fountain, the writer defended the importance of the conscious and 
historical placing of the city’s monuments and made clear that he was wary of them 
“losing their place” in the city and its historical record. This wariness towards the setting 
of such precedence is evident in his assertion that “tomorrow someone will be reminded 
to move the statue of Pedro I for another point in the city.” His trepidation went beyond 
just the city’s first and controversial statue to include the warning that the future could 
see “those of José Bonifácio, José de Alencar, Osorio, Caxias, etc.” moved as well. Many 
writers before him felt just as strongly about the implications of making what was to be 
permanent transitory instead, and he also included those Republican monuments in his 
warning to help make his point that removing imperial structures would inevitably make 
the current regime’s memorials vulnerable as well. A. V. concluded his piece by using 
another common refrain. He pleaded for the government of the Republic to leave the 
fountain “in peace” and think of “things more useful” to do.336 
By 1911 there was more evidence that both the public and the politicians had 
moved on from the question of removing imperial statues. The passage of time and the 
approach of the nation’s centennial celebration had begun to affect both of those groups. 
Rather than discussions in the papers about the statue of the first emperor, the details and 
lead-up to the inauguration of a new statue honoring the second emperor in Petrópolis 
                                                 
336 A Noticia, November 30-December 1, 1904, “Sito Restaurado.” 
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dominated the discourse of the day.337 In creating—rather than destroying or removing—
an homage to Pedro II and thereby the empire, the powers-that-be were signaling that in 
some ways they and the nation were moving on. And they were ultimately leaving the 



















                                                 
337 A Noticia, February 6-7, 1911, “A estatua de D. Pedro II.” 
Figure 13: Shared historical space made permanent in Rio de Janeiro. 
Photo by author. 
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Chapter Six:                                                                        
Conclusion 
 I set out in my research to explain how a nation remembers a controversial yet 
fundamental historical figure. At the time that I began this study, political pundits and 
presidential historians were frequently being asked on television whether George W. 
Bush would be remembered as the worst president in United States history. With my 
prior experience studying Brazil’s Pedro I, I began to look on that topic of discussion in a 
new way. What if the founding political figure of the United States had been as much 
George W. Bush as George Washington? How would that have affected our national 
identity and sense of history? While we as historians typically shun “what if’s,” it was 
precisely this contextualization that set me on the path of this study. 
 As an historical figure, Pedro I is a mixed bag. As the figurehead of independence 
and the first Emperor of Brazil, he has a legitimate claim to an iconic level of fame and 
standing in the history of that nation. As a political leader perceived as foreign and 
despotic and run out of town, he has a stain on his record which adds a level also of 
infamy and calls into question the legitimacy of that historical standing. This complicated 
legacy has existed since April 7, 1831 when Pedro I abdicated his throne, and Brazilian 
intellectuals and politicians have been grappling with it going back even further than that 
date. At stake in this contestation of memory and history is the fundamental question: 
what historically makes Brazil, Brazil? This study, through the lens of the legacy of 
Pedro I and his statue in Rio de Janeiro, provides new insight into the components that go 
into answering that question, namely how a people understand their nation’s origins and 
history and how that understanding informs the process of the construction of national 
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identity amidst notions of nationalism, the articulation of the nation-state, and the pursuit 
of the idealized modern nation.  
 No comprehensive study of the historical legacy of Pedro I exists. There are 
multiple biographies of the first emperor to represent every historiographical generation 
of scholars, but those biographies are naturally limited to perceptions of him during his 
lifetime. Many Brazilian scholars are similarly engaged in a detailed examination of the 
First Reign. Because of its notoriety as the nation’s first public monument, the statue of 
Pedro I has generated many articles and chapters within larger works looking at topics 
such as the public display of state power and contested views of the past and the 
construction of political and social legitimacy in both the contexts of the Empire itself 
and later the Republic. In many cases, the statue and Pedro I end up being a relatively 
small part of the larger discussion and analysis taking place in these studies. Since this 
study looks across time and regimes, it can provide more extensive and additional 
primary source research and synthesis to begin to provide that missing long—term 
exploration of Pedro I’s legacy while at the same time informing the continuing work on 
those larger theoretical and conceptual topics.  
 
Research Questions and Summative Findings: the Imperial Era 
 
The fundamental research question that drove the analysis of the rhetoric of 1862 
was how writers originally defined the legacy of Pedro I at the time of his statue’s 
inauguration and in the context of the imperial rule of his son. The answer was that Pedro 
I was overwhelmingly defined by the Empire’s supporters as the proclaimer of Brazil’s 
independence and the author of the nation’s constitution, just as the imperial project and 
the careful selecting of the statue’s imagery intended in order to glorify the nation and its 
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origins. The rhetoric shows that his exploits in Portugal heavily influenced Brazilian 
notions of Pedro I as a soldier, a hero, and a magnanimous father.  
Secondly, I wanted to understand what the public discourse surrounding the statue 
inauguration showed about how the elites conceptualized the legitimacy of the imperial 
regime and how it impacted the construction of a national founding narrative. For the 
empire’s elites, the legitimacy of the state stemmed from the people’s acclaim for their 
royal sovereign and his accomplishments and stewardship of the Empire. That was the 
driving force behind the “national project” undertaken by the intellectual elite and the 
reason why the statue was conceived of to glorify specifically the nation’s origins. On the 
other hand, critics refuted each of those celebrated identities and presented a counter-
narrative that emphasized a bottom-up and thoroughly Brazilian interpretation of history, 
a vision that would be advanced after the proclamation of the Republic amidst the need to 
assert a new popular and decidedly Brazilian sovereignty. From this perspective, Pedro I 
was a conniving royal opportunist and tyrant who thwarted the will of the people by 
superimposing himself onto a preexisting independence movement. Similarly, Pedro II 
was an out-of-touch old monarch out of sync with the world of modern republics. The 
negotiations between these two extremes would play out throughout the latter decades of 
the Empire’s existence and the first decade of the Republic’s. 
Lastly, the 1862 sources analyzed led me to one other question regarding the 
Brazilian imperial definition of Pedro I. The overarching presence of references to his 
exploits in Portugal prompted an investigation into the impact that Pedro I’s dual legacies 
in the national trajectories of both Brazil and Portugal had on how writers in Rio de 
Janeiro defined him. I find that Pedro’s role in defeating the absolutist army of his brother 
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Miguel and reinstating the limited and constitutional rule of his daughter Maria II 
rehabilitated and redeemed interpretations of his Brazilian legacy. It provided him a 
second act and a way to prove himself over again after being forced from power in 
Brazil. His sacrifices on the battlefield in Portugal earned him military credentials and 
sympathy, neither of which would ever have been a part of his memorial legacy in Brazil 
if his story ended as simply an exile.  
 
Research Questions and Summative Findings: the Early Republic 
 
 The political rupture that occurred on November 15, 1889 allows for many of the 
questions above to be reformulated to explore the impact that the proclamation of the 
Republic had on how people remembered Pedro I and how they approached his statue. 
The first question addressed was how did republican elites after the proclamation of the 
Republic respond to the public and civic representations of imperial sovereignty in 
general and the existence of the statue in the public square in particular. The sources 
analyzed show that some attempted to eradicate the imperial presence in the public 
sphere by replacing imperial denominations, dedicated space, and civic narratives with 
republican ones, but they were confronted with the difficult reality of the massive statue’s 
presence in the public square and at most a pre-existing sense of a national collective 
identity and at least a sense of national history and tradition. The covering of the statue 
on Tiradentes Day generated a great deal of criticism for a wide range of reasons while 
the lack of success on the part of proponents of moving the statue from the public’s eye 
ultimately reveals the government’s complete lack of will to remove the nation’s first 
monument. All in all, the republican backlash against the presence of an imperial statue 
in their Republic’s public square as evidenced in the proposals to remove the statue was 
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relatively tame and consistent in nature. So was the government’s and public’s rejection 
of those calls. 
 The second research question focuses primarily on the aftermath of the statue’s 
covering. In light of the bandstand incident, how did writers publicly view the Empire’s 
legacy in general and Pedro I’s in particular? In addition, what were the different views 
on how to remember the imperial past? The evidence shows that some considered the 
Empire’s legacy a dangerous one and sought to extirpate all vestiges of it, up to and 
including the removal of the statue from the square. Some considered the traditions of the 
past to be indicative of a people’s sense of self and history and sought to preserve some 
elements of it. The discussions reveal an increasingly sophisticated view of Pedro I. 
Writers could engage with the questions of his political and personal shortcomings 
without necessarily feeling compelled to repudiate his role in history in full. While there 
was some evidence of wholesale repudiation of his standing in the pantheon of the nation, 
the larger discourse points to many in the elite intellectually coming to terms—in one 
way or another—with a past that included important civic moments marked by royal 
participation. 
 The final question that drove my analysis of Brazil in the 1890s focused on what 
we can learn about how republican elites conceptualized the legitimacy of their new 
regime and how those ideas impacted previous understandings of nation’s past. The 
answers to these questions lie in the rhetoric involved in those discussions of the past, the 
statue, and commemorative dates from the imperial era. For the more radicalized 
members of the republican elite, their political legitimation was a zero-sum game. There 
was either total republican political legitimacy and its requisite popular sovereignty, or 
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there was a menacing and lingering imperial institutional threat with ongoing royal 
sovereignty and popular subordination (or stupefaction). For the moderates, however, a 
sense of a middle ground existed in which the Empire could be acknowledged without it 
posing an existential threat to the viability of the republican nation-state. 
 
Overall Conclusions and Perceptions 
 
 What this study repeatedly brings to light is the inherent anxiety that political 
actors feel in times of political change. It is this anxiety which drives new leaders and 
regimes to raise monuments commemorating prior figures or moments that lend 
legitimacy and glory to the nation and the state. Thus, the erecting of statues and other 
symbolic representations of power is as much, if not more, about the living as it is the 
dead. Specifically, it is about the elites who raise them and the political landscape at the 
moment as much as it is about the figures or moments memorialized. This reality is why 
a study of Emperor Pedro I’s legacy resulted in three chapters involving the first decade 
of the Republic.  
 That political and intellectual climate of the 1890s was also ripe with lessons 
greater in scope than that one decade. It shows that ideological questioning and purity 
tests can—and do—occur anywhere, anytime, and over anything. That the covering of a 
bandstand and the public response to it could initiate a litmus test for republicanism 
speaks loudly to this point. Similarly, the study shows that there are no easy answers 
when it comes to acknowledging the past without offending contemporary sensibilities. 
This negotiation is timeless, as evidenced by this study being completed at exactly the 
same moment that public institutions across the United States are trying to decide what to 
do with relics of their Confederate past. Yet what the writers in the 1890s showed, so 
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often eloquently, was that even amidst a tense political context, intellectuals are ever-
ready to engage in the larger meanings of events, no matter how seemingly small, and 




 Brazilian history does not end in 1898. Therefore, the long-term legacy of Pedro I 
requires further study. My ongoing research is prompting me to look at the intriguing 
question as to why the remains of the first Emperor were asked for and received by a 
Brazilian government in 1972 but not 1922 when the remains of Pedro II were brought 
back and enshrined in the city of Petrópolis. Just as the regime change that occurred in 
1889 provided a charged political environment surrounding civic remembrances and 
commemorations, a study of 1972 will shed light onto the impact of the military 
dictatorship on the sesquicentennial celebration of independence and the particular vision 
of the nation that the regime sought to project to its people and the world. It also will 
provide the opportunity to explore the relationship between Brazil and Portugal as it 
relates to those two dictatorships’ ties to each other and their approach to public imagery 
and memory. I also intend to investigate how, of all places, the nation would decide to 
house a museum to honor the reign of the nation’s first emperor (and empress) in the 
residence of his mistress. The shift in focus will allow me to use that issue of the 
repatriation of Pedro I’s remains to continue these discussions across more political 
cleavages as his statue became less provocative of commentary in the public sphere. 
There are considerable holdings in the National Library and National Archives that will 
provide a wide range of sources to analyze.                                                           
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The peregrination of the mortal remains of Pedro I across all parts of Brazil in the 
lead up to his entombment in the Monument to Independence in São Paulo on September 
7, 1972 will allow me to begin to redress the Rio-centric nature of this study. I 
additionally plan on exploring how the different regional identities and historical 
experiences within Brazil impacted those societies’ perceptions of the nation’s first 
emperor. The historiography has documented a distinct sense of internal colonialism on 
the part of the government and society seated in Rio de Janeiro towards those localities, 
so this will be an important aspect of my future research. I also want to expand my 
research into whether or not Pedro I’s historical experience in Brazil similarly influenced 
how Portuguese commentators defined him in 1866 at the time of the inauguration of his 
statue located in Portugal. 
 
Ultimately, this study of how Pedro I was remembered in moments of symbolic 
importance for the nation during both the Empire and Republic will serve as an important 
starting point for this future scholarship and will help to provide greater evidence and 
insight into the ways that national memory becomes highly politicized in the search for 
identity and legitimacy. The imperial statue that perseveres in Praça Tiradentes to this 
day testifies to the contestation over and eventual resolution of the historical space and 
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